The Thomist 61 (1997): 605-15
THE ROLE OF THE ORDINARY MAGISTERIUM: ON FRANCIS SULLIVAN'S
CREATIVE FIDELITY(1)
Livio Melina
Pontificia Università Lateranense
Rome, Italy
THERE WAS A TIME, before the Second Vatican Council, when there were manuals of ecclesiology and canon law, and even specific handbooks, that offered sound criteria for determining the "theological notes" relative to the doctrinal affirmations and teachings of the Magisterium. These works clarified the type of assent required on the part of the faithful, the censure foreseen for whoever denied them, and the sin such people incurred. Cartechini, Salaverri, Schmaus, Choupin, to cite only the most authoritative and widespread manuals, offered such criteria, explanations, and examples for identifying, according to the widest variety of nuances, what was "dogma fidei" ("de fide," "de fide catholica," "de fide divina et catholica"), "de fide ecclesiastica definita," "de fide divina," "proxima fidei," "theologice certum," "doctrina catholica," "certum," "commune et certum," "moraliter certum," "securum seu tutum," "communius," "communissimum," "probabilius," "probabile." With these objective points of reference theological inquiry could develop within the limits of tradition and of a consensus among the experts, becoming as complicated as one could imagine, yet
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without running the risk of casting doubt on the structure of Catholic doctrine.
Certainly these were different times: theology was confined to scholastic debates, undertaken in Latin among a few specialists; the context of substantial reception of the teachings of the Magisterium and a common philosophical and methodological system offered a solid basis for dialogue and discussion on individual points. Sometimes the deliberation of the theological notes seemed to be an exercise of academic hairsplitting, posing no threat to the faith.
There is no need to say how radically the theological context has changed. The disputes have passed from the theology of the school to the doctrine of the Magisterium, from the ecclesiastical academy to the mass media, taking full account of public opinion and the life of the faithful. The hermeneutical perspective first developed in the field of the interpretation of Sacred Scripture has been applied to the interpretation of the tradition of the Magisterium of the Church. The historical awareness of changes in conceptions and in practical orientations urges that what is handed down receive new verification. The demand for autonomy and for scientific scholarship in theological research, making it comparable to any other university discipline, tends to counterpose itself to the very idea of a Magisterium doctrinally binding once and for all.
It was in this context-and consequently with excellent reason-that the Council of the Faculty of Theology of the Gregorian University of Rome, quite some time ago, asked Professor Francis A. Sullivan, S.J., to hold for the students who were candidates for the licentiate a course on the fundamental criteria of evaluation and interpretation of magisterial documents. In what way are we to live out today the permanent need of referral to the Magisterium without sacrificing the creativity of theological research? Sullivan's book, which substantially relates lectures given first in Rome and then at Boston College, offers a reply that intends to follow in the footsteps of the manual tradition, while at the same time opening it to present applications of theology, in the manner of Karl Rahner and Avery
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Dulles and, above all, following the great inspiration of John Henry Cardinal Newman.
The essay that has now been offered to the general public is at once invaluable and unfortunately misleading. Its undeniable value derives first of all from the wealth of information and documentation that it contains, a mark of the great competence acquired by the author in long years of research and teaching. The historical perspective of the reading of the sources and the hermeneutical approach undeniably recommends the work and offers valid examples of an interpretative labor. Compared with the radical tendencies unfortunately present today in Catholic theology, the tone appears balanced and sensible. On pages 119-21, citing both Rahner and Dulles, the author recognizes the right and need of the Magisterium to protect the common profession of faith, affixing the limits of theological pluralism.
Nevertheless, as has been said, the volume merits some reservations, even grave ones, both in its general perspective, which tends to be misleading, and in some specific points.
I. A Misleading and Reductionist Perspective
The general spirit in which the learned treatment of the subject is conducted is seen in the second chapter, in the critique that Sullivan makes of the Catechism of the Catholic Church. The Catechism presents the teaching of the Church as "a sure norm for the faith" in 2865 paragraphs, but does not offer criteria for distinguishing the level of different authority of respective doctrines. Above all, in Sullivan's opinion paragraph 88, which speaks of the exercise of the magisterial authority of the Church, does not make a distinction between the dogmas contained in revelation and that truth not revealed but only connected with revelation which can be the object of infallibly proposed affirmations but cannot claim an irrevocable assent of faith (17-18). The author hopes that the final revision of the Latin text, promised by Cardinal Ratzinger, will also touch on this point, expressly signifying the type of response required of the faithful following the diverse levels of authority which the doctrines
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taught in the Catechism enjoy. Careful theological research would need to identify these articulations in all their nuances. This book intends precisely to offer criteria for making such distinctions. Furthermore, the author wishes to base his project on the new formulation of the Professio fidei proposed by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1989, interpreted in the perspective of an exact delimitation of the conditions of infallibility.
