BOOK REVIEWS
Temps, Dieu, Liberté dans les commentaires aristotéliciens de saint Thomas d'Aquin. Essai sur la pensee grecque et la pensee chretienne. By S. Decloux, S. J. Bruxelles: Desclée de Brouwer, 1967. Pp. 262.
In the Introduction the author clearly states his thesis:
La pensée grecque aurait constamment privilégié l'aspect d'universalité et d'objectivité, au détriment de la singularité et du mouvement de l'acte subjectif. Aristote, toutefois, dans son opposition à Platon, a voulu porter son interrogation sur la singularité irréductible du tov de ti et sur le dynamisme du mouvement. Mais cet effort--nous le verrons--n'a pu être poussé jusqu'au bout, et les cadres " noétiques " de la pensée grecque continuent à régir la pensée du Stagirite. N'a-t-on pu souligner, à plusieurs reprises, l' " ambivalence" d'Aristote et le " dilemme " auquel il se trouve acculé?
La pensée chrétienne, au contraire, dans sa réflexion sur le message du salut et dans sa réflexion sur I'homme, pose de manière définitive la réalité de la personne singulière et de sa liberté historique. C'est qu'elle trouve son point de départ dans la foi au Dieu personnel, Père, Fils et Esprit, et à la communion de " dialogue " qu'il veut instaurer avec l'homme. Du coup, par cette acceptation radicale de la dimension " pneumatique," le " noétique" lui-même se trouve transformé: de totalité objective, le voici devenu unité spirituelle, d'échange, de partage, de communion.
Par la conjonction dialectique du " noétique " et du " pneumatique," l'univers et l'histoire humaine, ainsi que la vie de chaque homme, peuvent donc être pensés, à partir de l'engagement premier d'un Dieu qui, en créant, se communique lui-même à sa créature, et atteint dans une même générosité la totalité de la création et tous les êtres qui la " composent." 1
It is, therefore, through the use of the twofold " noétique " and " pneumatique," such as he found them in the work of Maurice Blondel, that the author attempts to precise the philosophical divergences which exist between the Christian thought of St. Thomas and the thought of the Greek philosopher Aristotle.
In this perspective the author seeks, in the first chapter, to reinstate the Aristotelian commentaries of St. Thomas in their historical milieu. The second chapter, with its Aristotelian analysis of time and movement, explores the cosmological level of the thought of the philosopher and establishes comparisons with St. Thomas. In the third chapter theological questioning aims at precising the difference between the God of Aristotle and the God of St. Thomas. As for the last chapter, it is " anthropological "
1 Op. cit., p. 10.
in the sense that it considers the problem of person in Aristotle and St. Thomas.
We can see the interest and importance of such a study, one which would merit a point by point examination. For, as the author himself has noted, here the three ages of philosophical thought are touched upon: the cosmological age of Greek thought, the theological age of the Middle Ages, and the anthropological age of the modern epoch. We could say that Greek cosmological thought was a preparation for theological thought, while the latter, in turn, prepared the way for anthropological thought. What is certain is that Christian thought, and in particular that of St. Thomas, reveals a marvelous unity of these three ages.
In this perspective the author concludes--and his position is clearest in his conclusion, which is why we somewhat insist on it--by showing the grandeur of St. Thomas's vision regarding God and man:
Le Dieu créateur suscitant, au coeur de la personne spirituelle, une liberté capable de lui répondre en s'engageant dans une histoire, qu'elle construit en union avec toutes les libertés et dont Dieu est lui-même la fin.2
St. Thomas recognizes that philosophers, at the beginning of their reflection, were oriented toward this progressive discovery but were unable to attain it on account of their desire to " possess the truth ":
Dieu seul peut en définitive engendrer dans l'histoire des hommes, comme dans sa vie intime, son Verbe éternel; lui seul peut purifier le coeur de l'homme pour lui permettre de recevoir cette parole qu'il lui envoie. . . . La philosophie, oeuvre de la raison de I'homme, est ouverte à un achèvement qui ne vient plus d'elle-même.3
May we not affirm, moreover, that
l'univers entier, celui des paiens, des " Gentils," fut plongé dans l'ignorance " théorique" (speculativa) de Dieu? Si les esprits les plus exercés et les plus profonds sont en effet parvenus à découvrir la voie qui conduit à lui, tous ne l'ont-ils pas cependant ignoré comme Père du Fils unique? 4
In a certain way, we can say that philosophy has attained to a certain knowledge of the Father and the Word, but it has totally ignored the Holy Spirit. And the author concludes:
ce bilan de la philosophic antique, que reprend la Somme Théologique, ne nous invite-t-il pas à reconnaître le sens dernier des insuffisances d'Aristote? Le dualisme de l'esprit et du sensible, de Dieu et du monde, ce dualisme dont la racine se trouve dans une raison encore insuffisamment ouverte au dynamisme de la liberté et de I'amour, n'est-ce pas de la sorte que théologiquement il s'éclaire? "
2 P. 236.
3 P. 237.
4 Pp. 237-238.
5 Pp. 238-239. Cf. I, q. 32, a. 1.
All this is quite clear and helps us to understand the philosophical method of the authors: the philosopher Aristotle is judged by the theologian Thomas Aquinas. Philosophy is viewed as a disposition for theology, a disposition filled with awkwardness, filled with confusions. And we may even add that the theology of St. Thomas, on its part, is understood through the thought of Blondel. We see the danger of such a method; and we can immediately affirm that it is foreign to the thought of St. Thomas who, rightly, has always been careful to distinguish well what belongs to philosophy and what belongs to faith and theology. Moreover, the distinction, on which the author very much insists, between " noétique " et " pneumatique," implies a confusion. The term " noétique," the author explains,
désigne le principe constitutif de la realité et de l'intelligibilité des choses, qui les fait apparaître comme solidaires et réunies dans la totalité d'un univers. Il révèle donc à I'analyse une fonction unificatrice, une fonction d'intelligibilité objective et d'universalité.
Mais le noétique est continuellement solidaire du " pneumatique" qui, à son tour, dégage dans l'univers des centres singuliers de réaction et fait ainsi apparaître l'univers sous la forme d'une diversité. Sa fonction est donc de différenciation, en même temps que de dynamisme " subjectif " et de singularité.6
Now, according to Blondel, these two aspects are coordinated,
symétriques, s'appelant ou se provoquant l'un l'autre, chacun n'étant possible et intelligible que par l'autre et pour l'autre.7
It is easy to understand that this distinction, which sought to express St. Thomas's analysis--the distinction between subject-object, intellect-will-- no longer expresses it in reality; for it is not on the same level, and this is the confusion that the author has fallen into. The analysis of St. Thomas is located on the level of principles and proper causes (the object, for him, signifies the principle of specification, of determination, whereas the subject expresses the principle of exercise), whereas the distinction of noetic and pneumatic is on the descriptive level, vital and existential, which corresponds to the schema " statique"-" dynamique."8 This is why it seems a grave error to judge the thought of Aristotle as a " noétique " 9 thought and to return to it constantly; for it amounts to judging this thought in terms of distinctions which have nothing to do with it. We understand, then, the judgment which is made on the philosophy of Aristotle:
6 Pp. 9-10.
7 Extract from La Pensée, quoted on p. 10.
8 See p. 93.
9 See especially pp. 100, 101, 117, 122, 151, 165, 172, 177, 183, 186, 210, 220, 233, 234.
Philosophie de la substance et philosophie de l'intellect, telle nous a semblé être, après le platonisme, la caractéristique de l'aristotélisme. II en résulte un dualisme de la matière et de l'esprit, du monde et de Dieu, dont l'immanence pas plus que la transcendance ne sont pensées jusqu'au bout . . . le " premier vivant " d'Aristote reste encore enfermé dans les cadres de l'identité formelle avec soi.10 . . . cette identité reste finalement pensée en termes formels et selon les lois de l'extériorité.11
L'identité formelle ne domine-t-elle pas aussi sa réflexion sur le temps et l'éternité? L'impossibilité où se trouve Aristote de poser un début et un terme à l'histoire, en même temps qu'elle le pousse à une conception du retour circulaire, négatrice des lors du véritable devenir, ne signale-t-elle pas son incapacité de saisir le surgissement toujours neuf de la liberté, sa gratuité et sa générosité créatrice? 12
And, speaking on the nunc which, he thinks, should invite " a dégager en lui la présence immanente d'une dimension ' éternelle' transcendante," the author adds:
C'est cette transcendance de l'acte qu'Aristote en définitive a méconnue. L'acte a été par lui finalement identifié à la forme; et la réduction du devenir à sa dimension horizontal et linéaire dans la durée, a fini par lui retirer toute réalité véritable.13
Is it possible to reduce the entire philosophy of Aristotle to a philosophy of substance and intellect? " The first philosophy of Aristotle is certainly the philosophy of substance, but it is also, and even more profoundly so, a philosophy of act. We might even say that his first philosophy is fundamentally that of substance, and, ultimately, that of act. And we cannot pretend that " l'acte a été par lui finalement identifié à la forme," 15 since act and potency immediately divide being, whereas form and matter arise from becoming. To pretend that Aristotle has reduced act to form is to say that Aristotle did not distinguish being from becoming, and therefore that his first philosophy consists in his philosophy of nature.16 It is very clear, if we analyze Book Θ of his first philosophy, that
10 P. 239.
11 P. 186.
12 P. 240. See pp. 230-233.
13 P. 240. The author says very clearly: " Philosophie du mouvement et de la génération, la philosophie d'Aristote n'accéde qu'a une transcendance qu'on nous permettra d'appeler ' horizontale,' en d'autres termes au maximum de perfection obtenue par extrapolation à partir de l'univers " (p. 168). The author seems to ignore totally the metaphysics of act in Aristotle and only considers the philosophy of form. See also pp. 50 (where it is affirmed that Aristotle " continue à penser la fin comme une forme, et l'acte pur comme une forme maximale "), 59, 82, 87, 90, 92, 93, 97, 99, 108.
