INDIRECT METHODS IN THEOLOGY:

KARL RAHNER AS AN AD HOC APOLOGIST

NICHOLAS M. HEALY

St. John's University

Staten Island, New York

THE PURPOSE of this paper is to discuss Karl Rahner's remarks upon, and use of, what he called 'indirect meth ods' in theology.1 To my knowledge there has been little analysis, beyond incidental treatment, of Rahner's scattered references to these methods.2 In the following pages I hope to remedy this gap, and argue for two interdependent theses: First, by construing Rahner's own theological practice in the light of his remarks on the indirect methods, an apologetic method can be discerned which could prove useful for contemporary theology. Second, reading Rahner from this perspective indicates that his apologetic method is much more situation-relative and occasionalist than has generally been recognized hitherto.

Two Kinds of Apologetics

A quick sketch of some aspects of the present theological scene will help make these theses a little clearer and provide some cate1 My discussion of the indirect methods is based primarily upon the following sources: Theological Investigations (New York: Crossroad, 1961-1982) (cited in the text as TI), vol. 6, "A Small Question Regarding the Contemporary Pluralism in the Intellectual Situation of Catholic and the Church ", pp. 21-30; vol. 11, "Reflections on Methodology in Theology ", pp. 68-114; vol. 16, "A New Task for Theology ". Foundations of Christians Faith (New York: Crossroad, 1978) (henceforth cited as FCF), introduction, pp. 1-23, et passim.2 See e.g., Anne Carr, The Theological Method of Karl Rahner (Missoula:

Scholars Press, 1977), pp. 267-9; Francis S. Fiorenza, Foundational Theology:

Jesus and the Church (New York: Crossroad, 1984) (cited as Fiorenza), p.

93. Both these interpreters consider the indirect methods to he synonymous with the transcendental method. They then interpret the former in terms of the latter, misguidedly, I will argue.

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gories for the following discussion. According to William Placher,3 the contemporary situation in North American theology is often characterized as one in which two rival models of theology are dominant, the revisionist and the post-liberal (Placher, 17-19). Placher discusses many aspects of each model; here I want to look only at those features which bear upon their different conceptions of the nature of apologetics.

According to David Tracy, a leading practitioner of the revisionist model, theology in all its forms must be "determined by a relentless drive to genuine publicness ".4 In order to maintain its public character, theology, like any discipline, must develop a preliminary systematic argument by which to ground its possibility and to establish its claims to truth and meaningfulness. This initial apologetics uses universal categories and proceeds in accordance with general criteria, functioning in terms, that is, which "all reasonable persons, whether ' religiously involved' or not, can recognize as reasonable" (Tracy, 57). Usually it takes the form of a foundational explanatory theory of religious discourse which appeals to the universal nature of the deep structures of religious experience. This general theory of religion provides criteria for the subsequent theology, thereby maintaining the latter's relevance for the general, non-Christian public. The theological method considered appropriate is one which attempts systematically to correlate Christian-specific claims with the deep structures of human experience.

The post-liberal model, by comparison, is more concerned to preserve Christian identity than to maintain the publicness of Christian discourse. The task of theology is not primarily the apologetic one of justifying Christianity to a non-Christian pub-

Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989) (cited as Placher) .

4 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981), p. 31 (cited as Tracy).

See the analyses in, e.g., George A. Lindheck, The Nature of Doctrine:

Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), chapter 2; and Ronald F. Thiemann, Revelation and Theology:

The Gospel as Narrated Promise (Notre Dame: U. of N. D. Press, 1985), chapter 4.KARL RAHNER AS AN AD HOC APOLOGIST615

lic. Instead the theologian should critically "describe and redescribe the character and relationship of Christian beliefs and practices for the purpose of sustaining and nurturing Christian identity ~'~8 The criteria employed in this second model are required, therefore, to be intrasystematic: they are founded on, and usually specific to, the practices of the Christian community.

Post-liberals believe that the revisionist model of apologetics clings to a number of fallacious Enlightenment assumptions concerning the nature of rational argument. One assumption is the foundationalist fallacy, i.e., the appeal to a special class of self-evident truths which are thought to be the foundation of all knowledge in a specific sphere. The incorrigibility of these truths is thought to be warranted by the peculiar way in which they are known, namely by their imposing themselves upon us through direct experience.7 Another assumption is that we can begin an argument from a neutral viewpoint, and/or that we can arrive by such an argument at an adequate account of some element of human experience which is universal in scope. However, both our perspectives on reality and our experience are deeply molded by our place within particular traditions of thought and practice, traditions which we are unable to transcend sufficiently to give anything like a neutral account of universal religious experience.8

More decisive for the post-liberals than these non-theological criticisms of systematic apologetical arguments are the theological consequences of revisionist apologetics. Whether or not the initial argument makes a strictly foundationalist move, the development of a general theory as the framework within which to assess Christian claims tends inevitably to distort the subsequent theology. Instead of Christian claims determining the explicative framework, they end up being revised in order to fit the general theory. Furthermore, the systematic correlation of Christian claims and those of the larger society according to criteria derived from a general theory diminishes not only the identity of

~ William Werpehowski, "Ad Hoc Apologetics Journal of Religion, 66 :3 (1986), p. 286.

