RAHNER'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION
OF THE VORGRIFF
WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
Trinity University
San Antonio, Texas
ACCORDING TO THE theologian Karl Rahner a necessary condition of the possibility of empirical knowledge is the knowing subject's possession of an a priori Vorgriff, or "pre-apprehension," of God. This Vorgriff is taken by Rahner to be more than a mere affirmation of the reality of God, for it is thought of as an actual apprehending or knowing of God by the subject. If Rahner establishes that there is a Voryriff of God and that it is this kind of apprehension, then he has also established that God exists, and so the argument Rahner provides for the Vorgriff can also be interpreted as an argument purporting to establish the reality of God.
The essentials of Rahner's argument can be found by examining both his doctoral dissertation on the metaphysics of knowledge of Aquinas, published in German as Geist im Welt and in English as Spirit in the World, and his later work Hörer des Wortes (Hearers of the Word) . The approach Rahner uses in these works to establish the existence of the Vorgriff, and hence of the reality of God, can be characterized as transcendental. If Rahner s argument is successful, his transcendental approach will thus demonstrate what Kant thought a transcendental approach could not theoretically demonstrate: the reality of God. In this paper I offer a reconstruction of Rahner's argument and compare certain features of it with the approach of Kant. I then suggest a reason for thinking that Rahner's argument cannot succeed in establishing the reality of God in the sense Rahner intends.
Rahner's argument focuses on the nature of judgment. Rah-
257
258 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
ner assumes that we have empirical knowledge of the world, and so, expressing the argument in the first person, one might take as the first premise: (1) I make judgments (I have knowledge) about empirical objects.
Rahner's complicated discussion of judgment is presented in terms of Aquinas's doctrines of sensibility and abstraction. Knowledge is characterized as the self-presence of being, and so the knower is also the being of the other that is known: this self-presence as being-with-another is called " sensibility." 1 Rahner notes that Aquinas sometimes speaks of sensibility in terms of the imagination. He thinks that what Aquinas refers to as the common sense, the imagination, and the memory are so intimately bound together that they could all be contrasted with the external senses as a single sense-totality, and Rahner would prefer to call this totality the "imagination." This totality forms the origin and permanent ground of the external senses, and Aquinas calls the act of the imagination as the source of sensibility the
phantasm."2 2
The liberation of the subject from the other is referred to as "thought" or "abstraction." When human existence asks about being in its totality, and thereby places itself as the inquirer in sharp relief against the world, it " objectifies " the other, and this capacity to objectify and make the knower a subject for the first time is called "thought." Thus Rahner claims that it is through thought that human experience of an objective world first becomes possible. Now in the Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge, abstraction is the formation of a universal concept, and the universal concept is the predicate of a possible judgment.3 Judgment is the relating of the universal in the predicate to the universal in the subject, and I see this as Rahner's second premise: (2) Judgment involves the awareness of universals in the subject and predicate.
1 Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, trans. William Dych (London: Sheed & Ward, 1968), 74, 78-80.
2 Ibid., 107.
3 Ibid., p. 119-123.
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 259
But the universals in the subject and predicate of a judgment are already "concretized," that is, thought of as related to a possible subject. In fact, before the universal concept of the predicate can even be ascribed to the subject it must be concretized. And even the subject is understood as a concretized universal rather than, for example, as a bare particular; the subject of a proposition is rarely a bare "this " which stands completely undetermined in itself, for usually the subject is already the synthesis of an empty "this" with a universal, known intelligibility. The Thomistic term for such a prior synthesis is "co ncretio," which Rahner translates as "concretizing synthesis."4 For Rahner there is no awareness of a universal apart from such a concretizing synthesis, and thus the third step of the argument could be seen as this claim: (3) I am aware of a universal only in a particular object.
The move to the fourth step will take some time to explain. Judgment requires not only these concretizing syntheses but also an affirmative synthesis. In the judgment the ' this" of the subject is identified with the "this " of the predicate, though both subject and predicate are each already concrete. The predicate in its concretizing synthesis is a possible synthesis of the universal with any supposit at all, but in the judgment the subject determines unambiguously which "this" is meant. Thus the subject functions only to determine that definite supposit to which the universal of the predicate is to be related.5 Rahner's translation of the Thomistic term for this synthesis in the judgment itself is "affirmative synthesis," and Rahner claims that there is no objective knowledge prior to the level of the affirmative synthesis. Objective knowledge occurs only when a knower relates a universal, known intelligibility to a supposit existing in itself.6 So we see that Rahner thinks that a universal concept does not stand alone in thought, even as a concretizing synthesis. Judgment is not a connecting of bare concepts, as though these were the
4 Ibid., 124.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 125.
260 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
fundamental units of thought and the role of judgment were to connect them only subsequently. Rather, as Rahner puts it, judgment is the referring of knowing to an in-itself, and in such a reference concepts are present as moments possible only in the judgment.7 Even the attempt to conceive a universal concept by itself succeeds only in forming a judgment. For if this concept is thought of " alone," then this thinking still thinks something about it. Here the concept is conceived as something already objectified, as something existing in itself, which thought holds before itself as something standing opposite, and to which the knower relates a known intelligibility.8 Thus Rahner holds that even a concretizing synthesis occurs in actual thought only in an affirmative synthesis.
Rahner's acceptance of the doctrine that the universal is grasped only as already concretized means that the universal is grasped only in the particular, and for him this precludes the possibility of a purely intellectual intuition for human knowers. Rahner takes this position to be the substance of the claim of Aquinas that all knowledge, even metaphysical knowledge, occurs only through the " conversion of the intellect to the phantasm." The phantasm should not be viewed as a "thing" but rather as sense knowledge as such. To say that human knowledge takes place in a turning to the phantasm is to claim that intellectual knowledge is possible only with a simultaneous realization of sense knowledge. This does not mean that the intellect first knows a universal quiddity and then afterwards turns to sensibility to complete such knowledge, for no intellectual knowledge at all comes about without its already being a conversion to the phantasm from the outset.9 The conversion is not a process following sensibility and abstraction but rather an essential moment within the one act of knowing. As Rahner explains, the doctrine does not mean that intellectual knowledge is "accompanied by phantasms" but that sense intuition and intellectual thought are united in one act of human knowing.10
7 Ibid., 126.
8 Ibid., 125.
9 Ibid., 47-48.
10 Ibid., 237-238.
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 261
We have seen that the knower cannot grasp a universal by itself. But how exactly can the human knower perceive the universal in the particular? Here we need to be more specific about the problem of abstraction. To abstract is to detach, and in abstraction one finds out that the "whatness " (in scholastic terms, the quidditas) given in sense knowledge may be detached from the individual thing or particular in which it presents itself. The essence of this universal quiddity is that it can be realized in particulars other than this one: this " whatness " is grasped as a determination which in principle applies to more than just this individual object in which it happens to appear and affect the senses. Thus to abstract is to discover that the quiddity given in an individual object is illimited in the sense that we grasp it as a possible determination of other objects.11 And so I characterize Rahner's next step in the argument as this claim: (4) The awareness of a universal in a particular is possible only if one is aware of the quiddity of the universal as illimited.