14 See, p. 86, for the manner in which the author defines the substance of Aristotle. But substance is not a synthesis!
15 P. 240. Cf. p. 101.
16 It seems that the author has not understood the transition, in Aristotle, from natural philosophy to first philosophy. This is why he does not hesitate to make the following criticism concerning his theology: " il nous faudra constater l'impuissance où elle reste à fonder à la fois la transcendance et l'immanence du premier principe. On a là comme deux lignes de réflexion qui ne parviennent pas à se rejoindre, parce que les schémes de pensée, empruntés à la dimension du devenir et du mouvement, continuent à se poser selon les lois de I'extériorité." (p. 166, cf. p. 70) Likewise we can understand how the author could affirm that movement is the " centre de la philosophic d'Aristote " (p. 169)--although he recognizes also that the tovde ti is the " point de départ" and the " centre de la réflexion philosophique du Stagirite " (p. 234). We thereby also understand how the author could affirm that it is in relation to movement that " se définissent dès lors les différents degrés selon lesquels s'étage le réel" (p. 169).--Let us point to other analogous affirmations: " L'analyse du mouvement selon le couple de matière et de forme, si elle peut conduire Aristote, par extrapolation de I'expérience du monde changeant, à une première substance qui soit pure forme, ne lui permet pas cependant d'accéder à la dimension de cause universelle qui est au fondement de la métaphysique thomiste " (pp. 169-170). " Le dynamisme du réel reste défini par Aristote dans les termes du mouvement comme passage de matière à forme " (p. 172). Cf. p. 70: " la composition de matière et de forme est la seule qu'il invoque pour rendre compte de toute la complexité du réel"! See also pp. 86 and 94.
the distinction of act and potency is an immediate division of that which is considered from the point of view of being. And act is first, it transcends potency (at least from the point of view of nature, of intelligibility, since from the point of view of becoming potency is prior). The first philosophy of Aristotle is the philosophy of being; it is therefore the philosophy of substance and the philosophy of act and, consequently, the philosophy of the one.17
To pretend that Aristotle identifies act with substance is to confuse the existential point of view and that of philosophical analysis. For, from the point of view of existence, it is correct to say that act is identified with substance; but, from the point of view of philosophical analysis, it is false, because substance is distinguished from accidents and act from potency. Therefore, potency and accident are not identified for Aristotle, since matter is in potency without being thereby an accident.
Finally, to pretend that Aristotle, " fidèle disciple de Platon," identifies being with the intelligible,18 is to misconstrue his realism. For, does not Aristotle show the difference which exists between substance, first being, and quiddity (toV tiv h\n ei/\nai), that which is first in the order of intelligibility? 19
17 For the discovery, in Aristotle, of being as being, we refer the reader to our Initiation à la philosophie d'Aristote (Paris: éd. de La Colombe, 1956), in particular pp. 130-140.
18 Cf. p. 90.
19 See Meta. Z, 4, 1029 b 1--1130 b 13. See also Initiation à la philosophie d'Aristote, pp. 130-132 and " La sustancia en la lógica y en la Filosofía Primera de Aristóteles," in: Studium, Revista de filosofía y teología (Madrid: Instituto pontificio de filosofía, 1966), VI, fasc. 1, pp. 94-101.
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Moreover, to pretend that the philosophy of Aristotle is a philosophy of intellect does not correspond to the definition which he gives of his first philosophy, philosophy of being insofar as it is being.20 If his philosophy of the living, in the periV yuchv , is interested in the intellect above all else, it is because the intellect allows him to grasp that which substantially characterizes the life of man: a life according to the nou'".21 But let us not forget that in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle shows the importance of the voluntary in human activity, in the search for happiness. The author, in following the interpretations of F. Nuyens on the evolution of the psychology and noetics of Aristotle,22 along with the interpretations of R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, has not grasped the proper significance of bouvlhsi" in Aristotle.23 He has, moreover, made no mention of the thesis of J. Vanier, which shows the partiality of the judgment of Gauthier and Jolif.24
When the author supposes that the philosophy of Aristotle implies a dualism between matter and spirit, between the world and God, here, too, does he have reason? 25 Aristotle distinguishes between matter and spirit, but he does not oppose them, since matter is a modality of being (in potency) and spirit another modality of being. For him, being is outside this distinction, and it is precisely in this that we come to grasp the progress of his thought on the philosophy of Plato. We can likewise say that there is no opposition (no dualism) between the universe and God, but a distinction. One represents the realm of movement, the other that of pure Act; one is measured by time, the other is eternal.
20 See Meta. E, 1, 1025 b 2.
21 It would be necessary to take up here the analyses given by the author on nou'" (pp. 202-212). Can we affirm that Aristotle arrives at the depersonalization of the nou'" (p. 207)?
22 See p. 198f.
23 See p. 221, 227f. The author does not hesitate to say that the voluntary dynamism is unknown to Aristotle (p. 226, cf. p. 229)!
24 See Jean Vanier, Le bonheur, principe et fin de la morale aristotélicienne (Desclée De Brouwer, 1965), and especially chap. II, 7, p. 146f.
25 We might also ask whether the author has well understood the significance of matter in Aristotle, since he asks the question: " N'est-ce pas d'ailleurs dans le même sens qu'Aristote sera amené à parler d'une matière universelle, semblable au receptacle (uJpodochv ) platonicien, doté par la pensée d'une certain autonomie? Ce qui revient à opposer entre elles matière et forme selon les schèmes renouvelés du dualisme " (p. 102, cf. p. 117). For Aristotle, matter is distinguished from form, but is not opposed to it, for it is essentially ordained to form and it is intelligible to us only through the form.
Moreover, is everything the author says on the God of Aristotle exact? 26 That Aristotle's theology is less precise than that of St. Thomas leaves no room for doubt. But how easy it is, in the name of a theology based on Revelation, to criticize the efforts of the philosopher searching for a philosophical precision of what God is! It is inaccurate to suppose that the first living being of Aristotle remains enclosed " dans les cadres de l'identité formelle avec soi." This is confusing the Categories with first philosophy. When Aristotle affirms that the first Being is Substance and pure Act, there is no longer question of a logical framework.27 And when he says that this Being is nohsi" novhsew", there is no longer question of an " identité formelle avec soi," since, precisely, there is question of showing that the substantial vital act of nou'" (the novhsi") can only be the object of its own operation. We are indeed here in the dynamic order, to use an expression of the author!
As for the author's critique of the conception of time and of eternity in Aristotle, does it not come from the author's own conception of time and eternity which is different--or, if one prefers, does it not come from a confusion between the proper point of view of the philosopher and that of the theologian? 28 For, before speaking of eternity, the philosopher must
26 See pp. 62, 150f, 157f. The author concludes: " De toute façon on ne pourrait qu'abusivement parler d'un monothéisme aristotélicien, puisque ce serait aller à l'encontre des affirmations les plus explicites du Philosophe " (p. 162). Can this be affirmed? The problem seems badly stated. Among those which Aristotle calls divine beings, is there not for him necessarily a first (since one is a property of being) ? Likewise, the author declares: " C'est que le nou'" suprême d'Aristote, substitut de I'ldée du Bien, semble, comme cette dernière, ne pas se détacher encore fort nettement des inférieurs hiérarchisés dans lesquels il se réalise et exerce sa vertu " (p. 164). But the nou'" of Aristotle is not a substitute for the Idea of the Good, for it is a separated substance and pure act, and not an idea; and Aristotle affirms that it is autonomous, substantially separated from all inferior beings. The author asks the question (to which he replies): " Le Dieu d'Aristote ne reste-t-il pas encore en quelque manière corrélatif au monde du devenir? " And then he adds: " Il suffit, pour s'en rendre compte, de reprendre la ligne générale de la preuve aristotélicienne " (p. 167). The author does not sufficiently distinguish that which permits us, from the point of view of our knowledge, to attain to the prime Mover, and what he is in himself. It is true that, for Aristotle, movement is for us an avenue of approach; but, considered in himself, God is not correlative to the world of becoming. This world is related to him, but he himself, " pensée de la pensée," is not related to the world.--See also p. 170, where the author adopts the affirmation of Fr. Ducoin: The pure act of Aristotle would be " acte pur dans la ligne du mouvement," and not in the line of being!
27 Let us also note what the author affirms following Miss Mansion: " Aristote fait, dans la question de la nécessité et de l'éternité, une fâcheuse confusion entre le plan de la logique et le plan de la réalité, entre la necessité et l'éternité de la proposition énoncée et la nécessité et l'éternité de l'être existant" (p. 101, cf. p. 109). We do not think so.
28 See pp. 65 and 68.
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precise what time is in itself and the measure of time; time is that which permits him to say something about eternity--while the theologian considers time in the light of eternity.
I do not believe that St. Thomas had a philosophical conception of time other than that of Aristotle; but, since he is a theologian, time only interests him in view of eternity, and the latter permits him to make a value judgment on time. I would be even more willing to think that the author has a conception of becoming which is neither that of St. Thomas nor, a fortiori, that of Aristotle. For when he reproaches the latter for " la réduction du devenir à sa dimension horizontale et linéaire dans la durée," which removes from it " toute réalité véritable," he is thinking of a fieri which is the recognition of a " plus-être." 29 Does there not appear to be a confusion here between fieri and vital operation? It is evident that the vital operation which we experience implies a mode of fieri; but it is not a simple fieri. And if vital operation implies (according to an expression which, moreover, is not exact from the point of view of metaphysics) a " plus-être," it is not insofar as it implies a mode of fieri but insofar as it is a vital operation. Fieri, as such, is the " acte de ce qui est en puissance" and, by that very fact, it remains within the horizontal dimension, without implying any perfection.
Similarly, regarding the end as conceived by Aristotle, the author affirms:
la réflexion sur la fin et sur le bien n'est pas intériorisée chez le Stagirite au point de s'enraciner dans la motion actuelle de l'acte créateur; elle reste au niveau de la forme et de la détermination par laquelle chaque être se définit en connexion avec 1'ensemble.30
But the end and the good, considered on the philosophical level, must not be immediately rooted in the actual motion of the creative act. The latter is an ultimate judgment of wisdom which precises it. In addition, it is impossible to say that for Aristotle the end remains on the level of the form, except when it is a question of physical becoming.
Staying in the realm of ethics, the author notes in Aristotle the absence of a deep reflection on liberty,31 and he makes his own this affirmation of Gauthier: the morality of the Nicomachean Ethics is a " morale de cette vie, sans aucune ouverture sur un autre monde quel qu'il soit."32 The philosophy of Aristotle " limite sa vue aux horizons terrestres." 33
29 P. 240; see also p. 101.
30 P. 104. See p. 150. We will return to this subject.
31 See p. 197.
32 P. 213. Cf. p. 221: ". . . une vie morale limitée a l'organisation de la cité terrestre, où s'engouffre le nécessitarisme de la raison, et qui à son sommet s'efface devant l'intellectualisme pur de la contemplation impersonnelle. . . ."
33 P. 218.
For the author, there is in Aristotle a dualism between nou'" and yuchv ; " dualisme d'un nou'" purement raisonnable, refermé sur soi dans son oeuvre d'intelligence et de raison, et d'une âme inférieure, lieu des passions et des appétits." 34 And he adds:
Il manquait sans doute à sa conception du nou'" l'élément dynamique qui aurait brisé sa suffisance statique et formelle.35
The author seems not to have grasped the final causality which is only exercised, for Aristotle, at the level of nou'". But this is not surprising, since, according to him, the good, such as Aristotle conceives it, " reste encore trop, dans la ligne ' idéaliste' de Platon, ' une idée de bien.'" 36 We do not think so; Aristotle has explicitly criticized this conception of the good.