The author begins then from an extremely rigorous definition of the term "dogma." "Dogmatic definition" refers to a truth divinely revealed, proclaimed with a solemn judgment, that requires an irrevocable response of faith and excludes the opposite proposition as heretical (41). The accent put on the fact that a dogma needs to be proposed as divinely revealed in order to be able to claim the assent of faith tends to obscure what the Second Vatican Council deliberately anticipated, which is that the Church can define doctrines without proposing them as divinely revealed (cf. Mansi 52, 7, B). The distinction made in the second paragraph of the Professio fidei thus becomes, in Sullivan's interpretation by means of the category of "dogma," the source of a first reduction. The emphasis on the fact that the so-called secondary object of the Magisterium cannot exact an irrevocable assent of faith, in as much as it is not a matter of truth divinely revealed, obscures the necessity of an acceptance and a firm reception of that which nevertheless is proposed in a definitive manner. The theological discussion of the type of assent needed does not in fact negate the characteristic of irrevocability with which the teaching must be received.
The underlining of the solemn nature of the judgment required so that one can speak in the proper sense of dogma opens the way to a weakening of that which is proposed by the ordinary universal Magisterium of the Church as considered to be definitive (cf. 43, 103). The second paragraph of the Professio fidei speaks of how much is proposed as definitive: a doctrine can be proposed in a definitive way by the ordinary universal Magisterium even without being put in the form of a solemn judgment. In such a case, in line with the doctrine of Lumen
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gentium 25, 2, the infallibility of the Church is involved. Indeed, it is rightly observed that "this ordinary Magisterium is the normal form of the infallibility of the Church" (J. Ratzinger, Il nuovo popolo di Dio [Brescia,197l], 180).
The fundamental limit of Sullivan's position on the entire question of the infallibility of the ordinary universal Magisterium and on the interpretation of the second paragraph of the Professio fidei is his way of understanding the concept of "definition," which does not take into account the distinction between the act of definition and the doctrine taught as definitive. It is true that the two notions can be simultaneously presented in a magisterial pronouncement (as in the case of a solemn judgment) but that does not necessarily always happen. In fact, "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditur vel tenetur" can be taught infallibly as a definitive judgment with an act of the ordinary Magisterium of the Supreme Pontiff without resorting to the form of a solemn definition (cf. Paul VI's Credo [1968]).
This is properly the case of such encyclicals as Casti connubi on the unlawfulness of onanism, Humanae vitae on the unlawfulness of contraception; Evangelium vitae on the unlawfulness of direct killing of an innocent human being, of procured abortion, and of euthanasia; and the apostolic letters Ordinatio sacerdotalis on the non-admission of women to the priestly ministry and Apostolicae curae on the non-validity of Anglican orders.
If, in fact, the Pope intervened with a solemn dogmatic definition in order to proclaim the certainty of a doctrine constantly proposed as definitive by the universal tradition of the Church, this would carry implicitly a depreciation of the ordinary universal Magisterium and infallibility would be reserved only for the "ex cathedra" definitions of the pope and for the those of an ecumenical council. Furthermore, one must affirm that the decisive verification and confirmation that a doctrine is taught as definitive comes from the Magisterium itself, and in particular the Magisterium of the pope as head of the episcopal college that gives voice to the whole episcopal body.
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Instead, according to Sullivan, this definitive character that necessarily characterizes the proposal of the ordinary Magisterium must be verified by means of "the universal and constant consensus of Catholic theologians." Moreover, since in the Code of Canon Law of 1983 (can. 749, 3) it is affirmed that "no doctrine is understood to be infallibly defined unless this fact is clearly established" (cf. 106), the infallible character itself is limited to that which is made the object of a solemn judgment or else to that which the constant and universal consensus of theologians holds to belong to the definitive doctrine proposed by the ordinary universal Magisterium of the Church. The role of the theologian becomes decisive and discriminating, according to Sullivan, for establishing that to which the faithful owe an irrevocable assent of faith.
II. Some Specific Points
The consensus of theologians and the reception on the part of the faithful shall be our beginning point in discussing the proposal of the celebrated Jesuit theologian. Clearly he plans to place the theme of the Magisterium in a wider ecclesiological context, which allows his proposal to be compared to other suggestions that have been made among the people of God. In a much more radical way Father Sullivan's confrere, John Mahoney, had outlined an overcoming of the rigid distinction between the teaching Church and dissenting Church and an introduction of the idea of a diffuse Magisterium that would be realized as the harmony of the diverse authorities of pastors, theologians, and the faithful, in which alone the fundamental authority of the Spirit in the Church would be manifested (cf. J. Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology, A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition [Oxford, 1987], in particular chap. 4, pp. 116-74; and chap. 8, pp. 302-47).