Rahner wishes to know the "transcendental" condition that enables the knowing subject to discover that the quiddity is, though experienced as the quiddity of a single individual, essentially illimited. Here a transcendental condition is that which must exist in the knowing subject logically prior to any knowledge or abstraction as the previous condition of its possibility. In the Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge the power of abstraction is called the " agent intellect," so in Thomistic terms this is a question about the nature of the agent intellect.12 Now we have seen that the power of abstraction is the power of knowing that the quiddity of the universal is illimited. To know that it is illimited, when we grasp the universal in the particular we must grasp
11 Karl Rahner, Hearers of the Word, selections translated by Joseph Donceel from the first edition of Hörer des Wortes (1942) and appearing in Gerald
A. McCool, ed., A Rahner Reader (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 15. All citations are from this translation. (English translations which one commonly sees are from the second edition, which has been revised extensively by Johannes B. Metz.)
12 Ibid.
262 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
that its limitation comes from the particular object. I take this assertion to be Rahner's next premise: (5) The awareness of the quiddity of the universal as illimited is possible only if one is aware that its limitation comes from the particular.
Rahner thinks that one experiences a limit as such when it is experienced as an obstacle to some activity which wants to get beyond it. So when we grasp the universal, we can experience this limitation only because the activity which grasps the particular sense object reaches out, prior to this grasping, beyond the individual object.13 Rahner calls this reaching beyond the individual object in abstraction the "Vorgriff," which might be translated as " anticipation" or, as already mentioned, " pre-apprehension." On Rahner's reading of Aquinas, this notion of a Vorgriff is to be found in Aquinas's remarks about the "excessus." 14 The Vorgriff is an a priori power given with human nature; it is the dynamism of the human spirit. Rahner claims also that abstraction is possible only if the Vorgriff is conscious of the range of the knowable revealed by it, though such consciousness emerges only with the knowledge of the particular. The Vorgriff makes the knower conscious by opening up the horizon within which the object is known.15
It must be kept in mind that this pre-apprehension should not be considered an instance of objective knowing, because it is not really a judgment; it is not by itself alone an act of knowledge. But although the Vorgriff is only the condition of the possibility of knowledge, Rahner thinks we cannot help conceiving of it as some kind of knowledge.'16 Even Rahner falls into the habit of speaking of it as if it were; this is especially noticeable in some of Rahner's later works, such as Foundations of Christian Faith. In that work he even considers the Vorgriff to be in the realm of what he comes to call "transcendental experience." 17
13 Ibid.
14 Rahner, Spirit in the World, 142.
15 Rahner, Hearers of the Word, 16.
16 Ibid.
17 Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, trans. William V. Dych (New York: Crossroad, 1984), 17-18.
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 263
As just mentioned, although the Vorgriff is only the condition of the possibility of knowledge, we cannot help conceiving of it as a kind of knowledge. Now according to Rahner if this is how we must think of this "pre-apprehension," we must be ready to state what the "object" of this "knowledge" is. We have already spoken of the Vorgriff as reaching beyond the particular object in which the universal is grasped. Rahner thinks that this "beyond" cannot be merely another single particular object of the same type, for then this new object would itself require a similar pre-apprehension to be known.18
What he claims is that abstraction would not even be possible unless the Vorgriff aimed at absolute and unlimited being. Rahner claims that the Vorgriff discloses objects beyond the one for whose apprehension it occurs. Any possible object which can come to exist in the breadth of the Vorgriff is simultaneously affirmed, and an absolute being, unlimited in every dimension, would completely fill up this breadth. Since it cannot be grasped as objectively merely possible, and since the Vorgriff intends primarily not merely possible but real being, absolute being is simultaneously affirmed as real.19 Thus this step of Rahner' s is the following claim: (6) The awareness that the limitation of the universal comes from the particular is possible only if one has a logically prior "apprehension" (Vorgriff) of infinite being.
Furthermore, since absolute esse is God, one must say that the Vorgriff aims at God; it intends God's absolute being in this sense that the absolute being is always co-affirmed by the illimited range of the Vorgriff.20 And so I interpret Rahner's argument as finally claiming: (7) Infinite being is God. And because of this one can rightfully conclude: (8) I have a pre-apprehension, or a priori unthematic awareness, of God.
Rahner claims this argument for the Vorgriff is not an a priori demonstration of God's existence; transcendental knowledge or experience of God is a posteriori knowledge because transcend-
18 Rahner, Hearers of the Word, 16.
19 Rahner, Spirit in the World, 181.
20 Rahner, Hearers of the Word, 19.
264 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
ental experience occurs only in one's encounter with the world and with other people.21 The Vorgriff and its range can be known and affirmed only in knowing a real individual thing or person (as the necessary condition of this knowledge). Rahner thinks that this way of understanding human knowledge of God is merely a translation into the metaphysics of knowledge of the arguments for God's existence that Aquinas presents in his metaphysics of being. Aquinas would say that a finite being that is affirmed demands as its condition the existence of an infinite being. Rahner, claiming to mean the same thing, says that the affirmation of the real finiteness of a being demands as the condition of its possibility the Vorgriff of esse, and a Vorgriff that implicitly affirms an absolute esse.22
Drawing upon the above comments, then, I reconstruct Rahner's argument for an a priori awareness of God as:
(1) I make judgments (I have knowledge) about empirical objects.
(2) Judgment involves the awareness of universals in the subject and predicate.
(3) I am aware of a universal only in a particular object.
(4) The awareness of a universal in a particular is possible only if one is aware of the quiddity of the universal as illimited.
(5) The awareness of the quiddity of the universal as illimited is possible only if one is aware that its limitation comes from the particular.
(6) The awareness that the limitation of the universal comes from the particular is possible only if one has a logically prior "apprehension" (Vorgriff) of infinite being.
(7) Infinite being is God.
(8) I have a pre-apprehension, or a priori unthematic awareness, of God. And of course it is this conclusion that implies the reality of God, thus making it possible to interpret Rahner's argument as a purported proof of God's reality.
21 Rahner, Foundat ions of Christian Faith, 51--52.
22 Rahner, Hearers of thc Word, 19; Spirit in the World, 182.
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 265
The Vorgriff is seen as a logically prior element in every instance of sense knowledge and thus is clearly intended as a priori. Rahner's argument starts with the fact of empirical knowledge of a world of objects on the part of the subject and argues that its necessary condition is a certain kind of a priori element in the subject. Recall however that Rahner claims his argument for God is a posteriori and resembles the Five Ways of Aquinas. This point needs clarification. In categorizing arguments for God's existence, it is common to distinguish between two types of argument. A posteriori arguments, which include versions of the cosmological argument (including here the first three ways of Aquinas) and also versions of teleological arguments (and arguments from design), start with the fact of the world or certain features about it. On the other hand a priori arguments, such as the ontological argument, attempt to derive the existence of God from a consideration of the meaning of concepts or terms alone. In the case of Rahner's argument, we need to note an additional distinction between the status of the knowledge mentioned in the conclusion and the status of the conclusion itself. Rahner's argument winds up in the position of being an a posteriori argument for the reality of God despite the fact that he is arguing for an a priori "knowledge" of God. That is, the conclusion of his argument is that we have what might be seen as synthetic a priori knowledge of God, but since it is a contingent fact that is stated in the opening premise, a claim that we have empirical knowledge, the conclusion (the claim that we have a priori knowledge of God) is itself a synthetic statement known a posteriori (assuming it is in fact known) . Rahner's argument, if successful, shows that the conclusion of an a posteriori argument for God can itself be an instance of synthetic a posteriori knowledge, even if it refers to synthetic a priori knowledge.
