1997 April A Dewan

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The Thomist Vol. 61 (1997): 279-300

ST. THOMAS, LYING, AND VENIAL SIN

Lawrence Dewan, O.P.

Collège Dominicain

Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

Is it good to tell a harmless lie in order to save a life? Immanuel Kant held that it is very bad, for even though the lie does no immediate harm to the individuals involved, the liar is doing all he can to undermine the basis of law and contracts.⁽¹⁾ Thomas Aquinas, following St. Augustine's lead, had a much less severe judgment in the matter. While he held that all lying is bad, what he called a "sin" (peccatum),⁽²⁾ nevertheless a harmless lie to save a life is only a venial sin, not a mortal sin. Still, some interpreters of Thomas would like to eliminate even this stricture, and to do so, they sometimes attempt to redefine the event of which Thomas is speaking.⁽³⁾ I am afraid that, in so doing, they tend to undermine our identification of species of sin. They cast doubt on the validity of moral taxonomy. I wonder if this is not, in part, due to a failure to understand the nature of venial sin. Accordingly, I propose here to recall some features of Thomas's doctrine of venial sin, and see how it applies to the discussion of lying.

I. Venial Sin

The distinction between venial sin and mortal sin is not directly about species of sin. What is in kind a venial sin can be done in such a way as to make it mortal, and what is in kind a mortal sin can be done in such a way as to make it venial. However, there are kinds of sin that by virtue of their very kind are mortal, and kinds that are venial.⁽⁴⁾ A mortal sin is one that goes contrary to the inclination to the true ultimate end, eternal beatitude. A venial sin is one that is not thus contrary. The result of a mortal sin is that the spiritual principle of life within the person, namely, grace and charity, is eliminated. Accordingly, the person does not have the inner resources to live spiritually. Such a sin has, as its appropriate punishment, perpetual banishment from beatitude. On the other hand, a venial sin does not eliminate or even decrease charity, and so one can repair oneself spiritually. The appropriate punishment is of limited duration.⁽⁵⁾

Thomas views the entire moral life as the movement of the rational creature towards union with God in the beatific eternal life.⁽⁶⁾ The acts that move us in that direction are those which are in accordance with reason, whereby we are in God's image.⁽⁷⁾ Thus, the entire moral enterprise is seen as enlivened by charity: that is, the love of God as source of beatitude, the love of oneself as capable of union with God in beatitude, the love of one's neighbor as capable of association with us in beatitude.⁽⁸⁾

God is the ultimate end.⁽⁹⁾ Creatures are "for the ultimate end."⁽¹⁰⁾

Thus, if one acts in such a way as to give a creature the status of the ultimate end, one commits a mortal sin.⁽¹¹⁾ If one treats a creature according to its true status in the scheme of things, there is no sin.⁽¹²⁾ Where, then, does venial sin come in? One can tend towards a creature in a way that is somewhat disorderly, and yet not make it the ultimate end. One retains one's love for the true ultimate end (see Appendix 1),⁽¹³⁾ even though one tends towards a creature in a somewhat disorderly way--disorderly, that is, from the viewpoint of reason.

Reason is the key to moral life, because it constitutes the proper nature of man. A thing is good inasmuch as it acts in accordance with its nature, and so man is good inasmuch as he is reasonable.⁽¹⁴⁾ And reason itself determines right action by considering the natures of things and their proper roles, one with respect to another. We are supposed to treat things, including ourselves, in accordance with their natures.⁽¹⁵⁾

Indeed, reason is that whereby we are united to God,⁽¹⁶⁾

and our treatment of natures as they deserve constitutes already a social relation to the author of nature.⁽¹⁷⁾

Thus, Thomas teaches that all acts of injustice, acts that truly harm our neighbor, such as murder or theft, are mortally sinful. They are against charity. They do not treat the neighbor according to his proper nobility in the divine scheme.⁽¹⁸⁾

Suppose we contrast a mortal and a venial sin. One act of simple fornication (i.e., non-contraceptive reproductive activity by people who are not married at all), is a mortal sin, because it is against the welfare of the child who could be conceived: such a child, having no father, will be handicapped as regards its entire life. On the other hand, one act of overeating is a venial sin. It is the expression of an excessive appetite for food, that is, an appetite not in accordance with reason. However, one such act does no great harm, and certainly not for the whole of anyone's life (see Appendix 2).⁽¹⁹⁾

Accordingly, when Thomas distinguishes between mortal and venial sin, the contrast is great. Indeed, he tells us that there is an infinite difference between them.

sins do not differ infinitely on the side of the turning towards the changeable good (in which the substance of the act consists); but they differ infinitely on the side of the turning away [involved]. For some sins are committed by turning away from the ultimate end, whereas some [are committed] by disorder having to do with those things which are for the end. Now, the ultimate end differs infinitely from those things which are for the end.⁽²⁰⁾

Furthermore, confronted with an adversary who cites Augustine's definition of sin (a thought, word, or deed against the eternal law), an adversary who argues that since what is against the eternal law is mortal sin, all sin is mortal sin, Thomas replies that the word "sin" is said analogically of mortal and venial sin. Venial sin does not correspond perfectly to the idea of sin. Just as "a being" is said of both substance and accident, but of substance by priority, of accident merely in a secondary way, so also "sin" is so said of the mortal and the venial. Venial sin is not "against the eternal law" [contra legem]. Thus, Augustine's definition applies properly only to mortal sin. Venial sin is "out of step" with law [praeter legem], since law always prescribes that things be done according to reason. Venial sin lacks the reasonableness that law promotes. Still--and this should be stressed--no law prohibits venial sin, even though it is not something licit. As Thomas says, "someone sinning venially does not do what the law prohibits, or fail to do that to which the law by precept obliges."⁽²¹⁾