" Aristote," the author repeats, " ignore la promotion ' personnelle' de l'être, le surgissement d'une liberté proprement spirituelle."37 We are in agreement with the author on this point but not on the reasons which he gives:
Parce que sa refléxion philosophique reste limitée au plan de la forme, et n'accède pas au " plan "... intérieur de l'acte où se révèle l'absolue immanence de la transcendance. . . .38
The author seems--this is clear from the few texts which we have quoted--not to have clearly grasped the point of view of Aristotle. This is sufficiently made manifest by hearing him reproach the philosophy of Aristotle for failing " à atteindre le véritable universal concret."39 Aristotle must not be judged in the light of Hegel! His perspective is altogether different; it is that of a philosopher in search of the proper causes of that which is moved, of that which is living, of that which is, of moral activity, and who, by that very fact, analyzes. Aristotle in his realism knows all too well that life is beyond analysis. The philosopher analyzes in order to live better afterwards, but his philosophy is not his life.
Finally, when the author compares the philosophy of St. Thomas to that of Aristotle, he sums up by saying:
sa philosophie n'est plus une philosophie de la forme ou de la substance, mais une philosophie de l'acte et de I'esse. L'identité qui, pour lui aussi bien que pour le philosophe grec, est le premier principe de sa métaphysique, n'est plus à considérer seulement comme une identité formelle. . . .40
34 P. 222.
35 P. 225.
36 P. 225.
37 P. 234.
38 Ibid.
39 P. 104.
40 P. 239. Cf. p. 50: " Affirmation de I'esse, découverte de la négativité infinie (corrélative de l'acte de création), voilà en quoi la métaphysique thomiste se distingue, d'une manière irréductible, de la métaphysique aristotélicienne." See also pp. 98, 111, 117.--Another opposition indicated by the author between Aristotle's philosophy and that of St. Thomas is their different conception of history. For Aristotle, the world is eternal and there is a cycle of eternal return, whereas for St. Thomas there is a history (see p. 103). When the author notes this opposition, he does not sufficiently distinguish between what St. Thomas says as theologian, basing himself on Revelation, and what he says as philosopher. Does not St. Thomas himself recognize that the creation of the world in time cannot be philosophically affirmed? The philosopher can affirm that the world is created; but, insofar as he is a philosopher, he cannot know how it was created, nor when it was created. The philosopher is unable to understand the sense of the history of the world.
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And elsewhere, he insists: the dimension of esse " reste ignorée d'Aristote." 41 And again: " C'est la dimension même de création qui fait défaut a la philosophie d'Aristote."42 And, speaking of the real distinction between essence and being, he adds: " Voilà certes une distinction et une composition ontologique qu'on serait embarrassé de retrouver chez Aristote."43 While the philosophy of St. Thomas is, for the author, " d'un autre ordre,"44 it is a philosophy of participation,45 a philosophy of creation 46 and of creative liberty.47 It is a Christian philosophy. " Seule une métaphysique de la creation," writes the author,
peut atteindre à cette conjonction de la plus intime immanence avec la plus totale transcendance.48
" L' erreur" d'Aristote, le caractère inachevé de sa réflexion philosophique, apparaît dans l'absence chez lui de cette dimension " verticale," du rapport immédiat au Dieu créateur.49
Later, he will speak again of " l'absence chez Aristote de la dimension d'intériorité totale qui permet à St. Thomas d'élaborer une métaphysique de I'esse et de la création." 50
41 P. 60.
42 P. 69.
43 P. 70.
44 P. 181.
45 See p. 78.
46 See pp. 166, 176.
47 See p. 176. Further on, the author says explicitly: " C'est done bien sa métaphysique de la création et de la liberté divine qui, à chaque pas, préserve saint Thomas des dangers du noétisme aristotélicien." (p. 183)
48 P. 100. Let us also note this manner of opposing the philosophy of Aristotle and that of St. Thomas: " Pour le philosophe grec, il faut rendre compte du mouvement et de son éternité . . . pour saint Thomas, il s'agit d' ' expliquer' I'être du monde en recourant à une cause transcendante qui fonde tant la valeur absolue que l'essentielle contingence du créé." (p. 178)
49 P. 120.
50 P. 166.
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As we have already said, the philosophy of Aristotle cannot be reduced to a philosophy of form. Moreover, if we want to compare the metaphysics of St. Thomas to Aristotle's, it will be necessary to ask whether their proper principles are sufficiently distinct. The metaphysics of St. Thomas appears equally to be the metaphysics of being, of substance, of act. Certainly, it is true that the " dimension de la création " is present in the metaphysics of St. Thomas, whereas it is absent in Aristotle's; but is the problem of creation, in the metaphysics of St. Thomas, a proper principle in the strict sense, which gives a new comprehension of being? Or is this problem a conclusion which must necessarily be inferred when the existence of the first Being has been posited and when its relationships to other existing realities are being precised? We can make an analogous remark with regard to the conception of esse, which would be altogether novel in St. Thomas and ignored by Aristotle. If we consider the participated esse of creatures, we can, in effect, affirm that this esse, as such, is ignored by Aristotle. But what does the knowledge of this participated esse represent in the thought of St. Thomas? Is it an immediate, direct knowledge which we have in experiencing existing realities? Is it a mediate knowledge, a conclusion which we affirm beginning with creation and in the light of it? If the knowledge of this participated esse is an immediate and direct knowledge, then we can ask ourselves whether it engenders a new metaphysics, whether it permits us to posit a new principle; but if it is merely a mediate knowledge, dependent on creation, everything can be reduced to the preceding question: is the problem of creation, in the metaphysics of St. Thomas, a proper principle?
Hence, it is evident that, for St. Thomas, we do not have a direct experience of participated esse. If we had the evidence of participated esse, we would have an evident knowledge of creation and of God himself.
We can reason in the same way with regard to that which concerns participation. May we truly oppose Aristotle's philosophy to that of St. Thomas by saying that the former is that of causality, the latter that of participation? If we understand " participation" in the sense of " participation in esse," and hence in the sense of " creation," we see what the answer is. If we understand " participation " in the Platonic sense, then the philosophy of St. Thomas is nothing but a philosophy of participation.
Finally, if we suppose that the real distinction between essence and esse is not in Aristotle, which would justify a distinction between the metaphysics of St. Thomas and that of Aristotle, we must then ask this question: is such a distinction considered as the fruit of a direct analysis of experience or as the fruit of an inference, of a metaphysical judgment? It is evident that, in Aristotle, there cannot be here any distinction that is the fruit of a metaphysical judgment, since this judgment presupposes the problem of creation. But if we consider the distinction in question as the fruit of a direct analysis of experience, there is room for discussion.
For Aristotle clearly distinguishes the tovde ti from to toV tiv h\n ei\nai, the existing singular of its essence. Therefore, it is evident that only this second consideration (where the distinction between essence and esse is seen as the fruit of a direct analysis of experience) could modify the structure of a metaphysical way of thinking.
We point out once more this opposition which the author makes between Aristotle and St. Thomas, when he supposes that, in Aristotle, affirmation and negation are opposed " dans l'ordre de la forme et ne portent pas sur I'esse lui-même de la réalité considérée," 51 for his thought " ne s'approfondit pas jusqu'à atteindre la source même de l'être, oil celui-ci se trouve affronté au pur non-être." 52 In St. Thomas, on the contrary, " l'accès a l'être véritable . . . passe par le moment de la négation."53 And the author will affirm that: " La saisie de la négation révèle une différence fondamentale entre Aristote et saint Thomas." 54
Is this opposition between Aristotle and St. Thomas in that which concerns negativity correct? Yes, without any doubt, if we accept what the author says with regard to negation in Aristotle. But, to be precise, this does not seem accurate, unless we confuse being and the first Being. The negation of being (this is not) is opposed to the affirmation of that-which-is (this is); such a negation holds well for being (is) but not for this.
Just as affirmation of the first Being is not immediate from the philosophical point of view, negation with respect to the first Being cannot be first, but we can make use of it to explain creation, participation in esse. Therefore, we concede that St. Thomas, with the problem of creation, has explicitated the problem of negativity in his ultimate conclusion; but this does not give us, on the metaphysical level, a new kind of negativity.
Again the author sees, between Aristotle's philosophy and that of St. Thomas, a difference (to which we have already alluded) concerning the conception of end. For the Stagirite end remains
un terme extérieur, vers lequel se meut l'être en movement, qu'il puisse d'ailleurs atteindre ce terme, ou que cette actualisation lui reste à jamais impossible . . Toute fin, pour S. Thomas, est, au contraire, pensée à partir de la " fin dernière " qui est, dans l'être ce qui lui est le plus intérieur, plus intérieur à lui-même, selon le mot de S. Augustin.56
51 P. 116.
52 P. 118.
53 P. 120.
54 P. 150. For Aristotle, " la négation est reconnue dans le mouvement comme steVrhsi": elle est, en quelque sorte, le manque qu'implique toute forme autre que la forme pure. . . . Comme telle la négativité est essentiellement liée à la matière, et elle reste toujours, en fait, la négation d'une qualité déterminée. Chez S. Thomas, l'affirmation de la création . . . conduit à la reconnaissance d'une négation autrement radicale, laquelle est corrélative de l'être reçu de Dieu." (p. 150)
55 Pp. 150-151. Cf. p. 225: ". . . la fin dernière, ainsi que I'ordre entier de la finalité ne semblent pas encore conçus de manière totalement ' intérieure'."--It is evident that the finality discovered by the philosopher is not that of Revelation and of charity, which alone can be totally interior.
We find here once more the same misunderstanding of Aristotle and the same confusion concerning St. Thomas. In reality, finality, for Aristotle, does not reside in the exteriority of a term. Let us recall what he says regarding happiness, contemplation 56 and friendship, since it is there that we can understand finality in the most explicit manner. And in the case of physical realities the proper finality of these realities is their immediate connexion with their natural place. As for St. Thomas, he distinguishes well what finality is from the philosophical point of view and that certain finality which is that of God the creator, who is the last, ultimate finality. Let us not confuse the two, which would amount to the suppression of the order of secondary causes.
We could go on multiplying questions and remarks. But those already presented suffice to show the difference between the metaphysics of St. Thomas and that of Aristotle. If, substantially, they are one and the same metaphysics--for the same proper principles are had and utilized by both-- nevertheless that of St. Thomas incontestably marks a new achievement and new precisions. The problem of creation, while not presenting any new principles, allows very important new metaphysical judgments to be made, both from the speculative and the practical points of view, in order to better understand man's situation toward God and the universe. But the achievement, the flowering of metaphysics, must not be confused with its proper structure.
The constant opposition made by the author between Aristotle's thought and that of St. Thomas becomes so strong that we must ask the question: how could St. Thomas have commented on Aristotle with such precision and such care? For we are obliged to recognize, in the perspective of the author, that St. Thomas has understood nothing of the thought of Aristotle, that he thought he had understood it but in fact had not at all done so.57 This is somewhat annoying! For if St. Thomas, in commenting on Aristotle, was not interested in the historical--which is evident--he was interested in the philosophical in his search for truth; he used Aristotle as one uses a friend who helps to discover truth, a friend with whom, in
56 See especially the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics. See also Initiation à la philosophie d'Aristote, pp. 161-167, and " Nature de l'acte de contemplation philosophique dans la perspective des principles d'Aristote," Revue Thomiste, III (1949), 525-541.