~ See Placher, chapter 2; Thiemann, Revelation, chapters 1 and 2.

~ Placher, pp. 17, 156.

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Christianity but also its critical force within society. In the interest of publicness, Christianity ironically loses its distinctiveness, thereby becoming culturally irrelevant.9

These philosophical and theological difficulties indicate to the post-liberals that the attempt to develop a revisionist systematic apologetics should be abandoned. Not that we should abandon apologetics as such: Placher, for instance, argues forcefully that "the logic of Christian faith drives us to conversation beyond the borders of the Christian faith" (Placher, 167f.). But when we do engage in " pluralistic conversation ", as he terms it, it must be on an "ad hoc" basis.

What makes apologetics ad hoc? Negatively, ad hoc apologetics does not try, in the words of David Kelsey, to construct a "comprehensive, coherent, and religiously neutral systematic argument designed to exhibit the credibility of belief in God in general and the Christian symbol system in particular ".10 Positively, ad hoc apologetics develops arguments the force of which remains situation-relative. That is, the apologist is to retain her grounding within a particular tradition, and address herself not to some abstract unbeliever, but to one who lives within a particular concrete historical and cultural situation. The basis for such an address are some of the beliefs and practices both parties share. Naturally, these commonalities will vary from case to case, so no systematic rules can be developed to be applied in all cases (Placher, 167).

As I noted earlier, it is my contention that Rahner's own theological practice can be understood as compatible with ad hoc apologetics. Rahner, of course, is usually understood to be a practitioner of the revisionist model of theology."11 Later I will

A point made classically hy Van Harvey, "The Pathos of Liberal Theology ", Journal of Religion 56 (1976) .

10 "Church Discourse and Public Realm ", in Theology and Dialogue: Essays

in Conversation with George Lindbeck, ed. Bruce Marshall (Notre Dame:

U. of N.D. Pr., 1990), p. 16.

11 Besides the works of Carr and Fiorenza cited in note 2 ahove, see also,

e.g., W. V. Dych's interpretation of chapter one of FCF in A World of

Grace, ed. Leo J. O'Donovan (New York: Seabury, 1980); or Thomas

Sheehan, Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations (Athens, Ohio: Ohio

UP., 1987).

KARL RAHNER AS AN AD HOC APOLOGIST

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show how representative interpretations along such lines require his theology to be inconsistent. Although such inconsistency is indeed possible, the principle of charity suggests that we look for an alternative interpretation This I sketch out by first looking at Rahner's notion of indirect methods, and then by discussing the transcendental method, particularly with reference to the kind of argument it uses and its function in Rahner's apologetics. I will argue that the most coherent reading of Rahner requires that his transcendental method be understood as an instance of the indirect method, rather than vice versa.

This paper is not, however, merely to be an exercise in reinterpretation and rehabilitation. I hope at the same time to show that by interpreting Rahner as an ad hoc apologist we can discern some examples of an apologetic method which may be used profitably by those who seek, like Placher, to develop a way beyond the impasse of the revisionist and post-liberal models.12

Rahner's Indirect Methods

Rahner's notion of the indirect methods can best be understood in the context of his views on the nature and task of theology. In general terms, theology is a "necessarily ecclesiastical" discipline whose task it is "to serve as the science of the proclamation of the Gospel and . . . [to] serve the people of our time" (TI 21,

5). Its subject matter is "the act and content of Christian . . . faith ", the Christian kerygma, which it represents in language used by contemporary people. Theologians are to try to distinguish what is of permanent value in the Christian life from its historically and culturally conditioned conceptual packaging, which may no longer be useful for, and may actually distort, the Church's proclamation of the kerygma.13 As Leo O'Donovan

12 Although I have sketched out a specifically North American context for my discussion, a similar problematic pertains in Europe. See Walter Kasper, "Postmodern Dogmatics: Towards a Renewed Discussion of Foundations in North America ", Communio 17 (Summer 1990) .