I also point out that Rahner's argument starts from premises not presupposing any synthetic a posteriori knowledge of God (and not merely not presupposing any synthetic a priori knowledge of God) . Other aspects of Rahner's transcendental investigation published after Geist im Welt might be taken as assuming
266 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
the reality of the revelation of God in history and thus might be characterized as assuming the existence of synthetic a posteriori knowledge of God. But there is nothing in the premises of the above argument about such knowledge.
I now turn to consider more specifically how Rahner's transcendental approach differs from that undertaken by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason and Prolegomena. Of course an obvious difference is that the argument above is concerned with the reality of only one a priori element, that of the Vorgriff, whereas Kant claims to undertake a critique of all a priori reason. But, acknowledging this basic difference, I will focus on describing three aspects of Kant's philosophical project which will be especially relevant to analyzing Rahner's approach: (1) Kant's distinction between sensibility and the understanding, (2) Kant's distinction between two basic functions of argument: the distinction between a metaphysical deduction and a transcendental deduction, and (3) Kant's distinction between the transcendentally ideal and the transcendentally real.
(1) In his critique of knowledge Kant distinguishes between sensibility and the understanding. Sensibility is the capacity (receptivity) for receiving presentations (or "representations"; Vorstellungen is perhaps better translated as "presentations ") through "the mode in which we are affected by objects." By means of sensibility, Kant says, objects are given to us, and the product is intuition, thus sensuous intuition is the mode of our immediate relation to objects, and this is possible only insofar as we are affected by these objects.23 Our human mode of intuition depends on the existence of the object and our subsequently being affected by it, and so we are not capable of intellectual intuition.24 (Kant does allow that other thinking beings may not be bound by the same conditions that limit our sensuous intuition. ) 25 Kant relates sensibility to sensation by distinguishing between the matter and the form of intuition. Sensation is the effect of an object af-
23 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith
(New York: St. Martin's, 1929), A 19/B 33.
24 Ibid., B 72.
25 Ibid., A 27/B 43.
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 267
fecting the faculty of sensibility, and therefore such an intuition is empirical. Sensations are modifications of the subject: "A perception which relates solely to the subject as the modification of its state is sensation," while that which " produces" them is not.26 Kant calls the undetermined object of such an empirical intuition an appearance.' Furthermore, Kant says, "that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its matter; but that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations, I term the form of appearance." 27 Using this distinction between matter and form, Kant claims that while the matter of all appearance (sensations) is given to us a posteriori, the form of such appearance (actually the forms of space and time) cannot be, and so the form is given a priori by the mind.
The world of appearance and empirical knowledge of this world depend not just on the faculty of sensibility but also on the understanding, which supplies a priori concepts or categories to experience. As Paul Guyer (along with many others) has pointed out, behind this view is Kant's presuppositions that, first, any form of knowledge involves a connection of diverse representations and, second, such a connection requires a mental act of combination. For example, the first assumption is evident in Kant's claim that "knowledge is a whole in which representations stand compared and connected," such that "if each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise"; he further adds the claim that since it is by time that diverse representations are separated, "for each representation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity," it is therefore in time that all representations must be "ordered, connected, and brought into relation." 28 An expression of the second assumption is clearly found in his claim that "the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to
26 Ibid., A 320/B 37.
27 Ibid., A 19/B 34-A 20.
28 Ibid., A 97, A 99.
268 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of a sensible intuition," because "it is an act of spontaneity," and therefore "all combination--be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts--is an act of the understanding." 29 This leads to Kant claiming that the universality and objectivity of empirical knowledge come not just from the a priori contribution of the forms of sensibility mentioned above but also from the a priori contribution of concepts from the understanding (the categories) in unifying our sensible intuitions.
Kant argues that the operations of both of these faculties are necessary conditions of objective experience. They are necessary first of all if objects are to be perceivable, and Kant's demonstration of the indispensability of these conditions is accomplished in the metaphysical and transcendental expositions of the concepts of space and time. But they are also necessary if objects are to be thinkable, and the argument that purports to prove the categories are such conditions is accomplished in the Transcendental Deduction proper.30 That Kant thinks both conditions are required for objective experience is evident from his claim that:
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts.31
(2) Thus Kant thinks that our pure a priori concepts, the categories, are not abstracted from perception. In order to discover them we must examine judgment, and Kant undertakes this in the Metaphysical Deduction.32 Very briefly put, Kant's
29 Paul Guyer, "Kant's Tactics in the Transcendental Deduction," Philosophical Topics 12, no. 2 (1981) :163-164.
30 S. Körner, Kant, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1955), 59.
31 Kant, A 71-B 75.
32 Körner, 47.
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 269
line of reasoning seems to be as follows. Two aspects can be distinguished in every judgment: the application of specific concepts, and the manner of their connection, the logical form, in the judgment. Kant argues that if what confers objectivity and generality on an objective empirical judgment is not to be identified with its specific concepts, then it must be an a priori concept embodied in the form of an objective empirical judgment. So there will be one elementary a priori concept or category for each of the different ways in which objective empirical judgments confer objectivity and generality on corresponding perceptual judgments.33 Kant refers to the Metaphysical Deduction as "the transcendental clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding," and it is a clue because Kant thinks that if he can list all the possible forms of objective empirical judgment (he bases his list on Aristotle's) he can produce a complete list of the categories.34 To each of the different logical forms there will correspond one category.35 What is important for my purpose is to note the function this argument serves for Kant, the demonstration that certain concepts are a priori: " In the metaphysical deduction the a priori origin of the categories has been proved through their complete agreement with the general logical functions of thought...." 36
But for Kant it is one thing to demonstrate a concept to be a priori and quite another to show that its a priori employment in experience is legitimate, and so it is in the Transcendental Deduction that Kant attempts to demonstrate that we are justified in applying these a priori concepts. In the introductory sections of the argument he explains his use of the term "deduction" and his strategy for carrying out the task.37 Kant notes that in a legal action jurists distinguish between the question of right (quid juris) and the question of fact (quid facti) ; proof of legal right or claim is called a "deduction." With regard to the nature of concepts in human knowledge, he claims that some concepts are