Regarding this first theme, based on the letter of Pius IX to the Archbishop of Monaco on 21 December 1863 (Tuas libenter), Sullivan believes that one may find in the "universal and constant consensus of the catholic theologians" the decisive criteria for
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determining how much belongs to the ordinary Magisterium of the whole Church (99). Aside from the fact that, following the criteria proposed by Sullivan himself, such a pontifical letter need not to pertain to the infallible Magisterium, but if anything to the ordinary Magisterium of the Supreme Pontiff, and besides would need to be hermeneutically interpreted in a context in which the expression "universal and constant consensus of the catholic theologians" had a completely different meaning, it seems to me important to note that in the text of the letter the consensus of the theologians is evoked with a disjunctive and consecutive conjunction (ideoque, "and therefore") after it is recalled "how much is transmitted as divinely revealed by the ordinary Magisterium of the whole Church dispersed throughout the world."
Such a consensus is therefore if anything the consequence that would necessarily follow, rather than the hermeneutical criterion that would identify, the ordinary Magisterium. Otherwise would there not be a risk, perhaps, of emptying of meaning the very concept of the ordinary Magisterium, whose verification would be entrusted to a contemporary theological consensus, in the fragmented plurality of languages which would make it almost impossible, and subject to changes in time? The possibility of the advent of something unforeseen, in the changing of cultural horizons, would not permit anything to be affirmed in the present with irreformable certainty (cf. 106-7). It seems obvious to me that Pius IX meant by "catholic theologians" those approved by the church and belonging to its tradition and not simply some scholars that accredit themselves with this title. The constancy and universality would then need to be not simply simultaneous but also diachronic. The association of the question of monogenism with that of the prohibition of contraception seems to me to be particularly wanton, and misleading (104-5).
As for the reception on the part of the faithful, Sullivan presents it as a key element for verifying the definitiveness of a conciliar judgment (43), and of a pontifical teaching (88). Notwithstanding the tentative subtleties adduced in explanation of this proposal, it is not clear how it is in accord with the
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affirmation of the First Vatican Council, according to which those definitions are irreformable in which the Roman Pontiff enjoys infallibility "ex sese, non autem ex consensus Ecclesiae" (DS 3074). On this point Sullivan's exposition would have profitted on both the historical and the dogmatic levels by a critical confrontation with the short and lucid work of an author certainly agreeable to him: Newman's On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine (ed. T. Coulson; London, 1986). The great English cardinal explains that the faithful are the subject of a sensus fidei doctrinally relevant insofar as they are Ecclesia docta. So they express the voice of tradition which testifies to the patrimony of faith lived in the Church. The consensus fidelium is therefore a mirror in which is faithfully reflected what the pastors have always taught. The consultation or reception is not therefore a democratic procedure or a sociologically determined verification, but the testimony of the tradition that has its principle of authoritative discernment in the authentic Magisterium.
A second point regards the place of moral truth within the Magisterium. On the one hand our author limits the expression of the second paragraph of the Professio fidei "circa doctrinam de fide vel moribus" to those moral truths that are necessarily connected with the deposit of faith, thus excluding the natural law as such from that which can be the subject of infallible definition (cf. 18, 81, 158-59). He is thus forced to distinguish between the infallible Magisterium and the authentic Magisterium on the basis not so much of the act but of the object (cf. 18, 42). On the other hand, Sullivan distinguishes between "principles" and "practical applications." Even that authority which governs the teaching of the principles would have to allow room for personal discernment in concrete applications, in respect of which the value of the pronouncements of the pastors would only be of a disciplinary nature (l7l-72).
Concerning the former point, based on the tradition of the Church, revived by Paul VI in Humanae vitae no. 4, it is certain that the Church can also authentically teach the particular norms of natural morality in as much as there is an objectively necessary
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relationship between their observance and the salvation of man. Furthermore, the foundation of such a magisterial competence of the Church is the fact that these things are necessarily included in the revelation that is Christ, the new Adam.