13 How, more exactly, Rahner does this is described in George Lindbeck's Pere Marquette Theology Lecture, Infallibility (Milwaukee: Marquette U.P., 1972), pp. 51-3.

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points out, theology functions not only as faith seeking understanding, but as a practical and transformative discipline, "a reflective effort to open Christian life to ever greater and more active faith." 14 By showing that a Christian claim is something that "can be lived out in a genuine way" (TI 21, 77), theology serves the kerygma by aiding its call to the decision of faith.15

Recent Catholic tradition has distinguished two ways in which theology is to carry out its task, namely fundamental and dogmatic theology. The latter addresses those who are already within the borders of the Christian faith, and attempts to demonstrate the coherence of particular beliefs within the Christian system. Fundamental theology has taken the form, since the Enlightenment, of a "scientific and systematic reflection upon the grounds of credibility of Christian revelation and the obligation of faith" (TI 16, 156). It is a deduction, arguing according to general criteria, addressed ad extra, with the intent to convince non-Christians of the truth and meaningfulness of (the Roman Catholic form of) Christianity.16

Rahner contends that there has occurred a qualitative change in the situation facing fundamental theology which has rendered the discipline as traditionally conceived practically impossible today. Three factors are responsible for this change. The first and most obvious, perhaps, is that the sheer volume of data to be considered in order to make such an argument has become overwhelming. Theologians now face a number of sub-disciplines and a plurality of methods, making them mere amateurs outside their chosen specialty. Systematic theologians, for instance, cannot hope to be sufficiently expert in exegesis, in moral philosophy and so on, to use the materials specific to these disciplines with any degree of conviction (TI 6, 23ff) . In addition, they must digest the data from a large number of other sciences and learn the

14 Leo O'Donovan, "Orthopraxis and Theological Method in Karl Rahner", Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, 35 (1980) p. 61.

15 See Rahner and Karl Lehmann, Kerygma and Dogma (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), p. 23.

16 See Fiorenza, for a discussion of the origins and development of fundamental theology .

KARL RAHNER AS AN AD HOC APOLOGIST 619

many philosophical languages now used. Consequently it is impossible for any single individual (and Rahner rules out collaborative efforts) to bring together all the knowledge involved in order to present a direct and unified argument for a particular view of the world.

The practical difficulties consequent upon contemporary intellectual pluralism have led us to recognize a second factor, namely the inescapability of our situatedness with relation to truth. We cannot help but work with certain "philosophical preconceptions" which are " subject to historical conditions and the limitations of particular epochs" (TI 11, 74). Theologians must now "explicitly allow for . . . the fact that their own recognition of truth is subject to historical conditioning " (ibid, 77). There is no possibility of transcending our particular view of reality to reach a neutral vantage point and so create an argument which would answer all counter-arguments to come. We can only reason within a tradition: "truth has something to do with institutional life and practice" ; it is available only within particular historical-cultural contexts (ibid., 80) .

One consequence of contemporary pluralism for fundamental theology, therefore, is that it must explicitly recognize the necessity of beginning within a particular ecclesiological context. Abandoning attempts to develop a neutral, non-perspectival basis for its argument, rational apologetics must "take as its starting-point the average and representational awareness of faith to be found in the Church as it exists in the concrete" (TI 11, 81).

The methodological issue for fundamental theology is further complicated by a third factor, however, namely the new cultural situation in which the Church finds itself. According to Rahner's analysis in The Shape of the Church. to Come,17 the loss of Christendom has resulted in the Church becoming an increasingly marginalized community amid a neo-pagan and scientistic culture (Shape, 33; see TI 14, 255f.). The Roman Catholic Church's membership has consequently changed from one which consisted primarily of socialized Catholics drawn from the Catholic sub-

17 New York: Seabury, 1974. Henceforth cited as Shape.

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culture to a new kind of membership based upon personal decision. New members of the Church are called to belief in Jesus Christ by their decision " in a critical dissociation " from " current ways of thinking and behaviour in [their] social environment" (Shape, 23).