33 Kant, A 67/B 92.3
34 Ibid., A 70/B 95.
35 Körner, 49-50.
36 Kant, B 160.
37 This starts at A 84/B 116.
270 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
derived from experience, while others relate a priori to objects. The former are empirical concepts, for which experience is always available to demonstrate their objective reality; an empirical deduction would show the manner in which a concept is acquired through experience. But a merely empirical proof would not justify the a priori use of those concepts that are not derived from experience, for the fact that we use a priori concepts does not itself show that we have a right to use them.38
Kant here claims that the pure concepts of the understanding speak of objects through predicates of pure a priori thought and therefore relate to objects universally, apart from all conditions of sensibility.39 Since the categories do not represent the conditions under which objects are given in intuition, objects may appear to us without the necessity of being related to the functions of understanding. The understanding need not therefore contain their a priori conditions. The crux of the problem is that:
Thus a difficulty such as we did not meet with in the field of sensibility is here presented, namely, how subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects. For appearances can certainly be given in intuition independently of functions of the understanding.40
But Kant considers whether a priori concepts serve as antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be thought as an object in general. Noting that in addition to the intuition of the senses experience contains a concept of the object as being given, Kant claims that therefore concepts of objects in general are the a priori conditions of empirical knowledge. The a priori concepts (categories) relate of necessity and a priori to objects of experience, and so their objective validity depends on the fact that through them alone experience is possible. And so Kant finds that he has a principle to direct the Transcendental Deduction, in that the categories must be recognized as a priori and necessary conditions of the possibility of experience, and "The a priori con-
38 Ibid., A 84/B 116-A 85/B 117.
39 Ibid., B 120/A 88.
40 Ibid., A 89/B 122-A 90.
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 271
ditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience." 41
For my purposes it will not be necessary to offer an interpretation of the complicated argument of the Transcendental Deduction. I simply note that remarks such as those above leave it clear that the Transcendental Deduction is intended as a demonstration of the legitimacy of the employment of a priori concepts in objective experience. Whether or not Kant thinks that objective experience is a condition of the possibility of any and every experience, he at least seems to be arguing that the application of the categories is a necessary condition of the possibility of that objective experience we call empirical knowledge, and that this fact serves to justify our employment of the categories in experience.
With regard to the a priori origin of presentations and the validity of their employment in experience, I take this distinction between the function of a metaphysical deduction and that of a transcendental deduction to be one Kant considers fundamental. Actually, Kant employs a variety of terms for his arguments concerning a priori elements, among which, in addition to " metaphysical deduction" and "transcendental deduction," are "metaphysical exposition," "transcendental exposition," and "transcendental proof." The distinctions among such terms are not always clear. In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant claims that an exposition is the clear though not necessarily exhaustive representation of that which belongs to a concept, and the exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which exhibits the concept as given a priori.42 Apparently he means by this just that a metaphysical exposition is an analysis of the concept which makes clear the concept's a priori origin.43 On the other hand, Kant characterizes a transcendental exposition as the explanation of a concept as a principle from which the possibility of other synthetic a priori knowledge can be understood.44 The transcendental ex-
41 Ibid., A 93/B 125-A 94/B 126, A 111.
42 Ibid., B 38.
43 Ralph C. S. Walker, Kant (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 72.
44 Kant, B 40.
272 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
position of space establishes the reality, or in other words the objective validity, of space in whatever can be presented to us outwardly as object, but at the same time it also establishes the ideality of space in respect of things when not regarded in relation to our sensibility.45 What Kant might mean, given his actual examples of transcendental expositions, is that transcendental expositions of the concepts of space and time require premises that claim that we have synthetic a priori knowledge of space and time and then go on to argue that only if space and time are pure intuitions is this possible.46 In other words a transcendental exposition argues that a necessary condition of the possibility of some given synthetic a priori knowledge is that a representation be of a certain a priori nature. Drawing upon these descriptions, I can characterize a metaphysical exposition as showing that a concept or representation is a priori. A transcendental exposition shows that a concept or representation must be a priori if a particular instance of synthetic a priori knowledge is to exist, that is, it demonstrates that the representation's being a priori is a necessary condition of the possibility of the particular body of synthetic a priori knowledge. "Transcendental proof," on the other hand, seems to be the term Kant uses to refer to the proofs of the individual categories or the synthetic a priori principles which relate the categories to the possibility of objective experience (though given Kant's description of transcendental expositions, one wonders whether these proofs can also be considered transcendental expositions) . The discussion of these transcendental proofs follows the Transcendental Deduction and takes up much of the rest of the Transcendental Analytic.
The basic distinction I wish to point out is that between two purposes or functions of argument, between those arguments intending to demonstrate merely the a priori character of presentations (I will call these "metaphysical deductions ") and those intending to go further and prove the legitimacy of employing such
45 Ibid., B 44/A 28.
46 Walker, 72.
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 273
presentations in experience (I will call these "transcendental deductions ")
(a) The first sort of argument shows that certain presentations (concepts or intuitions) are a priori and, therefore, not derived from experience. Such arguments are metaphysical expositions or metaphysical deductions. An individual presentation can be exhibited as a priori (as in the metaphysical exposition of space) or a group of presentations can be shown to be a priori (the Metaphysical Deduction of the categories) .
(b) The second type of argument employed by Kant is intended to come after the use of a metaphysical exposition or metaphysical deduction and demonstrate that we are justified in employing such an a priori presentation or presentations in objective experience. While the " metaphysical " type of argument, above, shows that a presentation is a priori, this transcendental type of argument shows that the actual existence and employment of such an a priori presentation is a necessary condition of the possibility of objective experience. A transcendental exposition takes for granted the truth of synthetic a priori propositions about the realm of appearance or a body of knowledge involving such propositions and then argues to the necessary conditions of its possibility in the a priori (and for Kant transcendentally ideal) nature of certain representations. Kant even refers to this argument as a transcendental deduction. There seems to be another version of this transcendental type of argument employed by Kant (also intended to come after the use of a metaphysical deduction), but one that does not presuppose the truth of a body of synthetic a priori propositions about objects of experience. (Some interpretations of the Transcendental Deduction see it in this sense.) Still another example of this type of argument aims to relate the concept to experience as a rule of synthesis, a principle. These transcendental proofs thus also establish the legitimacy of employing the associated categories in objective experience.