As to the distinction between the principles and applicative norms, John Paul II has clearly affirmed: "this law [natural morality] is not only made up of general orientations, whose precision in their respective contents is conditioned by varied and changeable historical situations. There are moral norms which have a precise content that is immutable and unconditioned . . . the norm that prohibits contraception and that which forbids the killing of the innocent human person, for example. To deny that norms having such a value do exist can be held only by one who denies that there is a truth of the person, an immutable nature of man" (Discourse of April 10, 1986: AAS 78/1986, p. l101). The encyclical Veritatis splendor has clearly confirmed that the Magisterium, as authentic interpreter of revelation, has the authority to teach determinate moral norms as valid without exception (cf. nn. 71-83, 115). Moreover, it is not at all clear how one can, as does the author, accept the teaching of Evangelium vitae concerning the grave immorality of the direct killing of an innocent human being, of acquired abortion, and of euthanasia, and, even more, recognize it as infallible teaching because it pertains to the ordinary universal Magisterium, and then practically denude it of any obligatory force, relegating it to something that concerns only principles, but leaves open the possibility of diversified applications (154-61).
A third specific point merits attention: that of the value of the ordinary teaching of the Pope and of the declarations of the Roman congregations. Sullivan states that only rarely have the popes had recourse to the exercise of infallibility (cf. 2, 86). Their role has been rather that of supporting and confirming the authority of the great councils that have dogmatically defined the faith of the Church. On the other hand the ordinary Magisterium of the Pope and of the Roman congregations, which participate in the former's authority, wouId have a predominantly prudential character (146, l60). This is the final fruit of the initial
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concentration on dogmatic infallibility: only in the face of that which is clearly defined as dogma and therefore as truth proposed as belonging to the faith does one have to make a decision between a yes and a no; in the face of teaching that is simply authentic but not infallible the question is only one of "certainty" or of "uncertainty" and thus of prudence. In the tenth chapter Sullivan gives a long and detailed list of historical cases in which the ordinary Magisterium of the Pope has erred, claiming to show thus the disciplinary and pastoral nature of its affirmations.
Finally, a word on the appendix to the book, in which Sullivan questions precisely what is taught in the Responsum ad dubium of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on the doctrine of Ordinatio sacerdotalis. In order to do this he lowers the level of the teaching to that referred to in the third paragraph of the Professio fidei, and, therefore, reduces the assent needed to a simple submission of intellect and will, when in fact it is a matter of a firm and definitive assent, founded on the faith in the action of the Holy Spirit in the Church and on the catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the Magisterium (cf. Declaration Mysterium ecclesiae no. 3, sec. 3).
III. Concluding Observations
In the end, the title of Sullivan's book does not seem to correspond adequately to its expressed substance: the adjective ("creative") is no longer a dimension that derives from fidelity but rather a substantive that is emancipated from it, that earns for itself an ever-increasing area of appropriation through an ever-more rigorous delimiting of the obligating value of the Magisterium. The Magisterium and the creative liberty of the theologian are seen as tending to be opposed, and the "charitable duty" of the theologian would be that of seeking to defend the faithful from the exorbitant claims of the Magisterium through the work of distinctions, delimitations, and hermeneutics.
It seems to me that the debatable consequences put forth in the completed analysis derive ultimately from a restricted, reductionist, and potentially misleading perspective that has
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governed the development of the topic--although we must not deny the value of this treatment. The concentration on the category of infallibility and of dogma has opened the way to a minimalization of the Magisterium, interpreted in a juridical key. In practice the defense of the freedom of the faithful is seen as a rigid delimiting of the binding character of teaching to those things of which the Magisterium speaks with the title of infallibility. Beyond this there would tend to be only an authority of a prudential sort, relative to expediency and not the truth.
In this way the vision of the unity of that auctoritas that constitutes the original gift of Magisterium in the Church and for the Church is lost (cf. J. Ratzinger, Natura e compito della teologia [Milan, 1993], 97-100). How could we see a strong relationship in a son who said to his father or a young man who said to his bride-to-be: "I will only believe you when you solemnly swear to me on the Bible that you are not lying to me"? Analytical distinctions are valuable only within a greater context, otherwise concentration on them destroys the vital synthesis (losing the forest for the trees). Authority is that charism that makes life grow in truth. It is realized as a complete and ordinary phenomenon, before distinctions and formal and solemn expressions. The loss of this basic and fundamental dimension runs the risk of reducing the discussions on the Magisterium to a dry and minimalistic juridical formalism. Its recovery allows us to focus on the ordinary exercise of the universal Magisterium as the normal dimension of the charism of infallibility, and welcomes also the ordinary Magisterium of the Pope as the authoritative witness of the head of the college of this same Magisterium.
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1. Francis A. Sullivan, S.J., Creative Fidelity: Weighing and Interpreting Documents of the Magisterium (New York and Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1996). Pp. 209. $14.95 (paper). ISBN 0-8091-3644-9.
This article was translated by Bethany Lane.