Even after they have made a decision for faith, Christians cannot isolate themselves from their cultural environment. They must continue to use the prevailing discourse, with its philosophical assumptions and patterns of thought which are themselves often implicitly anti-Christian (Shape, 23). Consequently many Christians continue to live in a way "remote from the Gospel message" even while, sociologically at least, belonging to the Church (Shape, 98; TI 14, 255). Each believer now lives in "a situation of crisis for their faith " (FCF 6) . To be a Christian is not a once-for-all decision, but an on-going task: "a person is always a Christian in order to become one" (FCF 306). Thus in the modern Church of the diaspora (TI 10, 13) there is no clear dividing line between Christians and non-Christians (Shape, 74).18

The changed situation demands "an aggressive attitude" on the part of theologians to win over those both within and without the Church to authentically Christian ways of thought and action (Shape, 31) . In response, Rahner proposes that apologetics be reconceived as an address not only to those outside the Church, but also, and even primarily, to those within who are engaged in the process of appropriating their Christianity (see FCF 294, e.g.). Those outside the Church, in fact, should be addressed only on the assumption that they have already implicitly said 'yes' to Christ. For it is Christians now who need confirmation in their faith, who need help to avoid a retreat into fideism, and who

18 In Two Types of Apologetics: a Rhetorical and Pragmatic Analysis (forthcoming), Kathryn Tanner develops a similar position in considerably more detail. She argues convincingly that the assumption that there is such a sharp boundary between believer and non-believer is at least partly responsible for the present impasse between revisionist and post-liberal apologetic method. Recognition that this is a false assumption would thus do much to dissolve the problem.

KARL RAHNER AS AN AD HOC APOLOGIST

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need to be given "confidence from the very content of Christian dogma itself that they can believe with intellectual honesty"

(FCF 12).

In response to the blurring of the borders between faith and non-faith, the apologetical thrust of fundamental theology should, Rahner believes, be combined with the perspective and material concerns of dogmatic theology. The resulting apologetics will attempt to be a "unity" of philosophy and theology in response to the unity of these two forms of reflection "already present in the concrete life of the Christian" (FCF 11).

Rahner proposes that the new apologetics use a form of argument differing from that of traditional fundamental theology. This method can itself be " rationally justified" by generalizing the probabilist approach in ethics to include philosophical and historical issues, and by borrowing some suggestions from Newman (see TI 6, 27) . Rather than arguing systematically and deductively from self-evident principles, directly engaging all the material issues involved, and seeking thereby to effect a strict proof for the question at hand, an "indirect form of justification" should be attempted (TI 11, 75) .

Indirect apologetics begins from a particular perspective, i.e., faith "in its normal ecclesial form" (FCF 1). It addresses the individual or group in such a way that their concrete situation will bear upon the form and material content of the argument (TI 11, 78). Instead of a universally valid argument designed to vanquish all possible counter-arguments, the indirect argument avoids direct treatment of all the material issues involved, and takes the form of a case made to convince a certain set of people to think about a particular issue in a certain way. The force of the argument is not meant to be universally applicable; it remains an "incomplete proof" (TI 6, 29f.) . Instead of proceeding systematically in a linear fashion, the aim is to convince by showing a "convergence of probabilities," arguing from a variety of perspectives in order to show the reasonableness of the proposed thesis (ibid. ) . Consequently indirect apologetics resembles an argumentum ad hominem, but, Rather insists, there is nothing

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to be ashamed of in this, since the very situatedness of the argument will throw light otherwise unavailable on the material issues considered (TI 11, 78).

In sum the indirect methods differ from traditional fundamental theology in three ways: a) they avoid systematic deductive arguments involving direct treatment of material questions which need expertise in a multiplicity of disciplines; b) the argument is meant to apply only " in the particular concrete situation" of those who are to be addressed; and c) as situation-relative, the case made through an indirect method does "not lay claim to any permanent or universal validity "(TI 11, 75).

Rahner's remarks on the indirect methods in theology are clearly consistent with the two norms for ad hoc apologetics I noted earlier. The summary above indicates that the force of the argument of an indirect apologetics is situation relative, and does not attempt to ground Christian discourse upon a neutral universally-applicable argument. I suggest then that these remarks on the indirect methods be understood as a description of an ad hoc apologetic method.

Rahner as practitioner of the indirect methods

In order to move beyond Rahner's remarks on indirect methods to his actual practice, I could now turn to those arguments which Rahner explicitly describes as examples of the indirect apologetics. The aim would be, of course, to show how they are in fact consistent with the ad hoc approach. There are a number of such cases made for various proposals, usually historical in nature, including, for instance, the "historically indirect and immediately existentiell argument" (FCF 335) regarding the institution of the Church by Christ (FCF 329ff.; see also TI 11, 77f.). I will call these the 'narrow ' versions of the indirect methods, for they are all more or less brief, occur in the context of a larger work, and refer to isolated historical proposals.

However, my thesis about Rahner's work pertains to more than these narrow versions. I want to say that all Rahner' s apologetic work is ad hoc, including the large-scale, philosophically-oriented apologetic treatises Spirit in the World and Hearers

KARL RAHNER AS AN AD HOC APOLOGIST

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of the Word,19 together with FCF. These seem most obviously

revisionist in nature and are often the basis for interpretations of Rahner's work as a whole. Hence for the remainder of the paper I will discuss Rahner's theological practice in terms of these works, which, I will argue, are instances of what I will call the 'broad' version of ad hoc apologetics.