(3) By claiming that the knowledge of the senses is a priori insofar as its form is concerned and that these a priori forms
274 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
are mind-contributed, Kant is able to claim both that space and time are necessary conditions of the possibility of human experience and that this world we experience is transcendentally ideal. For the existence of appearances is bound up with our cognitive faculties: "appearances, as such, cannot exist outside us--they exist only in our sensibility."47 Kant combines this allegiance to transcendental idealism with a profession of empirical realism:
space is empirically real in that it is objectively valid for whatever can be presented to us outwardly as object, yet it is transcendentally ideal in that it is nothing at all " immediately we withdraw its limitation to possible expirience."48 Time likewise has empirical reality in respect of all objects which ever allow of being given to our senses, but it has subjective reality as the condition of all our experiences, which means that it too is transcendentally ideal: if we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, time is nothing.49 Thus Kant claims that all of intuition is nothing but the presentation of appearance, or as he also calls it, phenomena.50
Following Kant I will refer to the counterpart to transcendental idealism as "transcendental realism" rather than as "transcendent realism." Kant characterizes the difference between transcendental idealism and transcendental realism as the following:
By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves. To this idealism there is opposed a transcendental realism which regards time and space as something given in themselves, independently of our sensibility. The transcendental realist thus interprets outer appearances . . . as things in themselves, which exist independently of us and of our sensibility. . . .51
47 Kant, A 127.
48 Ibid., B 44/A 28.
49 Ibid., A 35/B 52-A 37/B 54.
50 Ibid., B 59/A 42.
51 Ibid., A 369.
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 275
As I will use the phrase "transcendental realism," any claim that an a priori element is constitutive of things in themselves (or noumena) is an adoption of transcendental realism with respect to that element. This use applies both to space and time as forms of intuition and to the categories, which also serve a formal function. For example, it may be that the categories are constitutive of things in themselves or noumena, and Kant at times seems to allow that we can at least think this, but to assert that such a priori and necessary formal conditions are so constitutive and/or that we can know that they are is a claim of transcendental realism.
Using these three features of Kant's transcendental approach I can now compare Rahner's approach with that of Kant. We saw that Kant recognized a fundamental distinction between intuitions from the faculty of sensibility and concepts from the understanding. The Vorgriff does not fit readily into any class of presentations such as Kantian intuitions or concepts. Translators translate " Vorgriff by such terms as "pre-apprehension," "pregrasp," and "pre-concept," and Rahner himself seems to think of it as a power. It is clear that the Vorgriff is not portrayed by Rahner as an empirical intuition, an empirical concept, or a judgment. It is not portrayed as an empirical intuition, for it is portrayed as the grasp of infinite being, and infinite being is not considered by Rahner to be a sensible object (but rather something which makes empirical intuitions of sensible objects possible). It is not portrayed as an empirical concept, for then we could appeal to experience for its derivation and justification, and Rahner shows no signs of doing that. And it is not portrayed as a judgment but rather, according to Rahner, as what makes judgment possible.
This might lead one to assume that it is proper to consider the Vorgriff to be either an a priori concept or an a priori intuition. There is perhaps some evidence that Rahner portrays it as an a priori concept of God, and some translate "Vorgriff " in Rahner's writings as "pre-concept." Some of Rahner's remarks indicate it is to be thought of as analogous to an a priori concept in being
276 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
a kind of spontaneity. For one thing, it is called a power, a reaching out, a going beyond, a drive, and an instance of the dynamism of the spirit. Also, the Vorgriff is portrayed as that which occurs in judgments to objectify them, to "refer" them to objective reality (a function of the Kantian categories) . But Rahner does not draw any explicit parallels between the Vorgriff and Kant's a priori concepts, and it is doubtful that he wants to portray it as such.
Instead, one might try to see the Vorgriff as an intuition, and some of the characteristics of the Vorgriff do lend support to this interpretation. It does not seem that there can be a "process
of intuiting without an intuited content, and in this manner perception or intuition could be considered some sort of apprehension or grasping. Sometimes Rahner talks of the Vorgriff in this way, as a pre-apprehension, not as a "pre-objectification" or a "preunification" (as one would expect were it an a priori concept) . Thus there is support for labelling it as a pre-apprehension or pregrasp in that the Vorgriff does seem to be portray-ed by Rahner as a kind of receptivity such that it is impossible that it should exist and yet what it apprehend or grasp not exist. Since it exists, what it "pre-apprehends " exists.
If the Vorgriff is an intuition, it must be a priori with respect to empirical knowledge, for Rahner portray-s it as an a priori condition that makes empirical knowledge possible. If the Vorgriff were an a priori intuition, then Rahner might, like Kant for his "transcendental deductions" of the forms of space and time, need only a very short transcendental deduction to supplement a metaphysical exposition of it. However the same reasons that would make such a transcendental deduction short seem to preclude the Vorgriff from being this kind of a priori intuition. Kant's transcendental deduction of the a priori intuition of space, for example, is according to Kant quickly accomplished because space is supplied by the subject as a form of sensible intuition. For Kant we can have an a priori intuition of space only because we can intuit it as the very form of our sensible intuition (at least with respect to outer sense), and there is no real danger of applying the a
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 277
priori intuition of space beyond the range of sensibility. Yet Rahner does not want to say that God is the form of our sensible intuition and therefore a priori intuitable, or that God as the form of our intuition is transcendentally- ideal.
This suggests that the most adequate characterization of Rahner's understanding of the Vorgriff is to see it as some unique kind of intuition, one that is, first, unconscious or not accessible through introspection, second, not totally removed from the involvement of sensibility in apprehending the " intelligible," third, not an intuition of a particular but of the absolute, infinite being, but also fourth, not a mere form of sensibility. Given these requirements, one might conclude that the Vorgriff should be seen as some sort of " a priori intellectual intuition," in the sense of an a priori and nonpropositional knowledge of an nonsensible object.52 Kant, of course, came to reject the possibility of human intellectual intuition. In his Inaugural Dissertation Kant made the distinction between the " sensible " or " phenomena," which was the object of the sensible faculty-, and the " intelligible" or
noumena," which was the object of the intellectual faculty; there the intelligible was considered to be available for a purely intellectual apprehension (which presumably is God's mode of intuition).53 But Kant came to reject the possibility of such intellectual intuition, and by the time of the second edition of the Critique he wrote that we cannot even comprehend its possibility.54 Of course it might be objected that to refer to the Vorgriff as an a priori intellectual or nonsensuous (nonsensible) intuition is improper because Rahner denies the possibility of human intellectual intuition; after all, as we have seen, Rahner's transcendental argument for the Vorgriff occurs in the context of an interpretive commentary on the claim of Aquinas that all knowing, even metaphysical knowing, occurs through the conversion
52 Richard Rorty, "Intuition," in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 4: 211.
53 Henri E. Allison, "Things in Themselves, Noumena, and the Transcendental Object," Dialecticcs 32 (1978) : 45.
54 Kant, B 307.
278 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
to the phantasm. But there seems good reason to think of it as a unique kind of intellectual intuition. A distinction might be made between (a) an intellectual intuition which creates its object (which Kant thought would be the kind of intuition belonging to God) and (b) an intuition which is intellectual merely in the sense of being a nonspatial and atemporal apprehending of a nonsensible object (which it does not necessarily create) . Kant might claim that here I am confused in calling an intuition of type (b) "intellectual" because a nonspatial and atemporal intuition of an object (where such an object is not created by- such an intuition) is still sensible, not intellectual, in that we can allow that there might be beings whose sensibility was under forms different than those we have (space and time) . On this view the Vorgriff would be seen as some type of sensible intuition but one not under the forms of space and time. In other words, the distinction between an intellectual and a sensible intuition is just that the former creates its object while the latter must be "affected" by the object. But it seems this would be merely- to define "intellectual intuition" in such a way- as to preclude it from being the apprehension of an object it does not create. The problem with such a classification, it seems to me, is not just that Rahner believes there to be a kind of knowledge that Kant does not; Rahner is trying to provide for a kind of intuition that does not even fit into the Kantian classification. Like a sensuous intuition, it does not create its object. Unlike a human sensuous intuition, it is not spatial or temporal. But unlike a nonspatial and atemporal sensuous intuition, it is an a priori act of spontaneity on the part of the subject. Here the notion of Rahner's Vorgriff strains intelligibility: it is an act of spontaneity in being an a priori reaching out," but insofar as it does not create its own object it is an act of receptivity as well. Because it is a mode of apprehending what it does not create I hesitate to call it other than an intuition (and Kant might claim one should hesitate to call it other than a sensuous intuition), yet because it is nonspatial, atemporal, a priori, and an act of dynamism I hesitate to call it other than an intellectual intuition. If a classification is
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 279
needed, I suggest it might be thought of as an a priori intellectual or nonsensuous intuition.