In this same line of thinking, we should hesitate even to say that venial sin is "bad." At least, we must recognize that "bad" is said in different ways. Thus, Thomas tells us: "venial sins do not exclude the spiritual good, which is the grace of God or charity. Hence, they are not called 'bad,' unqualifiedly [malum simpliciter], but in a qualified sense [secundum quid]."⁽²²⁾

A further gauge of the proper weight to be assigned to venial sins is the teaching that, for them to be forgiven, there is not even need that one think of them individually. Any actual charitable movement of the mind towards God includes the repudiation of all such "being out of step" with the divine plan. Still, one ought to have the ambition to cut down on such sin; otherwise one stands in danger of failing. Repeatedly sinning venially is seen as a "disposition" toward mortal sin.⁽²³⁾

II. Lying

How does lying stand with respect to sin, mortal and venial? Here Thomas distinguishes between two intentions on the part of the speaker: (1) the intention to say what is false, and (2) the intention, by so doing, to deceive someone. It is the first that is formal (i.e., essential) for the lie. The second is the lie's proper perfection, so to speak (something distinct from, but normally accompanying, the essence).⁽²⁴⁾

Thomas teaches that every lie is a sin, using the word sin to cover both venial and mortal. The reason is that words are naturally ordered to the manifestation of truth. Accordingly, to use words to express the false is an abuse of nature. In no circumstances, then, is a lie licit. Thomas makes the argument very carefully, so as to arrive at a universal ban on lying:

that which is in itself bad in kind, can in no way be good and licit, because in order that something be good, it is required that all [factors] rightly concur: "for the good is from the complete cause, while the bad is from any particular defect," as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 4 [no. 30 (PG 3:729)].

But a lie is bad in kind. For it is an act falling upon undue matter, for since spoken words are naturally signs of thoughts, it is unnatural and undue that someone signify by speech that which he does not have in mind. Hence, the Philosopher [Aristotle] says in Nicomachean Ethics 4 [7 (1127a28)] that "the lie is in itself bad [pravum] and to be avoided; the true is good and praiseworthy."

Hence, "every lie is a sin," as Augustine also says, in the book Against the Lie [1 (PL 40:519); 21 (40:547)].⁽²⁵⁾

This article is the occasion for Thomas to treat of the perennial "Gestapo question": what is one to say to the murderous agent of an unjust regime, asking about the presence of a victim one is hiding in one's house? His answer is quite simply that one ought not to lie, no matter what the consequences. He indicates that evasiveness should be exploited, but lying is not a thing to do. The argument of the objector interestingly tries compare lying to amputation for health:

The lesser evil is to be chosen so that one avoid the greater evil, as for example the medical practitioner amputates the member lest the entire body be corrupted. But it is a lesser harm that someone give rise to a false opinion in the mind of someone than that someone kill or be killed. Therefore, a man can licitly lie so as to preserve one [person] from homicide and preserve another [person] from death.

We notice, in this argument, the social character of veracity and lying; it measures the harm one does to one's neighbor by lying.

Thomas replies:

It is to be said that the lie does not have the character of sin solely from the harm it inflicts on one's neighbor, but [already] from its own disorder, as has been said. But it is not licit [non licet] to make use of some illicit disorder [aliqua illicita inordinatione] in order to impede the harms and deficiencies of others; just as it is not permitted to steal in order that a man engage in almsgiving, save perhaps in the case of necessity in which all things are in common [ownership]. And so it is not permissible to tell a lie in order that one free another from any peril whatsoever. Nevertheless it is permissible to hide the truth prudently under some dissimulation, as Augustine says in the book Against the Lie. [10 (PL 40:553); cf. also On Lying, c. 10 (PL 40:501)].⁽²⁶⁾

We see that the conception of the lie as a sin is very much tied to the right use of things (i.e., use in conformity with their own natures). Just as one should not allow one's appetites (e.g., one's anger or one's desire for wealth)⁽²⁷⁾ to be out of line with the reasonable, so one ought not to allow one's speech to be out of line with its reasonable condition.⁽²⁸⁾

But is every lie a mortal sin? Definitely not. Reminding us that a mortal sin is an act contrary to the charity by which we love God and our neighbor, Thomas presents a discussion in which we can see the many possibilities involved in lying. We can see mortal sins of lying, (1) considering the lie just in itself, or (2) considering the further intention one has in lying, or (3) considering some incidental feature of the situation.

Most important for our topic is the presentation of the lie "just in itself." Thomas will present a hierarchy of types of lie. It seems that the word lie, from the viewpoint of moral taxonomy, requires the same sort of care as does soul in Aristotle's De anima. Soul does not name one kind of thing only, but a hierarchy of forms, some more perfect than others.⁽²⁹⁾ So too, here, there is a hierarchy of lies. To consider the lie "in itself," one looks directly at what it talks about: "ex ipsa falsa significatione," from the false meaning itself. Suppose one lies about God. That is a mortal sin. Suppose one lies about the nature of things, or about moral formation. That is a mortal sin, though less grave. Suppose one lies about a contingent truth, such that the person to whom one speaks is not harmed by it. That is a venial sin.⁽³⁰⁾

We see, then, that it would be wrong to say, "lying is only a venial sin." There are types of lie that are mortal sins, and there is a type of lie that is a venial sin.