The claim just made cries out for a discussion of Rahner's use of the transcendental method. Transcendental arguments are surely instances of a religiously neutral, systematic and comprehensive apologetical approach. They are meant (are they not?) to transcend particularity to arrive at knowledge of conditions which prevail universally. And they are an integral element in all three of the works just mentioned. I will very briefly examine two interpretations of Rahner's apologetics which view his work from the perspective of the transcendental rather than the indirect methods to see how they answer two key questions: First, what kind of argument is the transcendental argument in Rahner's apologetics? Second, what function does it have in his theology?

The first kind of interpretation is one which construes Rahner's apologetics as an example of the foundationalist move. Perhaps the most sophisticated example of this reading can be found in Francis Fiorenza's Foundational Theology.20 Here Rahner's use of transcendental arguments is seen as an indispensable part of a theological method which attempts to establish the truth of Christian claims. The method consists of two steps: The first "presupposes nothing of Christianity ", but develops a neutral transcendental (and existential) analysis of the universal religious dimension of human existence. The second step then correlates the results of this analysis (namely that human subjectivity is grounded on a pre-apprehension of divine presence) with specific Christian claims (especially those having to do with Christology) . By showing how Christian claims are explicit symbols of the transcendental dimension of human experience, the correlation

19 Spirit in the World (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968) (cited as SW) Hearers of the Word (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969) (cited as HW).

20 See note 2.

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has thus confirmed the truth of Christian beliefs (see Fiorenza,

278-280).

Fiorenza's subsequent criticism of this method of correlation takes Rahner's putative use of foundationalist Philosophy to task (see Fiorenza, 280-282). He explains the problems associated with the foundationalist move, making many of the same points as the Post-liberals (Fiorenza 285-29 1 ) . He points out that all human experience, together with its theological interpretation, is situated within a particular cultural tradition. And so he faults Rahner s transcendental argument for its failure to take into account the "historical and hermeneutical dimension of human experience" (Fiorenza, 281).

As we have seen, Rahner is quite aware of our profound socialization. So in effect Fiorenza has implicitly accused Rahner of inconsistency: Transcendental arguments deduce universal, ahistorical conditions of the possibility for a given; yet Rahner has explicitly abandoned such arguments as impossible. The principle of charity suggests that we should see if Rahner is in fact using transcendental arguments to deduce necessary truths about the religious dimension of human experience. Perhaps, instead, he is using transcendental arguments in a more philosophically sophisticated way consistent with his views on the indirect methods.

According to Kathryn Tanner,21 a transcendental argument differs from simple proof by deduction. If the latter is successful, belief in the premise is transferred to the conclusion. By contrast, transcendental arguments take the conclusion as the given, and it is the conditions of the possibility which are argued for. But transcendental arguments themselves come in two versions:

"strong" and "qualified ". In the strong version, the given is unproblematic: it is the conditions of its possibility which are argued for as necessary preconditions, which must be accepted if we are to retain the given. If this version is used in fundamental theology, the preliminary deduction becomes a once-and-for-all

21 God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 20-24.

KARL RAHNER AS AN AD Hoc APOLOGIST 625

demonstration of what must pertain, if Christianity is to be credible. It is this version of the transcendental argument which Fiorenza assumes Rahner to be engaged upon.

Fiorenza is well-aware that the logic of this version of transcendental arguments is confused. S. Körner has pointed out that all that is demonstrated are merely sufficient reasons for the given; nothing can be said about their necessity.22 In the light of cross-cultural studies showing the pluralism of human experience, the uniqueness of the conditions must be demonstrated in addition to their sufficiency. This requirement is ignored by the " strong" version of the transcendental argument.

The second, qualified, version of the transcendental argument is more modest in intent, and recognizes the logical possibility of a plurality of metaphysical schemes. Here it is the given--that for which the conditions of possibility are supplied--which is the problem. The point of engaging in such an argument is therefore to support the given by providing suitable conditions; that is, by demonstrating its internal coherence, getting rid of difficulties as to its credibility, and so on. These conditions are recognized as merely sufficient, and will vary depending upon time and place. Hence the qualified version of the transcendental argument "must he undertaken over and over again in relation to changing and different schemata" (Körner, 331).