57 The author does not hesitate so say: " Ici encore, il faut que saint Thomas dépense des trésors d'habileté pour justifier l'accord de sa pensée avec celle du Stagirite" (p. 180). See also pp. 186, 221, and 223 where the author writes textually: ". . . ce n'est que pour sauver, par une pieuse interprétation, le texte d'Aristote qu'il ne comprenait plus, que saint Thomas se résigne à voir ." etc.
seeking truth, one works jointly, and, consequently, whose thought one does not hesitate to explicitate when he himself has not sufficiently done so.58
The historian must keep in mind this attitude of St. Thomas with regard to Aristotle; otherwise, he risks failing to understand the thought of St. Thomas by no longer understanding a chief source of his philosophical thought. Perhaps this is the reason, moreover, why so often those who dialectically oppose the philosophy of St. Thomas to that of Aristotle arrive at the point of no longer understanding the true metaphysics of St. Thomas; they see only his conclusions without regard for principles and thereby no longer understand it.59
58 On St. Thomas's use of auctoritates we refer the reader to an article entitled " Reverentissime exponens Frater Thomas," published in French in Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 12 (1965), nn° 2-3, 240-258; and in English in The Thomist, XXXII (1968), n° 1, 84-105.
59 See for example p. 110, where the author affirms that, in the perspective of St. Thomas, " I'esse et l'immanence créatrice sont au fondement de tout être et de la nature même du créé." Likewise p. 121: " L'action créatrice de Dieu est la source même de la consistence en soi du créé." And p. 122: " La liberté créatrice, de la métaphysique thomiste. . . ."--Is it exact to say that the " cause universelle " is the "fondement de la métaphysique thomiste" (pp. 169-170) ? Is this not to accept the confusion of ontologism? The author affirms again that " toute philosophie qui échoue à accéder à la dimension de I'esse devra immanquablement recourir à des réalités intermédiaires entre le fini et linfini." (p. 169) If esse signifies participated esse, we can see where we shall end up, far from the thought of St. Thomas! If esse here signifies actus essendi (the first modality of act), we should therefore rather talk of a metaphysics of act, which would be true; but then we should, at the same time, recognize that Aristotle is the first to have come to this metaphysics, even though he may not have explicitated all the consequences.
Is the supposition that the dualism (immanence-transcendence) " est dès le départ dépassé " in fact the thought of St. Thomas, the reason being none other than " l'introduction dans le nou'" de la dimension de liberté: le dynamisme qui anime le Dieu de S. Thomas lui permet de franchir tous les cercles superposés pour habiter, de sa presénce immédiate, chacun des êtres " (p. 174) ? The author again says that " Saint Thomas, parce que sa réflexion est exercice concret du ' mouvement de transcendance,' aboutit a une cause premiere infinie." (p. 178) But is it correct to say that the reflection of St. Thomas is " exercise concret du ' mouvement de transcendance' "? Can we say, on the other hand, that the Thomistic synthesis, " est la volonté libre qui clôt le ' cercle de l'esprit'" (p. 197) ? Let us note also the following affirmations: free will " achève de poser la personne dans sa singularitè et de l'integrer dans la communion interpersonnelle. Elle résoud par le fait même la dialectique singulier-universel saisie encore de façon abstraite par l'intelligence." (p. 197)--Finally, wishing to characterize the position of St. Thomas with regard to morality, the author shows that this morality is totally oriented toward eternal beatitude, and he adds: N'est-ce pas elle déjà qui commence, de manière imparfaite, dans l'adhésion a l'être de I'intelligence, lorsque, en fonction de son ouverture radicale, celle-ci découvre dans l'instant la présence de l'Absolu " (p. 218; the author even says, p. 231, that in his eternal destiny the person " adhère à l'être qui est sa béatitude ") . But is there not some confusion here? Is it not faith, rather than philosophical knowledge, that in which the intellect " découvre dans l'instant la présence de l'Absolu "?
Fr. Decloux considers the metaphysics of St. Thomas as
une réflexion totale, qui saisit au coeur du réel la dimension de l'esse [et qui] saisit corrélativement la liberté spirituelle de la personne qui doit la reconnaître et s'y soumettre." 60
And the author adds:
Parce qu'elle atteint, dans l'affirmation du Dieu transcendant et immanent au monde, la source vivante et personnelle de la totalité de I'être, la refléxion de saint Thomas perçoit également, au niveau de l'esse que lui communique le Créateur, la valeur ultime de la personne spirituelle.61
Is this not a very particular type of Thomism?
Finally, for the author, it seems that the final perfection of Thomism is to have grasped
le dynamisme de la personne et de l'univers qui se réalisent en faisant leur le don premier de Dieu, dans un mouvement de liberté réellement " autocréatrice." 62
The author admits that his criticism of Aristotle is at times somewhat unilateral:
60 P. 197. Similarly, the author, in order to characterize that which is proper to the metaphysics of St. Thomas, declares: " Ne fallait-il pas pousser la pensée jusqu'à la refléxion totale sur l'acte et le dynamisme de l'exercise, pour obtenir, sans confusion indéaliste, l'identité de l'être et du connaître, et pour que I'infinité noétique, au-delà des dualismes, cesse définitivement de représenter un jeu de miroirs ou de correspondances quelconques? " (p. 207)
61 P. 197.
62 P. 234. Such a definition of Thomism, which is hardly Thomistic, would, on the contrary, wonderfully agree with a definition of the philosophy of Whitehead. In fact, we find in it, very well rendered in the French, a part of the key concepts of this philosophy: self-realization, self-creation, initial aim, endowment inherited from God, freedom. . . . The metaphysics of Whitehead, in fact, brings to light a dynamism, that of the " entité actuelle " and, by means of it, of the universe, which realizes itself by making its own, in its subjective aim, the primordial gift of God in a movement of freedom really " auto-créatrice." See A. Parmentier, La philosophie de Whitehead et le problème de Dieu (Paris: Beauchesne, 1968), pp. 372-379. The definition of Thomism given by Fr. Decloux can almost be interposed on certain phrases of Whitehead, notably the following: " Thus the initial stage of the aim [qui guide l'auto-création de l'entité actuelle et, par elle, de l'univers] is rooted in the nature of God, and its completion depends upon the self-causation of the subject " (Process and Reality, Macmillan, 1929, p. 373) .
Au risque de paraître injuste envers le Stagirite, nous avons surtout souligné le coté lacunaire, à nos yeux, de sa philosophie. II faut reconnaître cependant que sa conception du premier Moteur ne manque pas d'une certaine grandeur.63
We make the same admission. At the risk of appearing unjust toward Simon Decloux, we have especially noted what in our eyes is the lacunary side of his comparison between Aristotle's philosophy and that of St. Thomas. It must be recognized, however, that his study does point, at certain times, to a relationship between the Stagirite and the medieval theologian, and even shows how one prepares for the other.64
M.-D. Philippe, O. P.
University of Fribourg
Fribourg, Switzerland
St. Thomas Aquinas: Quaestiones De Anima. A newly established edition of the Latin text with introduction and notes. By James H. Robb. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968. Pp. 282. $9.00.
Students of St. Thomas will welcome this new edition of the Quaestiones disputatae De anima. It is intelligent and well produced. However, they will want to know the textual basis for this new edition. In the strict sense of the term this is not a critical edition. For this we will have to await the patient work of the Leonine editors with their new exhaustive methods. The present text is basically that contained in Oxford manuscript Balliol 49, which is of Parisian origin and contains pecia indications throughout. In other words, the present edition represents the university tradition collated with three other manuscripts of the same tradition: Paris, Bibl. lat. 14547, Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 15352, and Vatican, Bibl. Vat. lat. 786. Of the sixty manuscripts known to the editor, fifty have been examined and forty-one are said to be based on university exemplars. The other nine belong to a different tradition which contains " rather marked differences." This second tradition is not given a name or source; however these manuscripts could possibly constitute the " conventual " tradition, meaning the text preserved in religious houses and copied by religious. This phenomena has been encountered elsewhere, notably in Gauthier's magnificent edition of the Super Ethicam. The Leonine editors have repeatedly pointed out that the university tradition is by no means the best. University stationers were not as interested in a faithful text as they were in money.
63 P. 184.
64 See pp. 190, 204, 205, 209, 219.
With them it was a business. Of the nine non-university manuscripts only three have been selected for collation in the apparatus: Vatican, Bibl. lat. Ottob. 212, Vatican, Borg. 15, and Bruges, Bibl. de la Ville 491, plus one incunabulum.
The author knows of sixty extant copies of the De anima. In actual fact, the Leonine editors know of ninety-one. Mere numbers do not mean much except as an indication of the diffusion of the text. But the thirty-one additional MSS still need to be analyzed and divided into groups. It might even be possible to establish a stemma for the entire collection. The whole point of a stemma is to eliminate codices that are simply duplicates or to eliminate new errors that have crept into a copy (eliminatio codicum) so that they can be disregarded in the actual reconstruction of the authoritative text. This eliminatio codicum has for its ultimate purpose the relation of extant manuscripts and the reconstruction of the original exemplar or something close to it. Dr. Robb has not given the reader an evaluation of the individual codices listed. So it is impossible to make a judgment about this matter. The main point here is that thirty-one codices remain to be examined and that the whole collection needs to be broken down into groups. Dr. Robb realizes in part this grouping when he indicates the agreement of MSS OVB by the letter g in the non-university tradition.
A more serious question in the introduction is the dating of the Quaestiones De anima. The author's thesis is that the questions were delivered and written during the " spring of 1269 " (p. 27) and therefore a product of St. Thomas's second Parisian regency (passim). It is true that two MSS (Klosterneuburg, Stifsbibl. 274, and Angers 418) state explicitly that these questions were debated in Paris (determinate parisius). But this testimony must be considered in the light of other testimony. The catalogue of Prague, Bartholomew of Capua, and Nicholas Trevet merely say " Item de quaestionibus disputatis partes tres. Unam disputavit parisius de veritate; aliam in Italia de potentia dei et ultra; aliam secunda vice Parisius, scilicet de virtutibus et ultra." The other catalogues present conflicting testimony. There is no difficulty about dating the De veritate. They were given over a period of three years and can be distributed into three groups: qq. 1-7, qq. 8-20, qq. 21-29. No author or catalogue gives evidence of other disputations during this regency. The three catalogues mentioned can be presented in the following way:
(1256-69) De veritate --Paris
(1259-68) De potentia --Italy et ultra
(1269-72) De virtutibus--Paris et ultra
The critical question is the scope of " et ultra " and, in the present context, the place of the De anima, whether this is to be placed in Italy, where
St. Thomas resided for nine years, or in Paris, where St. Thomas lived only two and a half years during his second regency. There is no dispute about the De malo, which is a long work consisting of 101 articles or subjects for disputation. Nor is there any dispute about the De virtutibus, a substantial collection of five subjects and containing 36 articles. Likewise, there is no trouble about the series of questions called De spiritualibus creaturis: " Hic incipiunt questiones fratris T. de Aquino disputate in Italia." The De veritate, De potentia and De virtutibus are certain and based on sound evidence. The only question is about De anima and De unione Verbi Incarnati. We must not forget that St. Thomas's sojourn in Italy after becoming a master included Anagni (1259-61), Orvieto (1261-65), Rome (1265-67), Viterbo (1267-68) and Naples (1272-74) and that he did not always have the same audience. Our concern here is the place and approximate date of the disputations De anima.