This hierarchy should be related to Thomas's conception of the proper perfection of the human mind. Thomas himself does not make this comparison in the text of the question on lying, but I believe it is the relevant, and indeed crucial, background. It is not simply knowledge of any contingent fact that constitutes what properly perfects the mind.⁽³¹⁾

Rather, it is (1) the truth about God, the author of reality; (2) truth about the permanent features of reality (the species of things, the objects of science); and (3) truth about morals: these are the things we naturally desire to know. Thomas presents Adam, prior to the Fall, as perfect in the order of knowledge of science and morals (though not yet at the ultimate goal). Yet Adam was not thought to know "how many pebbles are at the bottom of this or that stream."⁽³²⁾ So also, in teaching about the communication among angels Thomas distinguishes carefully between the speech that is properly called "illumination" and the speech that is "merely speech." The former communicates truth concerning God and the nature of things. The latter speaks merely of what depends on the will of this or that creature.⁽³³⁾

Thus, lies about things that pertain to the proper perfection of the human mind are against justice and charity. They are mortal sins. A lie, on the other hand, that is false concerning contingent truth not pertaining to the person addressed is a venial sin. It is a disorder merely touching on a created good, a thing "for the end" (ad finem) and not the ultimate end. It is the conception of the mind and its proper perfection that allow us to assess the gravity of this sin, and find it "venial."

It is only after he has presented the types of lie that are, in themselves, mortal and venial that Thomas raises the question of the further intention, that is, an end in view beyond the lie itself. It is here that we have the famous triad of lies: malicious, jocose, and officious (or out of kindness). Obviously, lies that aim to injure are mortal sins, but lies that are in themselves venial, and are performed to amuse, are venial. And even less grave than the comic lie is the kind lie, where one's motive is actually to help someone. This should be underlined. The so-called officious lie--the lie out of kindness, the lie to save lives--is of even less moral importance than the comic lie which, by the way it is told, is meant to deceive no one.

Lastly, to leave nothing out, Thomas reminds us that there is always the possibility of a situation that will turn any lie into a mortal sin (e.g., if it could cause scandal under the circumstances).⁽³⁴⁾

Most illuminating is his treatment of the Egyptian midwives, who lied to Pharaoh in order to save the male infants of Israel from death. He treats this first in the discussion of whether every lie is a sin. The Book of Exodus tells us that God rewarded the midwives by building them houses.⁽³⁵⁾ Surely they were not rewarded for sin! Thomas replies that they were rewarded for their reverence for God and benevolence toward the Israelites. They were not rewarded for the lie itself, which followed upon this good will. In this Thomas is echoing St. Augustine.⁽³⁶⁾

However, much more is said in the context of the question, is every lie a mortal sin? An adversary, contending that every lie is a mortal sin, appeals to St. Gregory. The idea is that the good will of the midwives would ordinarily merit for them an eternal reward. However, they receive a terrestrial reward. Thus, the lie must be the occasion for losing the eternal reward, and so must be a mortal sin (and if even such a lie is a mortal sin, what lie is not?). Thomas, in his reply, denies that the midwives lost their eternal reward. Rather, for their good will they did merit eternal life. Thus St. Jerome has interpreted the "houses" as an eternal dwelling-place. Thomas even opines that they might have received terrestrial houses as a reward for the lie itself (that is how Gregory ought to be interpreted). Thomas had already said, in an earlier discussion of rewards, that merely terrestrial goods are not "rewards" properly so called. But he definitely sees the midwives as meriting eternal life, and the lie does not deprive them of that.⁽³⁷⁾ This is in keeping with his doctrine that venial sins do not eliminate or even diminish charity and grace.⁽³⁸⁾

If we apply this solution to our modern question about lying to the Gestapo to save the Jewish family we are hiding, the answer of Thomas is that we should not tell a lie, even a harmless lie. To do so would be a venial sin, and one should never commit a venial sin, no matter what good might come of it. However, given the human condition, most good people, most saints (we might even say), will tell the lie, that is, will commit the venial sin.⁽³⁹⁾ For their charity, which consists in their good will toward their neighbors, God will reward them with eternal life. It is even possible that for the venial sin God might reward them with some terrestrial goods, though that is hardly of interest to such people.

III. Really Bad?

Now, thus far my aim has been to show how minor a moral fault a venial sin is, and this venial sin in particular. I did say that venial sins could only be called "bad" in a qualified sense of the word. However, to the extent that I have succeeded, the question arises: is a venial sin really bad in any sense? Might we not say that the person should lie to the Gestapo? Might it not be a terrible moral fault not to tell the lie? And it is the answer to this challenge which seems to me to show the importance of the entire question of venial sin. For the answer turns on one's fundamental conception of the moral life. One must have firmly in view the project of friendship with God, a friendship to be perfected by action according to reason. One is dealing with an almighty and universally provident God. He is the author of nature. We humans come upon an already given scene, and our role is to cooperate with the author of nature. The rejection of mortal sin is obvious. The rejection of venial sin is the extension of the same primary project to every nook and cranny of our existence. We should refuse to perform any act that misuses the nature that is given into our charge (which ultimately includes the whole material universe).⁽⁴⁰⁾

The temptation to think that we would be morally at fault for not telling the lie to save a life arises from quite a different moral scenario. Of course, it plays on our quite reasonable and wholesome love of human life.⁽⁴¹⁾ However, it arises from a conception of the moral agent as much more "an engineer of reality" than a co-operator with the author of reality. It acknowledges certain given "ends or goals of life," but sees less than it should of the givenness of nature and natures.