This qualified version of the transcendental argument is, I suggest, compatible with Rahner's own comments. He has never claimed that his analyses are definitive, and in fact explicitly asserts that no "transcendental enquiry" is to be considered a once-for-all demonstration of necessary conditions. Rather, such enquiries "must constantly be undertaken afresh" (TI 11, 90). There is no intrinsic reason why qualified versions of transcendental arguments should not be used within an indirect apologetics. It is clear, too, that they can be compatible with the positive norm for ad hoc apologetics, namely, that the force of the argument should be situation-relative.

22 S. Körner, "The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions ", The Monist, vol. 51(1967).

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Yet even if Rahner can be read as using a qualified version of the transcendental argument, and thus as innocent of foundationalism, such an argument can still function as part of a revisionist apologetic strategy. A qualified transcendental argument is based upon premises which are admittedly conditioned by a particular cultural situation. But these premises may be used to formulate a general theory which appears religiously neutral and reasonable to all within that culture. The theory can then be used systematically to ground subsequent Christian claims. This use of transcendental arguments would then be in violation of the negative norm for ad hoc apologetics. The theological problems will then remain the same as for strong transcendental arguments, for particular Christian claims can be distorted as they are correlated, and revised to fit, with the general theory.

The problem of distortion is a central concern of a second kind of critical interpretation of Rahner. This interpretation is distinct from the first in that it understands Rahner to be using the transcendental method to ground, not the truth of Christian claims (which is a matter of faith), but their meaningfulness. The best recent example of this reading can be found in Bruce Marshall's Christology in Conflict,23 which analyses the move from general theory to particular doctrine specifically in terms of Christology.

Marshall understands Rahner to be making two key Christological assumptions. The first is compatible with pre-modern theology, namely, that what is ultimately or salvifically significant can be known only through knowledge of the unique individual, Jesus Christ (Conflict, 10). Second, as a post-Enlightenment theologian, Rahner also assumes that it is absolutely necessary to develop a preliminary argument which grounds the meaningfulness of Christian claims about Christ (Conflict, 20). It is this second assumption which determines Rahner's theological method, which has two stages: In the first, a transcendental anthropological argument appeals to "general criteria of religious and moral meaningfulness" (Conflict, 15) in order to develop a theory of

23 Christology in Conflict: The Identity of a Saviour in Rahner and Barth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) . Hereafter cited as Conflict.

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what salvation must be, and thus what Rahner calls an "absolute saviour" must look like. Then in the second stage, theology shows how the concept absolute saviour can be meaningfully ascribed to Jesus Christ (see Conflict, 21-32).

Marshall's criticism of Rahuer depends upon the distinction between two kinds of identity descriptions, the "particular" and the " positive ". A person may be known concretely by reference to features which indicate aspects unique to that particular individual. These would include ostensive reference (" that's the fellow over there ") or a (more or less complete) biographical recital. Alternatively, a person may be known abstractly, with reference only to indeterminate features. In this case the individual is known positively as the one who functions in a role or is an instance of a class, but who is otherwise unknown (see Conflict, 42-7).

With this distinction in mind, Rahner's Christology can be faulted on two counts. First, by moving logic ally from the general concept " absolute saviour " to the person Jesus Christ, the transcendental method leads to the loss of the " material decisiveness " of the particular identity- description of Jesus Christ for our understanding of absolute salvation. Thereby our knowledge of the Christian notion of salvation is at least diminished and more or less distorted. Second (and this is Marshall's key contribution to Rahnerian criticism), Rahner's method as described is logically inconsistent with his initial assumption. Transcendental arguments can explicate only the general and the abstract; a transcendental Christology can thus deal only with the positive identity of Jesus Christ, not with his concrete particularity. But Rahner's first assumption is that Jesus' particularity is logically indispensable for Christology. Therefore when he engages in transcendental Christology, his method is inconsistent with this initial assumption.

Marshall's criticism of Rahner is itself dependent upon some vital hermeneutic decisions. Like Fiorenza, he understands the function of the transcendental argument to be the first stage of a two-stage revisionist apologetic strategy. He also understands the

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transcendental Christology to be intended as part of Rahner's theological redescription of the particular identity of Jesus Christ. I believe both these decisions are misguided, and are responsible for the putative inconsistency in Rahner's theology. In a paper of this scope I am unable either to provide a detailed criticism of Fiorenza or Marshall's interpretations, or to offer a properly detailed alternative reading of Rahner's texts. Instead I will offer a sketch of an alternative reading of Rahner's large-scale works which is guided by his remarks on indirect methods, and which does not require inconsistency on his part.