Dr. Robb follows P. Glorieux in placing the De anima in St. Thomas's second Parisian regency. Glorieux's arguments are not conclusive: (1) the length of 21 questions fits neatly into the period from January to June 1269, but so do others; (2) this would explain the inclusion of the work in the stationer's office in Paris, but this would not explain why the De potentia is also included; (4) there are parallel places in the Parisian Quodlibets and the De anima, but there are parallel places throughout the works of St. Thomas on this subject. Dr. Robb adds two more: (5) " the extreme unlikelihood that St. Thomas would dispute twice on the same topic in the same place and before the same audience," which would be the case if De spiritualibus creaturis and De anima were given in the same place and year; but this would not need to have been the case within the nine-year period when St. Thomas was in Italy before going back to Paris; (6) in both series of questions St. Thomas points out that Augustine is not the author of De spiritu et anima, but every parallel place can bear the brunt of this objection; moreover, St. Thomas need not have had the same audience for both series, and even if he did, there is no reason why St. Thomas could not have mentioned this significant fact twice. The most weighty argument to my mind is the fact that two manuscripts mention Paris as the place of disputation. This argument is serious, and I cannot answer it.
In the second Parisian regency Robb would order the disputed questions as follows: De anima, De virtutibus, De unione Verbi and De malo. But this does not accord with the lists given by the catalogue of Prague, Bartholomew of Capua and Nicholas Trevet, who explicitly state that the first set of disputations stemming from the second Parisian regency is De virtutibus. They would have said " De anima et ultra." Instead, they explicitly say " De virtutibus et ultra." Further, the collection of disputations known as De virtutibus parallels St. Thomas's composition of the Secunda Pars, which he was working on at that time in Paris, while the
De anima parallels Prima Pars, q. 75 ff. Furthermore, there are too many works attributed to St. Thomas's second regency, especially if Dom Marc's thesis is correct concerning the Summa contra gentiles. Even if Dom Marc's thesis is not correct, there are still too many works crowded into this period. Moreover, St. Thomas was working on some of the Aristotelian commentaries at this time besides the Summa theologiae, numerous opuscula and carrying out his duties as a regent master. After all, St. Thomas was in Paris for a second regency only two and a half years. It is natural to think that St. Thomas would have disputed on questions that most occupied his mind at the time. My own opinion is that he disputed the questions De anima in Italy, probably at Rome, where he was regent master in the new Studium Generale, or at Orvieto, where he was assigned for four years and lectured at the papal curia.
The question De unione Verbi Incarnati is more difficult to date and place. Since it is not noted in any of the lists mentioned by Dr. Robb, it may very well be that these were disputed at Naples where St. Thomas was sent after his second Parisian regency. As regent master he would be obliged to lecture on Sacred Scripture and to hold disputations as well as to preach. No one to my knowledge has attempted to determine which disputations were held at Naples. Moreover, St. Thomas would be particularly interested in this question, having written the first part of the Tertia Pars either at Paris or at Naples. If anything, the De unione Verbi Incarnati was not disputed in Paris; it may have been disputed in Italy where he found Latin versions of the early Ecumenical Councils and the Fathers of the Church.
My own inclination would be to list the chronological arrangement of the Quaestiones disputatae as follows:
I. Paris (1256-59) De veritate (qq. 1-7; qq. 8-20; qq. 21-29)
II. Italy (1259-68) De potentia
De spiritualibus creaturis
De anima
III. Paris (1269-72) De virtutibus (in communi; De caritate; De correctione fraterna; De spe; De virtutibus cardinalibus)
De malo
IV. Naples (1272-74) De unione Verbi Incarnati
The text of the De anima is very good and well presented. Nevertheless, one must always keep in mind that this version represents the university tradition. Apparently it was this version that had the greatest historical influence, at least before the printed versions. To the objection that editions of medieval texts are versions of works that never existed before, we can answer that this text belongs to a clearly defined tradition; it is not a conglomeration of variant readings for a version that never existed in
history. It is carefully done and excellently produced. More work like this needs to be done even before the Leonine editors get around to producing a definitive version. The fact that Dr. Robb recognizes the existence of a second manuscript tradition is a far-reaching step. Readers encountering a printed text of a medieval author too often assume that it is the Gospel truth and are not even aware of the subtleties and difficulties encountered by an editor.
James A. Weisheipl, O. P.
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
Toronto, Canada
The Apple, or Aristotle's Death. Translated from the Latin, with an introduction, by Mary F. Rousseau, M. A. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1969. Pp. 81. $3.00.
St. Thomas Aquinas: On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists. Translated from the Latin, with an introduction, by Beatrice H. Zedler. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968. Pp. 83. $3.00.
Long attributed to Aristotle by scholars of lesser standing during the Middle Ages, The Apple, or Aristotle's Death was probably of Arabian origin, the three paragraphs referring to Noe and Abraham having been inserted probably by a Hebrew translator of the original dialogue. Already deemed spurious by Thomas Aquinas and many of his contemporaries, there are at least five points of evidence against Aristotelian authorship. The first is that this dialogue is far too garrulous, in strict contrast to Aristotle's own dialogues (as well as we know them now) and the very concise style of the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. The second point is that this dialogue contains very strange medical doctrine, which could hardly be attributed to the son of the famous physician, Nicomachus. The third point lies in the very poetic language ascribed to a man whose recognizably last writings contained terms of the best scientific precision for his time. The fourth point comprises the numerous contradictions to his scientific teaching. A fifth point is that the dialogue is imbued with a strange melancholy hardly in keeping with the Stagirite's character as known historically but well in keeping with the historically known character of Manfred, who apparently produced the first Latin translation of the dialogue from a Hebrew version before December, 1263.
We can thank Miss Rousseau for introducing us to an area poorly represented in Western publications and for producing a good English translation of the dialogue, including the Margoliouth English translation of The Book of the Apple from the Persian. Her summaries about the
influence of Plato's Phaedo upon the author of The Apple, the history of the latter's origin and tradition, and the manuscript tradition of the Latin version of The Apple, are well presented.
Working in an area in which modem scholarship has yielded a better-developed order of historical data and making use of the critical edition of the opusculum as produced by L. W. Keeler, S. J., Dr. Zedler has made a very good translation of the Aquinas defense of the coherent Aristotelian psychology concerning the mind against the Averroists at the University of Paris during the late 1260's and early 1270's. Her summaries of the history previous to and contemporaneous with the dispute about the unity of the mind (as well as her choice of excellent references in this regard), immediate facts relevant to the Aquinas treatise and its relationship with writings of Siger of Brabant, and the content and structure of this treatise, represent a splendid accomplishment.
F. C. Lehner, O. P.
Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.
Aristotle's Syllogistic: By Lynn E. Rose. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1968. Pp. 149.
It is no secret among logicians that Aristotle's theory of the syllogism has been the subject of much controversy for centuries. During these confrontations the Peripatetic has received many criticisms as well as many encomia for his pioneering efforts in the sphere of formal logic. In light of these varied representations of Aristotle's Syllogistic the author of this book purposes to correct once and for all some of these old and gross misunderstandings. By offering this amalgam of essays on the essential elements of syllogistic reasoning Dr. Rose hopes to " exonerate " Aristotle's theory. Using the Prior Analytics almost exclusively, his main thesis is that the only genuine way to view the syllogism is " as a linear array of three terms." With mostly probable arguments the author attempts in scholarly fashion to establish this position and then to explore its many consequences in deductive logic.
In general this book is composed of two parts: (1) the arguments themselves (pp. 3-97), and (2) the appendices (pp. 99-143). The first part is made up of ten chapters of uneven length, ranging from three pages e.g., chaps. II, V, VII) to twenty-two pages (e.g., chap. VIII) and arranged in no special order. The six appendices are quite similar as to their arrangement and length, the longest being a most interesting study of " Theophrastus and the Indirect Moods." (pp. 109-132)
In the early chapters Dr. Rose sees the Peripatetic's theory of the syllogism principally as a natural result of an evolutionary process of " premise sets " from Plato's theories about division and recollection. As long as Rose realizes that " division " was a very remote stepping-stone to the demonstration that Aristotle talks about in the Analytics, these chapters are of some value in his project. In the next few chapters (pp. 16-52) the author attempts to do three things but not always with equal success: (1) to explain why the syllogistic as conceived by Aristotle is exclusively a three-figured structure (chap. 3); (2) to show why logical " rules " are superfluous in the syllogistic in light of his earlier discussion about the sufficiency of " premise sets " in any argument (chap. 4); and (3) to emphasize the importance of the " reduction " technique in the axiomatization of Aristotle's formal logic. Of the subsequent chapters the best done are the most controversial ones on the " Counter Example Technique in Invalidation " (Chap. 6) and " The Fourth Figure and the Indirect First " (Chap. 8). However, we would heartily disagree that " counter examples would be perfectly appropriate as bases for a system of logic" (p. 51); nor is his rather dogmatic interpretation of the Aristotelian technique of " reduction" satisfactory in light of his lack of concern about the act of consequence in the syllogistic. Finally, of the half dozen or so typographical errors (e.g., pp. 3, 59, 89, 106, 116, and 138), only those on pp. 89, footnote 27 (consequence should have read consequent) , and p. 106, line 4, were serious.
To this reviewer Dr. Rose has performed a courageous and scholarly work in a highly sensitive area of formal logic. For his candid views, generally expressed quite soberly, Rose's colleagues in the field of Logic will be most appreciative, yet not too convinced that his principal aim was achieved. Chapters 4 and 10 were not done too scientifically. By way of constructive criticism we would like to make a few suggestions that might have helped the author realize his aims more perfectly: (1) greater expression of medieval and modern commentators on the Analytics; (2) more benign attitude towards other logicians' positions, especially those with reputations like Ross, Aristotle himself, and Lukasiewicz (see p. 39); and (3) less disregard for the necessity and vitality of the illative act in all genuine syllogistical reasoning. Despite these shortcomings and its limited appeal due to its tremendous scholarship, Rose's Aristotle's Syllogistic is a definite contribution to the literature of formal logic.
Dennis C. Kane, O. P.
Providence College
Providence, R. I.
Studies in Analogy. By Ralph McInerny. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968. Pp. 147. 19.80 guilders.
Like his earlier work on analogy, The Logic of Analogy, Professor Mclnerny's recent penetrating book, Studies in Analogy concentrates on Aquinas's doctrine of analogy. Basically, though not exclusively, Studies in Analogy deals with two exegetical problems in Aquinas's teaching on analogy. First and foremost, it confronts the difficult and crucial problem of whether or not Aquinas holds that there is a ratio communis (common notion) in an analogous name, and if he does, how the medieval doctor then distinguishes the ratio communis of an analogous name from the ratio communis of an univocal generic term. Second, Mclnerny investigates the question of the relationship of analogy to metaphor in St. Thomas. Concretely, he asks whether for Aquinas a metaphor is a kind of analogous name or whether it is to be distinguished from an analogous name.