To fill out the appropriate picture of our moral life, and the zone to which venial sin pertains, it is necessary to recall certain doctrines concerning the condition of Adam before the Fall, that is, the state of "original justice" or "innocence." Thomas conceives of this state of grace as one in which, as long as the mind of man remained properly subordinate to God, the lower powers of man would be rightly subordinate to the higher powers. Accordingly, in that state, venial sin was impossible. This is because sins venial in kind have their origin in a certain insubordination of the sense appetites.⁽⁴²⁾ For example, in the Gestapo case, we may lie because we "just cannot stand the thought of those good people dying"; such an event would be just too sad. Thus, venial sins are conceived of in the light of the perfect condition of the human being, in which there can be no flaw in the functioning of the lower appetites in their order to our higher nature. In other words, it is necessary to view the human being as capable of very great moral perfection, if one is to take seriously the sort of fault that is venial sin. This is to say that venial sin is part of the doctrine of human nature as a fallen nature. Somewhat in the same line of thought, we see that a pure spirit, an angel, simply cannot commit a venial sin. Only one sin of the angel was possible, and that had to be a mortal sin.⁽⁴³⁾ The venial sin is thus a problem typical of the human being in the fallen state. It corresponds to the nobility of the human calling, and the wounded character of our nature.

From what I have said, the question should arise, to what extent is this a doctrine that pertains to moral philosophy, as distinct from Christian theology?⁽⁴⁴⁾ Without the doctrines of the state of original justice and of the Fall, one might simply judge that such disorder in human behavior is an inevitable failing of human nature. One might think, then, that it is something to avoid if possible, but not something to take very seriously in the moral life. This is certainly, I would say, a much better, more reasonable, view than that proposed by Kant.

Kant's approach seems far too abstract. Thomas's distinction between what does and what does not constitute the perfection of the human intellect makes good sense. Once the reality of a "lie about contingent truth" is isolated for consideration, one can then raise the question of one's intention in telling the lie. There is a world of difference between lying in such matters harmlessly to save a life, and lying for commercial advantage or other unjust reasons.

Thomas, contrasting his own approach in morals with that of Aristotle, notes that Aristotle calls "bad," properly, whatever is harmful to other people, and so he said that the prodigal person is not "bad." The same is the case with other actions that do no harm. Thomas says that he himself calls "bad," more generally, everything that is repugnant to right reason.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Also interesting, when cataloguing the acts of law (viz., to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish), Thomas says of "permission," "But there are some [acts] which, as to their kind, are [morally] indifferent; and with respect to these, the law has [the role] of permitting." But he immediately adds: "And all those acts, also, can be called 'indifferent' which are either slightly good or slightly bad [vel parum boni vel parum mali]."⁽⁴⁶⁾ We should remember Thomas's doctrine that the law does not prohibit the venial sin. Still, the venial sin, for example, the harmless lie, is not properly a morally "indifferent" act. It is flawed from the viewpoint of reason.

IV. Conclusion

By way of conclusion, I will simply say that reflection on the conception of venial sin cannot be neglected, if one wishes truly to assess the morality of the harmless and indeed helpful lie. Kant's contention that such a lie is "a wrong done to mankind generally" should be rejected. With St. Thomas and St. Augustine, we do not approve of such a lie, but we do say, to others and to ourselves, that if refraining from such lies

is at present beyond us, we must at least admit of lies only in this sort of necessity. We may then deserve to get rid even of these lies, if they alone remain, and receive strength from the Holy Ghost to make light of any suffering for truth's sake.⁽⁴⁷⁾(See Appendix 3)

Appendices

In connection with the Holy Eucharist and its reception, there are good texts on the distinction between habitual charity and actual charity, so that while one does not have the spiritual refreshment of the sacrament, one can still have the grace from the sacrament; this is important for the question, can one sin venially and love God charitably?

The text I have in mind is STh III, q. 79, a. 8. Thomas asks whether venial sin impedes the effect of the Eucharistic sacrament. Speaking of actually exercised venial sin [prout sunt actu exercita], he says:

venial sins do not totally impede the effect of this sacrament, but [do so] partially. For it has [already] been said that the effect of this sacrament is not only the obtaining of habitual grace or charity, but also a certain actual refreshment of spiritual sweetness. This latter is impeded if someone comes to this sacrament with a mind distracted through venial sins. But it does not take away the growth in habitual grace or charity.

And in the reply to the first objection we read:

he who approaches this sacrament with an act of venial sin eats spiritually in habitual fashion, but not actually. And so he receives the habitual effect of this sacrament, but not the actual.

We thus see that habitual action, "going through the motions" to a certain extent (where that involves no disrespect), results in a growth in grace and charity, at the habitual level: that is, one obtains an increase in one's readiness to act charitably. Thus, what one does habitually, one really does, and one really derives benefit from it. This helps us to get the picture of ourselves as caught in venial sin, and yet as habitually ordered towards God as source of beatitude (even though what we are actually doing does not have such a character as to advance us actually towards beatitude). There is nothing in what we are doing that points us towards an ultimate end other than God, the object of beatitude. We are loving God as ultimate end, not actually, but habitually.

While sins can be venial or mortal depending on factors having to do with the sinner himself, what I wish to get at is the venial sin, as so determined by the very nature of the act. The following text [De Malo q. 7, a. 1 (Leonine lines 335-62)] seems to me especially helpful. Thomas says:

In another way, it comes about that some sin is contrary or is not contrary to charity from the very type of the act, which is from the side of the object or matter which is contrary or not contrary to charity. For just as some food is contrary to life, for example a poisonous food, whereas some food is not contrary to life, though it imposes an impediment as regards the right condition of life, for example fat food and not easily digestible food, or else, if it is suitably digestible, because it is not taken in due measure; so also, in human actions, something is found which of itself is contrary to charity towards God and neighbor: viz. those things by which are taken away subjection and reverence of man to God, as blasphemy, diabolic activities, and things of that sort; and also those things which do away with the association [convictum] of human society, for example theft, murder, and such; for human beings cannot live socially together where such things are perpetrated randomly and indifferently. And these are mortal sins in their very type, no matter with what intention or disposition of the will they be done. But there are some [actions] which, though they contain an inordination, nevertheless do not directly exclude either of the aforementioned: as, for example, that a man tell a lie not concerning the Faith, nor tending to harm one's neighbor, but to delight him or even to aid him, or if someone goes to excess in food and drink and other such. Hence, these are venial sins in their kind or type. [Italics mine]

Notice this inclusion of drink. We might note that Thomas changed his mind about the seriousness of excessive drinking when the beverage can cause drunkenness. Thus, in De Malo q. 2, a. 8, ad 3 and q. 7, a. 4, ad 1, drunkenness is venial in kind, whereas in STh I-II, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1 and II-II, q. 150, a. 2 (which is directly on the topic), it is very explicitly mortal in kind. However, he still mentions venial sins of overindulgence in beverages generally.