This bring us to the question of what kind of argument is needed to demonstrate that there is such an intuition. Here we see a fundamental difference between the transcendental approaches of Kant and Rahner. Concerning a priori presentations or elements Kant thinks there are two distinct arguments needed. A metaphysical deduction is needed to delineate just those presentations which are a priori--for example, as in the case of the metaphysical exposition of space and the metaphysical deduction of the categories. Following this demonstration of the a priori origin of such presentations, Kant then undertakes a justification of their employment in experience, whether quickly as in the case of the "transcendental deduction" of space as an a priori intuition or with much more attention as in the case of the transcendental deduction of the categories.
Rahner does not seem to separate these two functions of argument in his approach. Instead of presenting a metaphysical deduction showing a presentation of infinite being to be a priori and then presenting a justification of the employment of that presentation in experience, Rahner provides an argument that claims a "pre-apprehension" of infinite being to be a necessary condition of the possibility of objective empirical judgment. With respect to function, such an argument seems to have the closest affinity to Kant's Transcendental Deduction, which argues that the fact that the employment of a priori concepts in objective experience is a necessary condition of the possibility of such experience provides legitimacy to such employment. This suggests that Rahner's argument is a transcendental deduction, and it has been referred to as such. On this interpretation it appears no metaphysical deduction is needed, because in showing that such a preapprehension is necessary and therefore universal, Rahner presumably accomplishes the task of showing it must be a priori.
However, further reflection reveals that because the a priori element under consideration is distinct in kind from those Kant considers, this issue is more complicated than the above reason-
280 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
ing suggests. For what can it mean to establish the legitimacy of employing in objective experience a pre-apprehension of infinite being? If in fact we have such a pre-apprehension, then there can be no real question of our having a "right" to employ it in experience. The question of legitimacy in employment can arise only if we have a presentation of infinite being without it having been established that such a presentation is a real pre-apprehension, and not instead, for instance, an a priori concept of infinite being or an innate belief in the reality of infinite being. But then this fact suggests that if a successful metaphysical deduction shows the Vorgriff as a genuine pre-apprehension to be a priori, then no transcendental deduction is needed, because the question of legitimacy does not arise.
This confusing situation suggests that, depending on one's characterization of the Vorgriff , Rahner's argument can be seen as functioning as a metaphysical deduction and/or a transcendental deduction. If one characterizes the Vorgriff as a genuine pre-apprehension of infinite being, then the argument might be seen as a purported demonstration that because the possession of the Vorgriff is necessary it must be a priori--which fulfills the function of a metaphysical deduction. Here no question of legitimacy arises and so no transcendental deduction is needed. If one characterizes the Vorgriff more broadly as a presentation of infinite being, then the argument might be seen as a purported demonstration of the legitimacy of "employing" such a presentation in objective experience insofar as such employment is a necessary condition of the possibility of such experience--the function of a transcendental deduction. Here of course "employing" would not refer to applying the presentation to unify a manifold of intuitions (the function of the Kantian categories) . It appears it would have to refer rather to taking the presentation to be a genuine apprehending of infinite being; establishing the "legitimacy of employment" of such a presentation would then be an establishment of the legitimacy of that assumption. In proving the presentation to be a necessary condition the argument pre
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 281
sumably would have also fulfilled the function of a metaphysical deduction.
Rahner's approach differs from Kant's with respect to transcendental ideality and transcendental reality as well. For Kant the legitimacy of employing a priori presentations or elements in objective experience is shown by the fact that they co-constitute the realm of their legitimate employment. The categories are legitimately employed in objective experience because they are necessary conditions of the possibility of experience being of an objective realm. But because the categories (along with the a priori forms of sensibility and the matter of sensation) co-constitute objective experience and the phenomenal realm, their legitimate function in theoretical knowledge extends no further. Those a priori elements whose legitimacy Kant seeks to prove have legitimate employment (with respect to theoretical knowledge) in a transcendentally ideal realm.
Rahner, on the other hand, seeks to show that we possess an a priori presentation of infinite being that is a genuine a priori apprehension of infinite being. But Rahner would be disappointed if all his argument showed were that, as far as we know, the infinite being of which we have the pre-apprehnsion is transcendentally ideal only. That is, while Kant is content to show that causes or substances, for example, exist in the realm of appearance and as far as we know exist no further than the realm of experience, Rahner wants to show that we have an apprehension of a reality that exists beyond experience. Since I am interpreting Rahner's argument as a purported demonstration of the reality of God, I might put this point by saying that Rahner wants to do more with his argument than prove that God is transcendentally ideal or phenomenal with respect to an a priori element in the manner that "cause" or "substance" is for Kant. That this is the case is clear from a consideration of claims made by Maréchal, whose approach is similar to that of Rahner. Maréchal's remarks make clear that the object of the Vorgriff is supposed to be what in Kantian terms is transcendentally real or noumenal:
282 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
Hence, if we wish to proceed beyond Kant, we shall also have to establish the absolute objective value of the affirmed object, by deducing the ontological (" noumenal ") affirmation as a theoretical or speculative necessity. We shall have to show that the practical and extrinsic necessity of a "transcendent order," admitted by Kant, is based itself upon an absolute necessity, which takes hold of every immanent object from within and as soon as it is constituted in consciousness. . . . Hence, should this condition logically imply the affirmation of a transcendent object, such an affirmation would be endowed not only with the practical necessity of a "postulate," but with the theoretical necessity of a speculative evidence, at least of an indirect (" analogical ") speculative evidence.
In this way our final demonstration would become what Kant, if he had deemed it possible, at all, would have called the "transcendental deduction" of the ontological affirmation.55
There are many objections to Rahner's argument that might be raised by someone outside the Thomist perspective; for example, a Platonic realist might argue against Rahner that we have an intellectual grasp of universals apart from or independent of their instantiation in particulars, while a nominalistically minded philosopher might argue that all that is needed for the possibility of empirical judgment is an awareness of certain resemblances among particulars. I do not wish to consider these objections here. Instead I suggest a major problem for Rahner's approach is that, even if one grants the truth of the first five premises of his argument, all Rahner can hope to show is that the possession of some kind of presentation of infinite being is a necessary condition of the possibility of objective experience; he cannot show that such a presentation must be a pre-apprehension (in the sense of a grasping) of a transcendentally real infinite being. This is because Rahner cannot show that a Vorgriff of infinite being is more than an a priori concept of infinite being. But then if Rahner cannot preclude the Vorgriff from being merely an a priori concept of infinite being, it seems he has not demonstrated that God is more than transcendentally ideal.