As we have seen, for Rahner all Christian thought and action is conditioned by its location within a given cultural milieu. Christians have no choice but to make use of a selection of conceptual tools provided by their social environment. They do so, as they have done throughout Christian history, by appropriating the prevailing conceptuality for their own ends according to their own criteria. However, their environment is neither static nor universal, and so these Christianized conceptual frameworks will over time show increasing inability to cope with new forms of thought and action within the prevailing culture. Although the Church can continue its proclamation of Jesus Christ, its task becomes unnecessarily impaired by the increasing inadequacy of the conceptual framework it uses to relate Jesus Christ to other sources of knowledge and experience (see FCF 13) . It becomes harder for Christians to bring their faith in Christ into every part of their lives.

One important function of theology, then, is to appropriate the prevailing conceptuality so as to broaden the impact of the Gospel on Christian life. Theologians are to formulate a mixed discourse, making use of the categories of the culture, but carefully reinterpreting them to accord with Christian criteria. This is not at all the same thing as trying to find a sufficiently neutral discourse that is acceptable to both Christians and non-Christians. Rather, "secular" categories will be used to develop a conceptual framework within which to summon the prevailing "mentality to the judgement seat of God" (TI 21, 77). This task is performed by

KARL RAHNER AS AN AD HOC APOLOGIST 629

using the (necessarily qualified) transcendental method in its broadest form, in which it functions to inquire into the linguistic conditions which are suitable to support the undermined given, i.e., the Christian kerygma.

Spirit in the World is an example of this kind of conceptual appropriation. Here Rahner is not trying to develop a neutral philosophy of religion as the first stage of a systematic revisionist apologetics. Instead, SW is a metaphysical inquiry done within the Christian tradition, subject to its criteria and its agenda. Within the parameters of similar efforts by Augustine and Thomas, Rahner appropriates and reinterprets the conceptuality prevailing in Germany at the time of his writing. Part of the conceptual apparatus which Rahner believes is useful for Christian proclamation is the transcendental method. For the turn to the subject has inextricably linked the dialect of his culture to anthropological questions. And since "every theology, of course, is always a theology which arises out of the secular anthropologies and self-interpretations of man" (FCF 7), theology must appropriate a discourse in which the new anthropologies can be addressed by Christian proclamation (and thereby summoned to God's judgment seat) .

Hearers of the Word can be read in a similar way. Leo O'Donovan 24 has argued that UW

does not prescind from faith in order to inquire into its foundations; instead it asks what understanding of reality (general ontology) and what correlative understanding of the human world (metaphysical anthropology) theology can appropriately use [my emphasis] in its reflection on faith.

In both SW and HW, according to this reading, a qualified version of the transcendental method is used to develop a conceptuality by means of which the Gospel can be shown to have a bearing on all aspects of life within the prevailing culture. Subject from the outset to criteria drawn from the Christian tradition, there is no attempt at formulating a neutral conceptuality, or one which would seem "reasonable to all" within a culture.

24 O'Donovan, "Orthopraxis and Theological Method p. 57.

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Furthermore, both works are clearly addressed to Christians who live within a particular culture: the force of their arguments are relative to those who live within the Teutonic philosophical tradition. Both works can thus be interpreted as broad versions of ad hoc apologetics.

Both SW and HW are Christian philosophies of religion, and operate at a high level of abstraction. Marshall's concerns about transcendental Christology can be addressed by looking at Foundations of Christian Faith, which, as a unity of fundamental and dogmatic theology, reflects explicitly on dogmatic material. According to Rahner, one of the most important applications of the indirect methods is in the area of the basic course for seminarians called for by Vatican II (TI 11, 79). FCF is clearly Rahner's attempt at constructing such a course. I have already noted some sections in which narrow versions of the indirect methods are used, but the work as a whole is indirect in approach. Rahner explicitly rejects the attempt to provide a systematic " foundation" for faith (FCF 9), and aims instead at presenting a "convergence of probabilities" which, it is hoped, will renew the decision for Christ of Christians as they live out their faith (FCF 10). The argument of the work should be read, then, as a "case" rather than a deduction; and as having an unsystematic, inductive character, rather than a two-stage form. Its force is situation-relative, for it is addressed to a specific audience, and makes use of a local conceptuality.

The express purpose of FCF is to reflect upon the "whole" of Christianity. This does not mean that it intends to cover all the theological loci in great detail, but that it looks at Christian faith as it is lived concretely within a particular cultural situation from a single vantage point, namely, the "idea" of Jesus Christ as God-man or absolute saviour. Running throughout the early sections is the concern to open up secular discourse to a " universal pneumatology" by means of which (as an "experiment") Rahner wants to "concentrate the whole of theology on the mystery of Christ" (FCF 3).