3) Disputed Questions

When I put the question to a philosophical (and decidedly Christian) friend, he said he would be inclined to think one might be culpable for not telling the lie. The only answer to that is the natural status of speech.

He asked whether there is not reason to abuse a nature in extreme circumstances. This might well be what the philosopher without revelation should say, at least as regards lying about contingent truth, a rather minor abuse of a nature. The lie becomes inconsiderable in the setting of the saving of a life.

I am saying that there is a criticism to be made of the lie, but that most people will tell the lie, and that it is not gravely wrong. They are in the position of the midwives.

Someone asked me why I could not use the lie as a form of self-defense, just as I would use a gun. The only answer is that some things qualify as legitimate weapons, the sort of thing one can use to defend oneself, so long as one uses it moderately. Words used as lies are not suitable weapons. Words might be used as weapons, as when I shout to frighten someone. But the lie is using the word in a bad way to scare someone off. It would be somewhat similar, or analogous, to committing fornication as a means of avoiding death. (However, that would be a mortal sin, and lying about contingent truth in a harmless way is a venial sin.)

Why is an amputation good and a little life-saving lie bad? I believe the answer must move along the lines of self-defense. Amputation is presented in terms of part and whole. Still, prominent in its explanation is the responsibility one has for one's own health (STh II-II, q. 65, a. 1). And this is prominent in the presentation of self-defense (ibid., q. 64, a. 7).

The answer, then, seems to lie in the reply to the question, concerning self-defense, why one cannot commit adultery or fornication, or any other mortal sin, to save one's life. Thomas replies:

the act of fornication or of adultery is not ordered to the conservation of one's own life by necessity [ex necessitate], the way the act [is] from which sometimes homicide follows. (Ibid., q. 64, a. 7, ad 4)

All the more, there is a certain natural necessity in the relation of parts to whole that justifies amputation. But there is not the same relation of lying to saving the life of oneself or one's neighbor. The lie may not be a mortal sin, but it is something not to be done.

1. Cf. Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). She includes in an appendix (pp. 285-90) an excerpt from Immanuel Kant, "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives," from The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, ed. and trans. Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949). Kant clearly regards any lie as what Thomas would call a "mortal sin." Kant says:

Truthfulness in statements which cannot be avoided is the formal duty of an individual to everyone, however great may be the disadvantage accruing to himself or to another. If, by telling an untruth, I do not wrong him who unjustly compels me to make a statement, nevertheless by this falsification, which must be called a lie (though not in a legal sense), I commit a wrong against duty generally in a most essential point. That is, so far as in me lies I cause that declarations should in general find no credence, and hence that all rights based on contracts should be void and lose their force, and this is a wrong done to mankind generally.

Thus the definition of a lie as merely an intentional untruthful declaration to another person does not require the additional condition that it must harm another, as jurists think proper in their definition (medacium est falsiloquium in praeiudicium alterius). For a lie always harms another; if not some other particular man, still it harms mankind generally, for it vitiates the source of law itself. (286)

Obviously this is to say that any lie is against the common good, and so is what Thomas would call unjust and mortally sinful.

2. We might note STh I-II, q. 71, a. 1: "Properly 'sin' [peccatum] names an act which lacks order [actum inordinatum], just as the act of a virtue is an ordered and due [debitus] act" (1088b10-13; all pagination references are to the edition of the Summa theologiae published in 1941 by the Collège Dominicain, Ottawa).

3. The Newsletter of the Center for Thomistic Studies, Houston, Texas, in 1994 reported a Ph.D. dissertation by Austin Rockcastle, entitled St. Thomas Aquinas on the Nature and Morality of Lying. It said that, using the sort of "speaking contra mentem" without intention to deceive exemplified by an actor in a play, Rockcastle argued that such exceptions could allow for speaking contra mentem to a would-be murderer. This shows the sort of odd twist in readings of an otherwise quite clear doctrine to which this issue gives rise. Thomas certainly would not call such speech to a would-be murderer anything more or less than a lie which is a venial sin.

Cf. for example Kenneth W. Kemp and Thomas Sullivan, "Speaking Falsely and Telling Lies," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67 (1993) [Annual Supplement: ACPA Proceedings]: 151-70. They try to make the acts under consideration "not assertions" (166).

4. STh I-II, q. 88, a. 2.

5. Ibid., q. 72, a. 5.

6. Ibid., I-II, prologue (11a28-29) characterizes the entire Second Part as "concerning the movement of the rational creature unto God [de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum]."

7. Ibid., and I-II, q. 5, a. 7.

8. Ibid., II-II, q. 26, aa. 2, 3, and 4.

9. Ibid., I-II, q. 3, a. 8.

10. This is true even of the created person destined for beatitude. Thus, in charity one loves oneself as a being pertaining to God (ibid., II-II, q. 25, a. 4 [1545b16-23]):

We can speak of charity as regards its own proper nature, according as it is a friendship of man with respect to God primarily, and consequently with respect to those things which have to do with God. Among which things, also, is the man himself who has the charity. And thus, among other things which one loves out of charity, as pertaining to God [quasi ad Deum pertinentia], one loves even oneself out of charity.