55 Joseph Maréchal, A Maréchal Reader, trans and ed. Joseph Donceel (New
York: Herder & Herder, 1970), 218.
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 283
Let us assume we have been convinced that each of us has no direct grasp of universals and that each of us must instead, for the reasons Rahner gives, have an a priori presentation of infinite being. My suggestion is that this would still leave undecided whether such a presentation was a genuine pre-apprehension (an a priori intellectual intuition) of infinite being or merely an a priori concept of infinite being. If one's awareness of particulars as such could be accounted for by- an a priori concept of infinite being, to claim that the Vorgriff must be an actual a priori awareness of "noumenal" being would beg the question in assuming that the Vorgriff is actually such an intellectual intuition; that is, it would beg the question of whether the Vorgriff intuits what is noumenal with respect to it or only presents infinite being as it exists in the realm of appearance with respect to it. The problem typified here is that one might exhibit the presentation as a priori and even demonstrate the presentation to be a necessary condition of the possibility of objective experience and yet not have demonstrated that it is in fact an intuiting of what is " noumenal " with respect to it. Thus the argument needed by Rahner is not merely one that demonstrates the Vorgriff (as such a presentation) to be a priori, or even merely one that argues that because the Vorgriff is a necessary condition of the possibility of objective experience it is legitimately "employed" in experience, but one that also demonstrates that the Vorgriff being no less than such an intellectual or nonsensuous intuition of noumenal being is a necessary condition of the possibility of objective experience. To show merely that a presentation of infinite being is a necessary condition of the possibility of experience is to demonstrate at most that within the realm of experience the concept of infinite being must be employed. This makes God into a phenomenal being (with respect to that presentation); the demonstration has shown only that the presentation of infinite being and therefore the "object" God is transcendentally ideal and empirically real. This is not to say that on this view God is a physical object, for the empirically real for Kant is wider in scope than the physical. Psychologists might discuss
284 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
mental phenomena that are empirically real (the realm of "inner sense") but not physical. Granted that the argument would at most demonstrate that God is empirically real and transcendentally ideal, it would not preclude the possibility that God's existence is tied to the employment of our a priori presentation (on this interpretation, a concept) of the Vorgriff .
The problem here may be due to an inherent limitation in the transcendental approach. Kant intends his transcendental deductions to show both the legitimacy of the employment of a priori presentations and the limits of such legitimate employment. Kant thinks that their necessity for the possibility of experience is shown by the fact that they co-constitute the world of objective experience. But while the categories (and the forms of intuition) are thus constitutive of phenomenal objects, they are not constitutive (as far as we can know) of things in themselves, the noumenal, or the transcendentally real. On the one hand, were Rahner to claim that the Vorgriff is a necessary condition of the possibility of objective experience because it co-constitutes such experience, then it could be objected that the employment of that a priori presentation has not been shown to extend beyond the realm of such co-constitution (which means it could be a concept or form of intuition rather than a genuine intuition) so, importantly, Rahner's argument does not avail itself of this "coconstitution" feature. But, on the other hand, Rahner cannot preclude the Vorgriff being interpreted as such an a priori concept because it seems such a presentation would provide for the awareness that the limitation of the universal comes from the particular. I cannot see any reason why an a priori concept of unlimited and infinite being could not provide for this awareness, and, if I am correct, then an a priori concept of infinite being could serve the function of the Vorgriff . Now an a priori concept of infinite being is the concept of an absolute and unlimited being that is not just merely possible but actual, but the fact that we possess the concept of infinite being would seem insufficient to prove the transcendental reality of such being with respect to that concept. If Rahner's argument shows that we have an a priori
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 285
concept of God, it is a valuable piece of work but insufficient to prove the kind of reality we wish to attribute to God, because the reality of the God for which Rahner argues is not a reality to be dependent on our mental processes.
I would like to consider some possible responses to the objection I am putting forward. (a) First, it could be replied that for there to be any such a priori concept of infinite being there would have to be a transcendentally real in finite being as the cause. For otherwise how could a finite person have the concept of an infinite being? Ignoring the questionable use of the category of causality for such a purpose in the context of a supposedly transcendental or Kantian framework, such a reply seems to include the kind of questionable assumption present in Descartes's Third Meditation argument for God's existence. Descartes claims that he has a positive conception of infinity' (not arrived at by negating the finite indefinitely) . His idea of God, which like other ideas has a finite amount of formal reality, has an infinite amount of objective reality in virtue of the fact that it represents an infinite reality. Descartes then asserts that God must exist as the ultimate cause of this idea because there must be at least as much formal reality in the cause of an idea as there is objective reality in the idea.56 Now even if we grant the Cartesian claim to have a positive conception of the infinite, some convincing reason to believe such a general principle about the relation of formal and objective reality would have to be provided. That it is true is certainly controversial. Rahner's own view is that a finite human person has an a priori grasp of something unlimited and infinite, and I do not see how it is less intelligible or more mysterious to say that a finite human person just has the a priori concept of such a being.
Actually, I am not sure that one even has to claim that such an a priori concept is a positive conception of infinite being rather than a merely negative conception (indefinitely negating the finite) . I have trouble understanding this distinction when it is
56 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), 26-34.
286 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
alleged to characterize an a priori, unthematic concept rather than an empirical one, but either a positive or a negative conception would be a conception of going beyond the particular so as to provide for the awareness that the limitation of the universal comes from the particular. Rahner might claim that if the conception is negative then in fact it becomes what needs to be explained, for such " going beyond " the particular is just what the Vorgriff was supposed to explain, not repeat. But what could be envisaged is the possession of an a priori concept that does not so much unify intuitions as merely go bey'ond them--it functions as just such an a priori rule to go beyond. Incidentally, as Rahner is presumably well aware, Kant himself admits that we have a Transcendental Idea of God yet does not find this Idea can be accounted for only by a logically prior awareness of God or by a transcendentally real infinite being as "cause " of the Idea.57
(b) Another reply would be to claim that the Vorgriff cannot be an a priori concept because the Vorgriff is unthematic. But in recognizing that in Rahner's terms it would be called a "pre-concept" I am acknowledging not only the fact that it is supposed to be a priori but also that it could be below the level of concepts of which one is conscious. I grant that Rahner takes it as special and not merely the same kind of a priori presentation or element as are Kant's pure concepts of the understanding, though if I am correct Rahner has not precluded the possibility that the Vorgriff is in fact an a priori concept. So this reply does not by itself demonstrate that it is an intuition of infinite being as transcendentally real.