As regards the first problem, Mclnerny first brings the issue of the ratio communis of an analogous name into sharp focus by carefully citing a number of Thomistic texts which seem to conflict openly on the question of whether or not there is a ratio communis in an analogous name. Rejecting the view that these texts are really incompatible with each other and that their differences are to be explained in terms of a change of mind on the part of St. Thomas, Mclnerny contends that the prima facie inconsistency dissolves once one realizes that Aquinas distinguishes two senses of ratio communis, i. e., the ratio communis of an analogous name and the ratio communis of an univocal generic name.
But the problem is exactly how St. Thomas distinguishes them. In other words, precisely how does Aquinas say the way something analogously common to many differs from what is univocally common? This can only be answered, Mclnerny holds, by first understanding what St. Thomas means by " analogically common " (as opposed to " univocally common "). But now if, as Aquinas says, the distinguishing mark of an analogous as opposed to an univocal name is that it does not signify one notion common to many but rather several notions related as prior and posterior, then how is it even meaningful to speak of the ratio communis of an analogous name or of something which is analogically common?
Using " healthy " as an example in the statements (1) " The dog is healthy," (2) "Food is healthy," and (3) "A cold nose is healthy," Mclnerny suggests that sense can be made of saying that " healthy " here is analogically common by identifying the ratio communis of " healthy " with " related in some way to health." Stated generally, the ratio communis of an analogous name is the res significata (the essence or nature) taken together with " a variable whose values would be determinate modi significandi." (p. 102) In other words, " being related in some indeterminate way to health " is what the subject terms of the above statements have
in common, even though, of course, they do not have health itself in common. In the sense described then, St. Thomas can speak of the ratio communis of a term which is predicated analogously. By contrast, the ratio communis of what signifies univocally according to Mclnerny (and, I take it, Aquinas too) is identical with its ratio propria. Thus in (4) " The dog is healthy," (5) " The cat is healthy," and (6) " The horse is healthy," the ratio communis is the nature health together with a determinate way of signifying it, i. e., " subject of health." Thus, what is common to the dog, the cat and the horse is that each of them is a subject of health.
Nevertheless, to this way of distinguishing the ratio communis of an univocal name from that of an analogous name it may be objected that the distinction is made possible in the first place only by falsely identifying what is univocally common with the res significata together with the usual mode of signifying it. For while it is true that the subject terms in, say, (4), (5), and (6) above are alike in being " subjects of health," still, someone might insist that only that which is predicated of these same subject terms can be said to be univocally common to them. But that which is predicated of them (according to Aquinas) is simply the essence health taken absolutely or, in other words, simply the res significata considered apart from any mode of signifying. But if this is true, it follows that St. Thomas cannot distinguish what is analogously common from what is univocally common the way Mclnerny says he does. Or, if Aquinas does indeed make the distinction in this way, he does so inconsistently. In any case, it is the reviewer's opinion that a discussion of this rather immediate objection would have helped to make the author's otherwise excellent treatment of the problem of the ratio communis univocal and analogous names more provocative and complete.
Finally, still in connection with this same problem of the ratio communis, there seems to be a certain ambiguity in Mclnerny's analysis on the question of whether or not the ratio communis and the ratio propria of an analogous name are identical. Most of the time the author implies they are not identical. In fact, it is their very difference in an analogous name that marks off the latter from an univocal name in which the two rationes are identical. But, at least in two places, Mclnerny expressly and misleadingly identifies these rationes in an analogous name. Thus: " From such considerations it seems to follow that the notion which is analogically common is none other than the ratio propria of the name." (p. 63) And again: " The ratio communis of the analogous name . . . is rather the most proper meaning of the term in question. . . ." (p. 63) But later on he clearly differentiates the two rationes in an analogous name. (p. 102) This ambiguity, occurring as it does at crucial points in Mclnerny's analysis, tends to leave the average reader somewhat confused as to what according to the author, is St. Thomas's teaching on the nature of the ratio communis in univocal and analogous names.
As regards the second, less fundamental problem (i. e., whether or not metaphor is a kind of analogy), Mclnerny's analysis is without ambiguity. He clearly shows how, according to Aquinas, analogy is formally distinct from metaphor by contending that, while the former always involves a new way of signifying the res significata, the latter never involves a new way of signifying the same form. Rather, a thing metaphorically named is referred to what is properly named by the term in question " because of a similarity of effects or properties." Nevertheless, the author points out that, if one goes by the narrower etymological meaning of metaphor (i. e., to transfer), then, to the extent that analogy involves a transfer of a word from its usual context, analogy may be say to be a kind of metaphor.
John F. Peterson
University of Rhode Island
Kingston, R. I.
Greek Thought and the Rise of Christianity. By James Shiel. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968. Pp. 161. $2.50.
Shiel's volume, presented in this country in paper by a firm commonly linked with the less-than-scholarly student handbook, marks a pleasing departure from that tradition. It is one of the series Problems and Perspectives in History which evolved under the general editorship of Hugh Kearney from the inter-disciplinary approach in force at the University of Sussex where Shiel lectures in classical and medieval thought. Although some might describe the work as an anthology, there is a much wider editorial consideration of issues than that format usually allows: fully half the text is Shiel's commentary. Even were this not so, with a problem as intricate as the relationship of Greek to Christian thinking, the selector/arranger can never move too far from the scene of his deeds. It can be reported that Shiel has positioned his texts with verve, imagination and fairness. The product is balanced and sure to prove a useful item for upper level college courses.
What is the philosopher to make of the New Testament, asks Shiel, and how account for Eusebius's declaration that " Nobody can deny that our Lord and Saviour was a philosopher and a truly pious man, no imposter or magician "? This encomium, of course, comes but a few generations after Paul warned his Colossians about the empty deceptions of philosophy. Shiel offers a generous cross-section of ancient writers who successively formulate and discard opinions, some tentative, some rabid, on the relationship of philosophy to the new religion. We meet Jesus who was a philosopher in spite of Paul, and Jesus who was not because of Paul. The procession
of witnesses is well introduced and a perspective of caution maintained. Part 1 brings the reader from Clement of Alexandria up to Gemistos Plethon, and the compiler has written generous pages of orientation to his forty-odd authors. The matter is broken down into four chapters treating: the question of Greek rationalism and the possibility of a religious undertone, as we understand it, in that thought; the noisy advent of followers of Jesus into the intellectual stoa and the various attempts to synthesize faith with the evidence of reason. Since this discussion is too often carried on solely in terms of Augustine's view, it is refreshing to find appreciation for what Damascene, Michael Psellos and Origen have contributed to the effort.
Part II is devoted to some thirteen " historical " approaches to the faith and reason question. In line with the definition given history by the general editor, the discussion here ranges into economic and social themes with Troeltsch, Gibbon and Toynbee represented. The same sense of balance and variety is had here as in Part I: Nietzsche speaks and Péguy responds.
If we are to take seriously Lord Acton's admonition to study problems in preference to periods--and the limitations of the lecture system still in vogue makes this an imperative--then Shiel's work offers hope that an historical approach can be combined with incisive commentary to the detriment of neither. Documentation is complete and so also is the index. While biographical data is supplied, one might have hoped for a larger bibliography.
John B. Davis, O. P.
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, Pa.
The Geometric Spirit. The Abbé de Condillac and the French Enlightenment. By Isabel F. Knight. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 321. $10.00.
While the Abbé de Condillac can scarcely be regarded as a major philosopher--or even a very important popularizer, as the often-reprinted Voltaire, for instance--a careful study of his works can provide a fascinating example of one way eighteenth-century, officially Christian Europe attempted to preserve the rationalism of Descartes and the empiricism of Locke while maintaining at least the forms of religious orthodoxy.
According to the Condillac family's oral tradition, the abbé was always careful to do and say the things orthodoxy required of him. A priest as a result of family pressures, he is said to have offered Mass only once, on the occasion of his ordination; nevertheless he was careful to wear always
the prescribed cassock, he assisted at Mass regularly in his private chapel, and professed at the end of his life that he died in the Catholic faith. Condillac's primary interest, however, seems to have been that of a bloodless sort of philosophe; that is, a man intensely interested in understanding the workings of a sensibly perceived universe he assumed to be wholly rational, but a man devoid of any zeal to change political, social, or religious structures.
As Miss Knight sees the relationship between Condillac's religious orthodoxy and his philosophical enterprise:
Perhaps the most striking thing about Condillac's religious references is their irrelevance to everything else in his philosophy. . . . They make no difference to his system, which would be the same without them. . . . Whether he really believed in the Christian revelation, or whether it was a mere convention which he dared not openly reject, is probably impossible to ascertain, but some tentative suggestions may be made. I think it more likely than not that he really accepted, with little passion and with some mental reservations, the Catholic position and simply kept it isolated from his philosophy, with which it was not compatible. . . . How he did it, by what intellectual or psychological machinery he managed not to let his left hand know what his right hand was doing, may be explained by two elements in his makeup: his conventional and retiring spirit, and his formalistic, unemotional temperament. Controversy and rebellion were deeply threatening to Condillac.
Miss Knight, however, reveals in her speculation concerning Condillac's reconciliation of religious orthodoxy and philosophical innovation, a certain simplistic approach to " Catholic theology," as she calls it:
His empiricism was incompatible with the metaphysics on which Catholic theology had always rested; his psychology made unnecessary any belief in the fundamental spirituality of man; and his assumption that anything worth explaining can be accounted for by natural means made theological explanations superfluous.
The author seems to be accepting here too readily an identity between Descartes' epistemology, with its divinely implanted ideas, and Christian doctrine. And she would seem to think, too, that a bona fide Christian could not share La Place's conviction that there is no place in astronomy, or in any other natural science, for what would amount to a deus ex machina.
However, Miss Knight's principal purpose in The Geometric Spirit was not to explain Condillac's accommodations vis à vis the Church but to
demonstrate the fact of Condillac's basic rationalism [and] to show how it functioned in his thought: how it shaped and altered the empiricist principles he had acquired from Locke, how it determined the meaning he attached to those ambiguous and omnipresent words " nature " and " reason," how it acted as an unconsciously held metaphysics which comes through most clearly in his methodology, how it served as an anchor for his religious convictions, and how it gave him an image of man and his works not dreamt of in the empirical philosophy.
Condillac's " basic rationalism " was rooted in "a view of the universe which assumed a fundamental order behind the empirically observable phenomena, an order more significant than the phenomena, which man can come to know because it is an order essentially congenial to his reason." It is this rationalism that explains the title, The Geometric Spirit. As the author explains in the second chapter, " Metaphysics en geomètre,"
while pure mathematics, mathematics divorced from the observable world, had markedly declined in prestige by the middle of the eighteenth century, mathematics as a technique of empirical science remained very much alive, and it was in the light of this conception of the geometric spirit that Condillac set himself the task of working out its implications for metaphysics.