11. Ibid. I-II, q. 88, a. 2.

12. Ibid. II-II, q. 64, a. 1 (1756b5-7): "no one sins by the fact that he uses something for that for which it is [intended] [nullus peccat ex hoc quod utitur re aliqua ad hoc ad quod est]."

13. Ibid. I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 3: "he who sins venially adheres to the temporal good, not as someone [there] finding ultimate satisfaction [non ut fruens], because he does not establish the goal in it; but rather as someone making use of it [sed ut utens], relating [himself] to God, not actually but habitually." Th. Deman, O.P., in his article on sin, "Le péché," in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, ed. A. Vacant et al. (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1933) t. 12, col. 140-275, at col. 237-44, discusses at some length the question of the ultimate end one has in view in committing sins venial in kind. All one's actions must be done for the sake of an ultimate end. In venial sin, one is not doing something that can advance one towards the ultimate end. Nevertheless, one cannot be acting for any ultimate end other than the true one; else it would be mortal sin. Thomas holds that one acts for the true ultimate end, taken not actually but habitually. Thus, at STh II-II, q. 24, a. 10, ad 2, on whether charity can undergo diminution, Thomas is led to speak about a type of love for a creaturely good that is merely venial sin and so does not diminish charity; in connection with it, he says: "that which is loved in venial sin, is loved on account of God [propter Deum amatur] habitually, even though not actually [habitu, etsi non actu]." And Thomas addresses the issue in a more ex professo fashion at ibid. I-II, q. 88, a. 1, ad 2 and ad 3, as quoted above. Deman focuses on someone who consciously commits the venial sin, considering that it is "only a venial sin." However negative this outlook, it does take into consideration one's own status regarding the ultimate end.

14. STh I-II, q. 71, a. 2 (1089b16-44):

The nature of each thing is primarily [potissime] the form in accordance with which the thing obtains its species.

But man is constituted in a species through the rational soul.

And so that which is against the order of reason is properly against the nature of man inasmuch as he is man; but what is in accordance with reason is in accordance with the nature of man inasmuch as he is man.

But the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, and "the bad of man is to be outside accordance with reason [praeter rationem]," as Dionysius says, On the Divine Names 4 [no. 32 (PG 3:733)].

Hence, human virtue, which makes a man good, and renders his deed good, is in accordance with the nature of man, inasmuch as it is in accordance with reason; and vice is against the nature of man, inasmuch as it is against [contra] the order of reason.

Notice that contra and praeter here do not seem to differ greatly; of course, Thomas is restricted by the words of the quotation from Dionysius, which text actually has (in the translation of Johannes Sarracenus): "est malum . . . animae praeter rationem"; cf. Thomas, In De div. nom. 4.22 (ed. Pera, Rome and Turin, 1950: Marietti, text no. 247).

15. See especially STh II-II, q. 154, a. 12 (2185b14-30):

In every order, [what is] worst is the corruption of the principle on which the others depend. Now, the principles of reason are those things which are according to nature; for reason, those things being presupposed which are determined by nature, disposes the others according as is suitable. And this is apparent both in speculative and in practical matters. And thus, just as in speculative matters an error concerning those things the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in man is most serious and most unseemly; so also, in matters of action, to act against those things which are determined by nature is most serious and most unseemly. Therefore, because in those vices which are against nature man transgresses that which is determined by nature concerning the use of sexuality, thus it is that in this matter this sin is most serious.

16. Ibid. I-II, q. 100, a. 2 (1260a42-51):

the community to which the divine law orders is that of men with God, whether in the present or in the future life. And therefore the divine law proposes precepts concerning all those things through which men are well ordered towards communication with God. But man is conjoined to God by reason or mind, in which there is the image of God. And therefore the divine law proposes precepts concerning all those things through which the reason of man is well ordered.

17. Ibid. II-II, q. 154, a. 12, ad 1; Thomas is replying to an objector who thinks that sexual sins against nature are less grave than such things as adultery, since the latter hurts others, whereas a sexual sin against nature does no harm to another:

just as the order of right reason is from man, so also the order of nature is from God himself. And therefore in sins against nature, in which the very order of nature is violated, injury [iniuria] is done to God himself, the Orderer of nature. Hence Augustine says, in Confessions 3 [cap. 8 (PL 32:689)]: "Disgraceful acts which are against nature are everywhere and always to be detested and punished, such as were those of the people of Sodom; which, if all peoples performed them, all would be held in the same guilt of crime by divine law, which did not so make men that they might make use of themselves in that way. Indeed, that very society is violated which ought to be between us and God, since the very nature of which he is the author is polluted by the perversity of carnal desire." [Italics mine]

18. Ibid., q. 59, a. 4.

19. Ibid., q. 154, a. 2, ad 6.

20. Ibid. I-II, q. 87, a. 5, ad 1 (italics mine); and we are told at I-II, q. 88, a. 4 (1196b21-24), "Not all the venial sins in the world can have as much liability for punishment as one mortal sin."

21. Ibid., q. 88, a. 1, ad 1; to understand how Thomas can say that venial sin is not prohibited by law, yet is "illicit," remember that illicitus, as in such crucial texts for our purposes as II-II, q. 110, a. 3, ad 4 (1996a20), means not "against the law," but rather "not a thing which should be done" in a more general way; licet is not cognate with lex, but appears closer to the lib- in liber. One is not altogether free to do what is illicit.