(c) A third response to my objection would be to claim that with the Vorgriff , and human knowledge generally, the knowing subject intends to grasp or affirm reality- as in-itself and not just as it appears. Rahner may anticipate this response implicitly in his claim that in judgment one refers the supposit of the predicate to an in-itself, which is to say that judgment refers the supposit of the predicate to the subject existing in itself as transcendentally real and not merely as it appears. I wonder whether such a claim
57 Kant, B 391/A 334-B 392/A 335.
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 287
is true in the first place; it may be that the "in-itself" described here is really just the in-itself of an empirically- real and transcendentally ideal object, which is in-itself in its existence apart from human empirical sensation but not apart from all sensibility and categorical employment. But even ignoring this, that we implicitly intentionally " refer" a quality to the transcendentally real and that we intuit the transcendentally- real are two very different claims; a proof of the former is not a proof of the latter. That is, there could be a discrepancy here between those transcendentally real features of the reality one intends in knowing and those transcendentally ideal features of the objects that one knows. An ontological (here noumenal) affirmation is not necessarily an ontological (noumenal) apprehension, whether in the context of ordinary knowing or of the Vorgriff.
(d) Rahner might reply- that the Vorgriff must grasp transcendentally real being and not merely transcendentally ideal being because of the identity of being and knowing, which is asserted elsewhere in Rahner's Heideggerian description of human existence as that of the being who necessarily asks the question of being.58 But relying on this would not seem to be a convincing
tactic of argument. Even if one were to accept Rahner's analysis, one could point out that even Rahner does not assert a full luminosity' to human being, and Rahner distances his claim from the kind of thoroughgoing identity- he sees held by German idealism. So all Rahner's claim amounts to is the assertion that, in knowing, human existence possesses some identity with being, and this might be transcendentally ideal being only'.
(e) Finally, in what might seem to be a reply to my- objection, Rahner claims that the Vorgriff cannot grasp infinite being as merely possible. Perhaps we can more fully explain why Rahner thinks that the Vorgriff cannot aim at infinite being, God, as merely possible by drawing upon Maréchal's explanation of this point. Maréchal distinguishes between the subjective end and the o bjective end of the intellectual dynamism of the affirmation, which is the Maréchalian equivalent of the Vorgriff. (But in the
58 Rahner, Hearers of the Word, 7
288 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
following description of Maréchal I will continue to use Rahner's term " Vorgriff.") If I understand Maréchal correctly, he considers the subjective end to be that at which the Vorgriff aims, while the objective end is what it attains. Now, the Vorgriff aims at the possession of God, which Maréchal thinks shows that the subjective end is in itself possible, for otherwise it is an appetite for nothingness, which he claims to be a logical absurdity:
to posit any intellectual act whatsoever in virtue of the natural tendency towards the subjective ultimate end of the intellect is tantamount to implicitly or explicitly willing this end, hence to adopting it as at least possible. Strictly speaking one may intend an end without being certain of reaching it, even with the certitude of never reaching it. But it would be contradictory to strive towards an end which one considers absolutely and in every respect unattainable. This would mean to will nothingness. This logical incompatibility, in the subject himself, between willing some end and affirming its total emptiness, applies as well to the implicit as to the explicit domain of reason.59
So the nature of the Vorgriff . in affirming infinite being as its subjective end as at least possible, is to affirm implicitly the reality of the objective end as its logical possibility.60 Furthermore, there is a radical distinction among objective ends between those which are finite and those which are infinite. There is no incoherence in a subjective end of a finite object which does not objectively exist as long as it is possible. " Nothing prevents us from desiring to acquire a thing which is not, but which will be (which exists in its causes) . I may even, without contradiction, although rather whimsically, desire to possess an object which is merely possible, provided, of course, that I suppose it to be really existing when my subjective end is hypothetically achieved." 61 But the possibility of the subjective end which is absolute being presupposes the reality of the objective end, for the condition of the possibility of the assimilation of absolute being is the existence of this being.
59 Maréchal, 184.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., 184-185.
RAHNER'S DEDUCTION OF THE VORGRIFF 289
But when this object is God, when the objective end is identified with the Being which is necessary by itself (the pure Act), which has no other mode of reality than absolute existence, the dialectical exigency implied by the desire assumes a new scope, not merely on account of the natural desire, but on account of the nature of the desire's object. To affirm of God that he is possible is the same as to affirm that he exists, since his existence is the condition of every possibility.
Hence we may state, in strictest logic, that the possibility of our subjective last end presupposes logically the existence of our objective last end, God. Thus, in every intellectual act, we affirm implicitly the existence of an absolute Being.62
One ventures to assume this to be what Rahner thinks as well.
Now I have granted for the sake of argument that Rahner has shown the presentation of infinite being to be a necessary condition of the possibility of experience, and that this shows the object of the Vorgriff cannot be empirically possible only but must be empirically real (recall that this does not mean it is physical). But what Maréchal and Rahner need to prove with this reply is that the object of the Vorgriff cannot be transcendentally possible only but must be transcendentally real. As has been remarked by others, the claim that if God is possible God must be real seems to be a version of the ontological argument.63 This is curious since Rahner explicitly disavows putting forward any a priori argument. But in a footnote in Spirit in the World Rahner hints at what might be the assumption behind his claim:
An 'intentional' pre-possession of its end presupposes its ontological one, an ontological ordination of the power to its end, and this is a condition of the possibility of anticipating the end in knowledge.64
This seems likewise to lie behind Maréchal's claim that because the Vorgriff affirms implicitly the reality of its objective end as at least possible, its reality follows. When the objective end is a
62 Ibid., 185
63 Denis J. M. Bradley, "Transcendental Critique and Realist Metaphysics," The Thomist 39 (1975) : 644-645.
64 Rahner, Spirit in the World, 259, footnote 62; pointed out by Denis J. M. Bradley, "Rahner's Spirit in the World: Aquinas or Hegel?" The Thomist 41 (1977) : 198-199, footnote.
290 WINFRED GEORGE PHILLIPS
being necessary by itself, to affirm of God that he is possible is the same as to affirm that he exists.
It is not clear that "ontological pre-possession of its end
means the intuiting of noumenal reality (noumenal with respect to an a priori concept of God), but that seems to be the meaning Maréchal and Rahner are forced to give it. Thus the claim in effect means that to grant that God is "possibly" transcendentally real is to grant that God is " actually " transcendentally real. But such a claim needs more support than Rahner gives it. The claim in the above quote is not self-evident but is not argued for. And without wanting to enter into a prolonged discussion of the prospects for the ontological argument, on which Maréchal's and Rahner's rebuttal seems to depend, I do want to note at least that it seems open to major objections. Furthermore, of course, even were such an ontological argument to succeed, its use in the service of Rahner's transcendental approach would make the whole approach superfluous with respect to demonstrating the reality of God, because if the ontological argument (as applied to the transcendental reality of God) were to succeed, one would have a direct proof of the reality (even the transcendental reality) of God without having to invoke the Vorgriff at all.
In this discussion I have considered three important features of Kant's transcendental approach and have examined Rahner' s
argument for the Vorgriff with them in mind. Without calling into question any of Rahner's other claims or arguments with respect to a transcendental consideration of human existence as a recipient of divine revelation, I suggest that Rahner's approach fails to demonstrate the reality of God.