The author elaborates several pages later:
Condillac's unbounded admiration for Newton, whose method he hoped to approximate, suggests that, like many another thinker of the second rank, he wanted to be the Newton of philosophy, reconciling the opposing tendencies of empiricism and mathematics. And, indeed, his work contains both elements. On the one hand, he adopted Locke's empiricist epistemology, and on the other, he championed mathematics as the perfect language for expressing and expanding knowledge. But . . . instead of subordinating mathematics to the requirements of the data by making it an instrument of measurement, comparison, and expression, he selected and shaped his data to fit the logical structures of analytic algebra. His logic became the master, rather than the servant, of his thought.
The remaining chapters of The Geometric Spirit consist of analyses of eight of Condillac's principal works, a chapter being devoted to each of them. Chapter Three, " True Systems and False Systems," is a careful study of the abbe's Traité des systèmes, an inquiry into the basis for some unity of the sciences, a unity required by Condillac's geometrical approach. The philosophe, however, did not let his enthusiasm for system-building destroy his respect for empirical data. Miss Knight translates a pertinent passage from the Traité:
To imagine that we can ever have enough observations to make a general system is to hope too much from the advancement of physics. The more materials experience furnishes us, the more we will feel what is lacking for so vast a construction. There will always remain phenomena to be discovered. . . . For, everything being connected, the explanation of the things that we observe depends on an infinity of others, which we shall never be able to observe.
Nevertheless, though the whole system of nature eludes man's grasp, partial systems can be discovered. And it is these partial systems the abbé attempts to explain in his Traité des sensations, with its " thought experiment" involving the genesis of sensation in the " statue man "; the Traité des animaux, with its ambiguous conclusion that animals and men differ in their knowledge only by degree and yet are of different " essences ";
the Essai sur I'origine des connaissances humaines, with its rationalistic reconstruction of the genesis of human language; the De L'Art d'écrire, with its aesthetic combining French classicism as the highest form of art with an openness to the aesthetic values of other cultures; the Cours d'étude, embodying the results of Condillac's theories and practice in tutoring the Prince of Parma for nine years; and Le Commerce et le gouvernement, a highly original essay on economic theory and the origin of political systems.
Miss Knight does more than merely paraphrase Condillac. She investigates his sources, provides an excellent historical background, and furnishes a helpful critical commentary. The fourteen-page bibliography with critical notes is carefully done.
Still, there is a nagging problem about the whole book: why spend so much time, energy, and talent on a strictly second-rate philosopher whose influence on the direction of philosophical study has been so slight as to be almost non-existent? Perhaps to establish his uninfluential, second-rate status--or, perhaps, by contrast, to give us a new appreciation of the real giants of philosophical thought? But, whatever the intention, The Geometric Spirit supplies a well-written, scholarly, and at times brilliant study of a figure about whom the historian of philosophy will always be led to ask the sorts of questions Miss Knight answers.
Rosemary Lauer
San Diego State College
San Diego, Calif.
The Religious Experience of Mankind. By Ninian Smart. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969. Pp. 576. $10.00.
The Bhagavad Gītā. Translated, with introduction and critical essays by Eliot Deutsch. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. Pp. 193. $4.95.
In The Religious Experience of Mankind, Smart discusses the nature of religion and describes the formulations and cultural manifestations of the variety of religious experiences from the days of our earliest evidence on through the present writings. There is a great wealth of material in this book, and it will be of significant help to most undergraduate students of comparative religion. The comprehensive nature of the work makes complete evaluation an impossible task, and so this reviewer will make a general evaluation of each chapter and indicate what he sees as assets and deficiencies in terms of the particular elements. The book is an overly
ambitious project, one that simply cannot live up to the promise of its title. The stronger parts are those dealing with ancient themes and perspectives, the weaker are those parts dealing with medieval and contemporary areas.
The first chapter is a discussion of the nature of religion. The author maintains that the study of religion can be a scientific discipline by reason of the many technological advances both in research and communication. Smart recognizes difficulties " in our appreciating fully the content and quality of prophetic, mystical, and other forms of religious experience," but maintains that " there is a sense in which we can deal with them objectively." One problem here is the choosing of what to include in the reports of such experience. This reviewer agrees with Smart that Paul's " shattering experience in the Damascus Road " is germane to a " proper account of Paul's apostolate," but other reports are not so clearly authentic in terms of what is included or omitted. For example, the early imprisonment (?) of Thomas Aquinas is included, whereas the acceptance of Christianity by the father of Karl Marx is omitted. In his discussion of religion the author presents six dimensions: ritual, mythology, doctrine, ethics, the social, and the experiential. These elements do present a good framework for a comparison of religious differences.
" Prehistoric and Primitive Religions " is the title of the second chapter. This is a good report on historical material, but the interpretive elements are sources of dissatisfaction. Freud seems to have been rather arbitrarily introduced and even more arbitrarily dismissed, whereas Jung is not even mentioned. Tyler, Schmidt, and Fraser are cited in the discussion about the origins of religion, but Albright is ignored even though his From the Stone Age to Christianity is the first book listed by the author in his bibliography for the sixth chapter.
Chapter Three, " The Indian Experience," is a superior presentation of the varieties of Hindu thought. This is the finest chapter of the book, and it reflects previous work in this area by the author. All of us who discuss Buddhism have a problem with the identification labels for the two major divisions. This reviewer suggests the term particularistic for Hinayana or Theravada and transcendental for Mahayana, since the commonly used terms often seem offensive to one group or the other. In his discussion of the classical schools Smart does not indicate the broad use of Yoga techniques, especially in Tibetan Buddhism (later on he does mention similarities in Taoism to Buddhist Yoga). His treatment of the Vedanta School should have begun with Gaudapada, since there has been much attention on the part of scholars to the possible identification of medieval Indian Buddhism and the rise of Vedantism, and Smart himself mentions that some of Shankara's contemporaries called him a " crypto-Buddhist." It would be more meaningful to describe Ramanuja's thought as " non-duality with differences" or " identity in differences" and his doctrine of maya as viewing the world as non-ultimate.
Chapter Four is concerned with " Chinese and Japanese Religious Experience " and it is very well done. One difficulty in understanding the religious life of China follows from the blending of Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. Smart does much to clarify these interrelations and to delineate each of the schools. His discussions of Taoism and Chinese Buddhism are especially good. Perhaps some comment was in order about the divorce between ethics and metaphysics as background for Smart's section on K'ung (why not call him Confucius even if it is a latinization?). He did not do so well with the doctrine of Yin and Yang. Nor was his section on Japanese thought as clear or as informative as that on China.
Chapter Five deals with the Ancient Mediterranean World and is mostly a mere report culled from various sources. The information here will be of help to the beginner, but there is little attempt to probe the religious experiences themselves. The ideas influencing the Greeks and Romans are not examined to any significant extent; the result is that we do not see the development of the Hellenic mind. The passing mention of the Pythagorean brotherhood in the text is quite unsatisfactory.
The chapter on " The Jewish Experience " has to be judged by those more competent in the field than this reviewer who has no way of knowing whether or not Jeremiah's prophetic role was a unique individualization of the God-man relationship beyond that of the other prophets. Here the author does not do much more than report the events when it is expected that he would try to give us insights into the experiences of the people. His discussion of the Kabbalah and the Hasidim do move in this direction and are more satisfying. On the other hand, his treatment of Zionism is again unsatisfactory in that he does not give us the religious dimension of the movement. Many Jews today have much to say about the theological notion of land in contemporary Jewish perspective, which is missing in Smart's book.
Reading Chapter Seven on " The Early Christian Experience" as a layman rather than as a professional, this reviewer felt that it simply did not capture the experience of the early Christian communities. The same criticism is placed against Chapter Eight and its treatment of the Muslim experience. Sufism is handled better than was monasticism in the previous chapter. Indian Islamism is practically ignored except for fragments on Iqbal and Ahmad. There is no insight into the spirit of Islam as it developed in central Asia and brought Pakistan into existence as well as giving India the religious and political problem it has with the Muslims today.
Chapter Nine is entitled " The Later Christian Experience." It attempts to cover the years from the Dark Ages up to and including the Second Vatican Council. It is most unlikely that anyone could satisfy even himself in a project such as this. Historical fragments seem thrown
together without much attention to the religious attitudes themselves. It would seem impossible to understand the religious attitudes of the Middle Ages without examining the various positions taken on the faith/reason question. The author does not do this. Nor does he give us much of an understanding of the influences of medieval Augustinianism, Averroism, or Scotism. In terms of medieval mysticism Smart does point out a number of similarities between Eckhart and Oriental thought. Although mentioned as an element of the ecumenical spirit, Vatican II is not given consideration as a principle of renewal in the religious life of Roman Catholics. So many important thinkers are left out of the discussion of contemporary Christianity that what is given becomes too arbitrary to be meaningful.
The tenth chapter which presents the humanistic dimension is the least effective from the standpoint of the stated objectives of the book. The treatment of Feuerbach is not in line with the tremendous influence he has had on the humanistic mind. The discussion of Marxism is somewhat better, but those who give Marxism its religious dimension today, men such as Bloch and Garaudy, are not mentioned. Existentialism is presented in the figures of Sartre and Kierkegaard, but Heidegger is incredibly omitted, as are the rest of the existentialists. And the contributions and insights of those belonging to the school of Linguistic Analysis are also left out.
The final chapter is entitled " The Contemporary Experience and the Future." This is a most interesting essay, one which brings Smart's professional background to bear upon the current situation. He concludes that religions are moving closer together even though differences are being accentuated in certain areas. There is an implication here that the present structures will endure even as new structures are being formed.
The New translation of the Bhagavad Gītā by Eliot Deutsch is not quite as readable as some others have been, but this is because Deutsch makes a point of staying close to the original text, which is a distinct advantage of his work. The Introduction and the Essays by the translator are well written and should prove to be of much help to students approaching the Gītā for the first time. His essay on " The Meta-Theological Structure " is especially good as an introduction to the notion of God in the Gītā.
Russell Naughton
La Salle College
Philadelphia, Pa.
page 787
The Christian New Morality. By O. Sydney Barr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 118. $4.00.
According to Barr the New Morality, better described as the Situation Ethic, has four basic premises, although his primary concern is with the last one. These premises are: (1) Persons are more important than things; (2) Love alone is the ultimate criterion for making ethical decisions; (3) What love demands in any specific instance depends upon the situation; (4) The New Morality is biblical morality. Behind it lies the authority of Jesus Christ himself. Barr makes out a cogent case for the biblical foundation of the New Morality by establishing the priority and primacy of agape over law.