For the distinction between contra legem and praeter legem, see also II-II, q. 105, a. 1, ad 1 (1971b44-46): "Venial sin is not disobedience, because it is not against the law [contra praeceptum], but rather [is] out of step with the law [praeter praeceptum]." And the same vocabulary is at work in I-II, q. 74, a. 9 (1124b40-46).

It is clear in II-II, q. 110, a. 4, ad 1, and especially in ad 2, that Thomas does not regard all lying as against the law.

22. Ibid. I-II, q. 78, a. 2, ad 1.

23. Ibid., q. 88, a. 3 deals with the sense in which venial sin "disposes" to mortal. Cf. also 3, q. 87, a. 1, ad 1. This whole article, on the need for repentance if venial sin is to be remitted, is of great interest. One must have more than just the existence of the habitus of charity (habitual displeasure with such sin, identified with the virtue itself), for the remission of such sin. However, one need not think of individual sins and be sorry for them singly. One must have a virtual displeasure, that is, an actual movement of the affection towards God and things divine, such that whatever would occur that would retard one from that movement would be displeasing, and one would be sorry for having done it, even if one does not actually think about it.

This is important in placing venial sin within a wholesome spiritual life. One should not be satisfied to have done such a thing. One ought to have the purpose of preparing oneself for reducing venial sin; otherwise, there would be danger of failing, since the appetite for improving would desert one, or the appetite for removing the impediments to spiritual progress, both of which are venial sins (ad 1).

One need not have the purpose of abstaining from all such sins, collectively (an impossibility), but one should have the purpose of abstaining from them individually.

24. Ibid. II-II, q. 110, a. 1, discussing "whether the lie is always opposed to the truth [i.e. to the virtue of veracity]?": "Now, the proper object of manifestation or enunciation is the true or the false. But the inordinate intention of the will can bear upon two items, one of which is that the false be enunciated, the other is the proper effect of false enunciation, viz. that someone be deceived" (1992b13-20). Now we begin to envisage the act as a whole:

If, therefore, these three concur, i.e. that that which is enunciated is false, and there is present the will to enunciate what is false, and also the intention of deceiving, then there is falseness materially, because the false is said; and formally, because of the will to say what is false; and effectively, because of the will to give a false impression. However, the intelligible aspect: "lie" is taken from the formal falsity, i.e. from the very fact that someone has the will to enunciate the false. Hence, the lie [mendacium] is named from this, that it is "said contrary to the mind" [contra MENtem DICitur]. (b20-32)

25. Ibid., q. 110, a. 3: the Ottawa editor includes references to Enchir. 18 (PL 40:240) and 22 (40:243).

It is notable that Thomas stresses in this argument the natural character of words as such. In the much earlier Quodl. 8, q. 6, a. 4, he speaks merely of words having been "devised" [inventa] in order to be signs of what we have in mind (though the doctrine is the same).

26. STh II-II, q. 110, a. 3, obj. 4 and ad 4.

27. See ibid., q. 158, a. 3 (2203a44-b1), on anger, and q. 118, a. 4 (2022a38-52), on avarice, as venial in kind.

28. These sorts of abuses of nature are analogous to what one finds in the criticism (ibid., q. 154, a. 12) of those sins of lust which are against nature, but in that latter case the matter is intrinsically grave.

29. Aristotle, De anima 2.3 (414b20-415a15).

30. STh II-II, q. 110, a. 4 (1997a31-b10).

31. See especially ibid. I, q. 12, a. 8, ad 4:

the natural desire of the rational creature is to know all those things that pertain to the perfection of the intellect; and these are the species and genera of things, and the natures [rationes] of them, which anyone seeing the divine essence will see. But to know other singulars, and their thoughts and deeds, does not pertain to the perfection of the created intellect; nor does its natural desire tend towards that, nor again to know those things which are not yet, but which can be made by God. If nevertheless God alone were to be seen, who is the fountain and principle of all being and truth [qui est fons et principium totius esse et veritatis], that would satisfy the natural desire to know, which would seek nothing else, and would be happy.

32. Ibid., q. 94, a. 3 (587a1-4).

33. Ibid., q. 107, a. 2. Cf. also II-II, q. 60, a. 4, ad 2, on whether, in judging the conduct of persons, what is doubtful ought to be interpreted for the better: It is said that in judging about things (de rebus), as distinct from judging persons (de hominibus), one ought to take care to judge them precisely as they are. However, in judging of persons, one ought, if possible, to judge the person favorably. Does this not reflect on the one who judges, when mistaken, as being an inept judge? Thomas says:

As for the man who judges, the false judgment by which he judges favorably of someone does not pertain to what makes his intellect bad [ad malum intellectus ipsius], just as it does not pertain essentially [secundum se] to the perfection of [his intellect] to know the truth concerning contingent singulars; rather, it [the favorable judgment] pertains to good inclination.

34. Ibid. II-II, q. 110, a. 4 (1997b11-32).

35. Exodus 1:21. Modern translations generally say that God gave the midwives "families" or "a posterity" or "descendents." However, the Vulgate has it that God built them houses: "Et quia timuerunt obstetrices Deum, aedificavit eis domos."