The sections of FCF preceding the Christology chapter can be

KARL RAHNER AS AN AD HOC APOLOGI5T 631

read as equivalent to SW and HW: that is, they are intent on appropriating the prevailing conceptuality in the interests of Christian proclamation. Operating within the framework of Christian faith " in its normal ecclesial form ", FCF attempts a "justification of faith by faith" (FCF 12). It uses the transcendental method to develop a discursive context out of some commonalities between secular anthropology and Christian claims. This mixed discourse is formulated in order that specifically Christian claims can be made clearly and yet in accordance with Christian criteria, and the call to decision for Christ understood. By reinterpretation and appropriation of the self-understanding of their culture, Rahner shows seminarians and other interested parties how they can talk about Jesus Christ and his relation to all aspects of human reality without retreating into fideism or intellectual dishonesty.

The function of the transcendental Christology in FCF is to abstract from Jesus' particular identity in the interest of universalizing him. Rahner takes certain positive concepts from Christian talk about Christ--absolute saviour, God-man,-- which he uses in the context of the mixed discourse. He is then able to show how the realities of the culture can be absorbed into what Christians want to claim is the larger reality of Jesus Christ. In his section on "Christology within an Evolutionary View of the World ", for instance, he appropriates and reinterprets a local (Hegelian) version of evolutionary thinking in order to be able to talk of Jesus Christ "as the unsurpassable peak of a universal history of grace" (TI 19, 10; FCF, 178-203).

My reading of the Christology of FCF, then, understands it as not about the business of redescribing the particular identity of Jesus Christ. This Rahner leaves to the exegetes and the historians who construct an "ascending Christology" (FCF, 177).25 FCF is not trying to be another Church Dogmatics with its small

25 Although Rahner no doubt thought of an ascending Christology as based upon some form of historical reconstruction his remarks suggest that there is plenty of room for a narrative approach to redescribing the particular identity of Jesus Christ.

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print exegesis, and cannot fairly be compared with it. Nor is FCF a Summa Theologiae, but is closer to the Compendium of Theology (see FCF, 2). Perhaps it is closer still in some ways to Barth's Epistle to the Romans. For in its own distinctive way FCF tries to challenge those assumptions of the day which function as conditions unsuitable to the preservation of a Christian given. In Rahner's situation the given to be preserved is not so much the Otherness of God as the fact that Jesus Christ is a constitutive element of all aspects of human life, who is ignored at our peril.

In this reading of FCF, Rahner's transcendental Christology is consistent with his assumption concerning the logical indispensability of the particularity of Jesus Christ. The logic of his Christological argument does not move from the general to the particular. Rather it proceeds from the particularity of Jesus as "the basic and decisive point of departure, of course" (FCF, 177). It then moves on to "generalize" Christ in such a way that all reality is absorbed by him.26 This broad apologetics is practical theology: its point is to help those who believe in Jesus Christ let their encounter with him transform all aspects of their lives.

Admittedly the attempt to universalize Jesus can easily lead to Christological and other distortions. But perhaps here too, as Hans Frei once remarked, we have to cut our losses.27 To do so becomes "theologically disastrous ", according to Frei, only "if it means either a complete elimination of philosophy as an issue and a means for reflection in Christian theology, or a pathetic obeisance to philosophy as the master key to certainty about all reason and certainty, and therefore to the shape or possibility of Christian theology" (Frei 31f. ) . Neither alternative, I have argued, is true of Rahner.

26 For a sophisticated discussion of the notion of absorbing non-Christianspecific truth into the Christian framework, see Bruce Marshall, "Absorbing the World: Christianity and the Universe of Truths ", in Bruce Marshall, ed., Theology and Dialogue (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1990).

27 Hans Frei, "Barth and Schleiermacher: Divergence and Convergence ", in James 0. Duke and Robert F. Streetman, edd., Barth and Schleiermacher:

Beyond the Impasse? (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988).

KARL RAHNER AS AN AD HOC APOLOGIST 633

Conclusion

In the foregoing I have tried to sketch a way of reading Rahner's apologetics which proceeds from the perspective of his remarks on the indirect methods. Even in his large-scale works and in his use of the transcendental method, I have suggested, Rahner can be understood to operate in accordance with the norms of ad hoc apologetic method. I have also tried to indicate that in these large-scale works, especially FCF, we have a broad version of ad hoc apologetics which, if used with a different conceptuality, might be an example for apologists in the North American situation to follow in their attempt to get beyond the impasse of revisionist versus post-liberal apologetics.28

28 I'd like to thank James Buckley, Bruce Marshall, Russell Reno and Kendall Soulen for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.