His analysis proceeds this way: The New Morality is biblical morality if it can be shown that (1) the teaching of Christ is not antinomian: (2) Christ was committed to a respect and reverence for the law, but he was never the legalist because in the texts cited by Barr it should be evident that he always maintained the primacy of agape. Situationalism insists that love is primary and that law is thereby relativized in importance. Law is for persons and not persons for the law. Law should never be considered as an end in itself; persons should never be considered as mere means, which is evident if in every situation law is primary and love secondary. Barr's case is strong if it is confined only to this conclusion: that Situationalism, identified by the primacy and priority of agape, is biblical morality. This includes a large number of interested parties, and no complaints can be raised by Fletcher, Robinson, Brunner, Niebuhr, Ramsey, Haring, and some of the Roman Catholic writers who are doing some exhilarating writing by enlarging the ambits of their own tradition. It is more a matter of all of these writers agreeing that agape is primary and that what survives of the priority of law over love in some juridical statements of the institutional Church will consequently be open to criticism as to their compatibility with biblical morality. But then the differences begin to appear.
The problems arise in a book like Barr's when we ask the deeper question--does the biblical evidence point to anything more than the primacy of agape? In other words, does the evidence vindicate Situationalism of any one of the several kinds? Dr. Barr sees the difficulties here because he says on page 29:
We have now reached the point where we can better appreciate the position of those who claim the authority of Jesus himself for their insistence that love alone is the ultimate criterion for decision-making. Admittedly, proof positive that the claim is correct is impossible. The gospels do not offer examples of Jesus' contravening every law of his day. Furthermore, there is no record of his having discussed the matter of law versus absolutes, or of legalism versus freedom, in the technical language of, or from the perspective of, today's Situation Ethics. And
we most certainly cannot read his mind. We have, nevertheless, uncovered certain elements of the gospel picture which clearly underline the strength of the situationist's position. It is now apparent that Jesus himself understood agape not simply as one of many guidelines for man's relationship with others, but as something in a special category all its own. There is no question but that he held the religious laws of his tradition in high esteem. It is equally certain that he did not hesitate to go beyond these laws. He did not do this arbitrarily, but whenever and wherever a primary concern for persons and sensitivity to human need dictated. Never, as far as the gospel record is concerned, did he default from this criterion, or allow any other consideration to have a higher claim.
Situationalism is protean and the classifications that are helpful in this discussion are similar to the classifications employed in treating of Utilitarianism. Philosophers refer to pure-act-utilitarianism, modified-act-utilitarianism, and pure-rule-utilitarianism. As Professor Luther J. Binkley clearly points out in Conflict of Ideals, the pure-act-utilitarian maintains that in a specific situation one ought to explore the likely consequences of one's actions and then choose to act so as to bring about the greatest amount of happiness possible. The important point here is that the pure-act-utilitarian holds that one ought not to ask about the likely consequences which might ensue " if the same thing were done in similar situations (i. e., if it were made a rule to do that act in such situations." (William K. Frankena, " Love and Principle in Christian Ethics," in Faith and Philosophy: Philosophical Studies in Religion and Ethics, ed. by Alvin Platinga, p. 207). At issue for the act-utilitarian is only the specific contemplated act for a particular circumstance; it is held to be irrelevant to inquire as to whether one ought to act that way in future situations which might be similar.
Opposed to the act-utilitarian, the rule-utilitarian maintains that in a particular situation one ought to appeal to some set of general rules, such as, " Tell the truth," Do not commit murder," etc., rather than attempt to calculate the likely consequences of the contemplated action. Rule-utilitarians would justify the rule even in the exceptional case by pointing out that in the last analysis more good is achieved for everyone by always upholding the moral rules. While a lie in a specific situation might produce more immediate good for those directly concerned, it would tend to break down the moral fabric of our society and encourage lying in other situations which might be less justifiable. Therefore, the greatest amount of good in the long run for the greatest number of people would be obtained by an undeviating adherence to the moral rule.
The third class is modified-act-utilitarianism. This interpretation recognizes elements of strength in both rule- and act-utilitarianism. The modified act-utilitarian admits that rules can be formulated for moral action, but he insists that these rules are not absolute; they are only generally binding. Thus in most cases, " Tell the truth " will produce the
greatest amount of good, but one is justified, for the sake of the ultimate principle of utility itself, in disobeying the rule in a particular situation where more good is likely to be achieved by such disobedience. Frankena in the article cited above suggests that the discussion concerning the status of rules or principles in Christian ethics parallels the discussion between the act and the rule utilitarians. The highest and ultimate principle in Christian ethics is agape or the " law of love," and in the light of this ultimate commitment the Christian ethic can be developed in terms of pure-act-agapism, modified-act-agapism, or pure-rule agapism. These distinctions are not sharply drawn in most of the writings on Christian ethics (as Professor Binkley has pointed out), but he offers some suggestions of ethicists in contemporary ethics who seem to fit fairly well into this classificatory scheme.
For pure-act-agapism Binkley considers that the Frankena terminology fits Fletcher the closest; that Robinson, Niebuhr (Reinhold), and Brunner might be seen as modified-act-agapists; and the best example of rule-agapism would be Ramsey. If we accept this outline of representative Christian ethicists, then we can raise the further question whether the evidence as Barr sees it bears out any one of the three kinds of agapism. It seems to me that the most difficulties are confronted by the pure-act-agapist who would look to the biblical evidence for apodictic evidence to support his claim. That evidence is a least ambiguous, and in a portion of a chapter of a book of mine (Christian Ethics for Today) I addressed myself to this problem. Barr considers the same text as I did in that chapter (p. 142 ff) describing Christ's behavior with the woman taken in adultery. The question is whether Christ reacts in the same way or a different way than the way situationalism seems to react. It appears to me that the incident does not offer categorical evidence for the Situationalist, especially the pure-act agapist.
For the Situationalist (pure-act-agapist), adultery must always be submitted to the crucial test of loving concern and, if this is promoted, then adultery can be situationally justified. Does Christ resolve the problem of the woman taken in adultery in exactly the same way? Of course, there was the additional problem of the relation of the Pharisees toward this woman. But he never asked the woman whether there was a situational defense for what she had done. He did not ask her what the pure-act-agapist would ask if the problem arose concerning adultery. For the Situationalist of the pure-act-agapist type the reaction is to submit a concrete existential case where adultery might be right and another where it may be wrong. But how does Christ behave toward the adulteress? He does not resolve the problem by disposing of the law and state that it must serve the situation in the name of loving concern. He does not seem to say that adultery is morally indifferent until a concrete case is submitted to him for a provisional and then final answer. He does not absolutize the
law as the legalist is represented as doing in the person of the Pharisees. They were anxious to see whether he would put aside the law in the name of love or charity and therefore be in opposition to their understanding of morality. On the other hand, they watched to see whether he would dismiss charity in the name of law and thereby recognize their conception of morality. The Pharisees would have subjected Christ to criticism in either event. However, if we read John 8:3-11 carefully we shall find that Our Lord neither discarded the law in the name of charity nor discarded charity in the name of the law. He was the wisest of all Situationalists in resolving the tension that existed between law and love, and therefore his first reaction was to place the law of adultery in proper perspective and to ask the Pharisees who were accusing the woman: " Let him that is without sin among you be the first to throw a stone at her." Christ implied that, if the law was to be cited by the Pharisees against the woman, then they should be consistent in allowing the law to be cited against themselves. This willingness on the part of the Pharisees would indicate a real genuine concern for law and not an idolatry toward the law. That they had an idolatry toward the law was revealed in the aftermath of his remarks. They left and silently admitted their unwillingness to be judged by the very law that they directed against the woman. Christ therefore made clear that judgment was to be made by God and no one else. He would equally show that forgiveness belongs ultimately to God and therefore he forgave the woman, not by saying that the law did not apply, or that she had not possibly sinned in the act of adultery, or that her psychological reaction should be one of mild regret because of a possible wrong ethical situational resolution, nor did he give indication that remorse and guilt were not proper to her. He simply said " I do not condemn you." In fact he implied that her wrongdoing was not only a possibility but an actuality because he advised her against future adultery and said: " Go and sin no more." Christ must have known that some of the situations in which this woman entered were experiences that were performed with loving concern. The prostitute with the heart of gold must have existed in Christ's day!! In those cases participants were better disposed to accept themselves and others as a result of their relationship. Nevertheless, Christ does not seem to relativize the law to the extent that would satisfy the pure-act-agapist, but he liberated the law from the charge of legalism by his exercise of love and forgiveness.
If this explanation I offer is plausible, then the Situationalism found in the biblical evidence is more to be characterized as a modified-act-situationalism or a pure-rule situationalism. The texts are hard to make compatible with the position of the pure-act-agapist. Barr's study examines texts in the first three Gospels, in St. Paul's letters, and in the Johannine writings, In all of these agape is viewed as love-with-responsibility. The last chapter applies the criterion of agape to several contemporary economic,
political and sociological problems. Barr's questioning of the real seriousness of the Church in exercising her own genuine biblical morality is pointed and sharp. In doing so, Barr is testifying to the prominence that has been given in contemporary culture to the ethic of responsibility over the ethic of conviction. The first makes its ultimate concern in the determination of rightness or wrongness the presence of agape in the personal empirical verifiable consequences of one's actions; the second makes the ultimate concern the principle or the rule with more or less indifference to the consequences. My own position developed in Christian Ethics For Today (Bruce-Macmillan, 1969) is that we cannot live on just one of these ethics consistently, constantly and uniformly, but we have to live on both in dialectical tension. Conscience in this ethic of tension becomes then a response with evaluational knowledge and freedom of one person to the Person of Christ incarnate in other persons. The person is the communicating existent who stands at the convergence of a series of relationships arising from his encounter with another person or persons. It is the person who must resolve this dialectical tension that exists between the two ethics, the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of conviction. This strikes me as the more genuine Christian ethic and defensible in the biblical evidence. At least it is more defensible than the situationalism of pure-act-agapism.
Thomas A. Wassmer, S. J.
Professor of Moral Philosophy
College of Business Administration
Ohio University
Athens, Ohio 45701
The Reasonableness of Faith. By Diogenes Allen. Washington: Corpus Books, 1968. Pp. 160. $4.95.
Is affirming the tenets of faith a reasonable act? It is to this problem that Diogenes Allen addresses himself from the context of contemporary British philosophy. It is no longer possible to present a rational proof for God's existence. Traditional arguments like those of Aquinas have not recovered from the critiques of Hume and Kant. For that matter, the very meaningfulness of propositions about God has been called into question.
But to these challenges there have been thoughtful responses on the part of believers. Thanks to linguistic analysis we are more careful in our use of religious language. Logical positivism raises the more troublesome problem: are ultimate questions worth the asking? Ian Ramsey, Austin Farrar and English Thomists have endeavored to show that Christianity offers the most satisfying world-view or that the world as we know it points of itself to a Creator. Professor Allen prefers to side with John Hick
in this discussion: theism can at best be a plausible option. But this is beside the point. Christianity is more a medium of salvation than an explanation of the world. In fact, religious questions cannot be a matter of disinterested knowledge, for if there is a God, this fact will affect my life.
The necessary and sufficient ground for faith is that it satisfies certain needs in man. This is not to say that religion is purely a projection of personal wishes. Religion arouses and satisfie