36. STh II-II, q. 110, a. 3, ad 2. Cf. St. Augustine, On the Psalms, vol. 1 (Psalms 1-29), Ancient Christian Writers 29, translated and annotated by Dame Scholastica Hebgin and Dame Felicitas Corrigan, Benedictines of Stanbrook (New York: Newman Press, 1960), 53-55: "To speak of what is, is to speak the truth; to speak of what is not, is to tell a lie [Si enim hoc dicitur quod est, verum dicitur; si autem hoc dicitur quod non est, mendacium est (PL 36:85)] (p. 53). Augustine remarks:

Many lies are apparently told out of kindness, not malice, the object being someone's safety or advantage; such were the lies told by the midwives in Exodus who gave a false report to Pharaoh in order to save the male infants of Israel from death. But even here what is praiseworthy is not the action but the motive, since those who merely tell lies such as theirs will deserve in time to be set free from all dissimulation, for in the perfect not even these are to be found. Let your speech be Yea, Yea: No, No, we are told. And that which is over and above these is of evil. Not without reason does Scripture elsewhere declare: The mouth that belieth killeth the soul, in order to teach us that no perfect and spiritual man is free to tell a lie to save this transitory life either for himself or another, since its loss does not kill the soul. (53-54, underlining mine)

However, he goes on to say:

If this is at present beyond us, we must at least admit of lies only in strict necessity. We may then deserve to get rid even of white lies, if we do no worse, and receive strength from the Holy Ghost to make light of any suffering for truth's sake. . . .

To sum up: there are two kinds of lie which are no great crime but not exactly free from sin, the lie spoken in jest, and the lie spoken to render some service. The lie spoken in jest does very little harm, since it deceives nobody. The man to whom it is told knows it is only banter. And the second lie is all the less offensive because it means well. (54)

37. STh II-II, q. 110, a. 4, obj. 4 and ad 4. The earlier discussion is I-II, q. 114, a. 10 and ad 2.

38. See ibid. II-II, q. 24, a. 10:

Similarly also, neither can charity be diminished by venial sin, neither effectively nor meritoriously. Not indeed effectively, since it does not touch charity itself. For charity is with respect to the ultimate end; but venial sin is a disorder with respect to those things which are for the end. But the love of the end is not diminished by the fact that someone commits some disorderly act [inordinationem] regarding those things which are for the end; for example, sometimes it happens that some weak people, while they love health very much, still behave in a disorderly fashion as regards the keeping to a diet; so also in the speculative sciences, false opinions regarding those things which are deduced from the principles do not diminish certitude concerning the principles. . . .

Similarly also, venial sin does not merit the diminution of charity. For when someone is delinquent in a minor matter, he does not merit to suffer detriment in a major one. For God does not turn himself away from man more than man turns himself away from him [God]. (1538a52-b22)

Thomas adds that one can call "indirectly, diminution of charity" the disposition to corruption of charity which is brought about by repeated venial sin.

39. In ibid. I-II, q. 74, a. 9 and in De Malo q. 7, a. 5, it is asked about venial sins in the ratio superior, that is, reason considering the eternal or divine law, and, by deliberation, having the last word on what we do. The latter text, at Leonine edition lines 191-98, reads:

[Concerning deliberation] But when something is accepted [i.e. chosen] which does not exclude the [true ultimate] end, but nevertheless without it one comes to the end in a better way, because in some respect it retards from the end or disposes to the contrary of the end, then it is a venial sin: for example, when someone speaks an idle word [verbum otiosum], even deliberating that it is a venial sin disposing to a mortal sin and is in some respect deficient [deficiens] from the rightness of justice which leads to God.

This would pertain to my scenario in which I say that I am going to lie to save a life. Such saying would pertain to deliberation about venial sin, and, as terminating in the choice of the lie, would be itself a venial sin. Teaching people that it is not a venial sin (i.e. no sin at all), or that it is a mortal sin, would be a mortal sin; in other words, knowingly teaching a false doctrine as to the nature of lying would be a lie that is contrary to charity and justice.

40. STh I, q. 96, aa. 1 and 2.

41. Cf. nevertheless ibid. I-II, q. 2, a. 5: human corporeal existence cannot be the goal of the human being.

42. Ibid., q. 89, a. 3. Cf. ibid., q. 71, a. 2, ad 3; the third objection points to the prevalence of vice among human beings. Surely what is against human nature will not be found to prevail among humans? Thomas answers:

in man nature is twofold, viz. the rational and the sensitive. And because through the operation of sense man comes to the acts of reason, therefore more people follow the inclinations of sensitive nature than the order of reason; for there are more who attain [assequuntur] to the beginning of a thing than who follow through [perveniunt] to its achievement. But it is from this that vices and sins occur among human beings, that they follow the inclination of the sensitive nature against [contra] the order of reason. (Italics mine)

Though the argument concerns mortal sin primarily, it is a most important consideration of the rationale of the existence of sin in the human race. It should help us in our conception of the psychology of sin.

43. Ibid., q. 89, a. 4.

44. We should also remember what Jacques Maritain called "moral philosophy, adequately taken" ("la philosophie morale adéquatement prise"): the need moral philosophy has, for its own proper full development, to be supplemented by divine revelation even as regards the order of specification. Cf. Maritain, Science et sagesse (Paris: Labergerie, 1935), 288-345.

45. STh I-II, q. 18, a. 9, ad 2.

46. Ibid., q. 92, a. 2 (1217a29-33).

47. Augustine, On the Psalms, 1:54 (on Ps 5). Here I have revised the translation, quoted earlier. The Latin reads:

[He is speaking of avoiding lies of the description: Multa quidem uidentur pro salute aut commodo alicuius, non malitia, sed benignitate mendacia.] Si autem hoc nondum potest, uel sola huius necessitatis habeat mendacia, ut etiam ab istis, si sola remanserint, liberari mereatur et Spiritus sancti robur accipere, quo quidquid perpetiendum est pro ueritate contemnat.

Augustine wrote these commentaries (on Pss. 1-32) in 392, the year after his ordination to the priesthood, and three years before he became bishop (see On the Psalms, 1:5-7) He is commenting on verse 7: "Thou wilt destroy all who speak a lie." Presenting the lie as the contrary of the truth, he is quick to deny that the lie has any nature of its own. It partakes of nonbeing, not of being.